7 ms·

You're using it wrong. SafetyNet is able to assert that the build the device asserts is what it claims. After you know that, it's up to you to decide whether yo

You're using it wrong. SafetyNet is able to assert that the build the device asserts is what it claims. After you know that, it's up to you to decide whether you trust communications from that build or not. If it's a known-insecure build, you can say that you don't. SafetyNet cannot assert that a third party ROM is what it claims to be, so you have to decide whether you trust communications from that device or not based on not knowing at all what build is on the device.

realusername 3y ago
Then you are back to square one pretty much since the safetynet result doesn't tell you anything about the security of the device.
wmf 3y ago
Does anyone use SafetyNet "right"? I assume not due to the user outcry issue.
- lern_too_spel 3y ago
  Most (all?) corporate endpoint security systems use it right in my experience. Even when using it right, you would have to block third party builds and cause outcry. You would additionally block some builds that SafetyNet (or Play Integrity) attests.
  - franga2000 3y ago
    > Even when using it right, you would have to block third party builds Unless you have an obvious and accessible way of getting secure third party builds whitelisted, this is still a very anti-user approach, which is not justifiable unless the user of the device isn't its owner (like with company-owned work phones).
    - lern_too_spel 3y ago
      That's up to the service to decide on the appropriate level of security risk in whether they allow unknown builds. They already don't allow custom builds on any other mobile OS, so this is really the best you can get as a user. What is your proposed solution?
      - justinclift 3y ago
        > They already don't allow custom builds on any other mobile OS ... Keep in mind that Pinephones and similar are a thing. Lots of people are hoping they don't fizzle out and die off like previous "open" phone projects. :)
        lern_too_spel 3y ago
        And Pinephones and similar don't have apps for these services that require attestation and never will. If some allow web access without build attestation, that works on custom Android builds as well.
      - Dylan16807 3y ago
        > What is your proposed solution? Ban attestation methods that owners can't control.
        hoffs 3y ago
        What does that even mean? It sounds like your proposal makes attestation pointless since owner can attest in whatever way they want.
        Dylan16807 3y ago
        It only makes it pointless for DRM purposes. If a company wants control over devices they own, that's still fine.
        lern_too_spel 3y ago
        So regulation. I can get into that. Until such regulation exists, phone manufacturers have no incentive to maintain different SKUs.
  - realusername 3y ago
    > Most (all?) corporate endpoint security systems use it right in my experience. I've never seen a usage of Safetynet which I would consider right, pretty much everybody thinks it creates some kind of "security" whereas it doesn't. One very rare useful usage for it could be removing bots for game leaderboards but certainly not banking apps.
ori_b 3y ago
In other words, it's virtually impossible to use right without also being the entity that hands out phones to users.
- lern_too_spel 3y ago
  Potentially, a manufacturer could make a multibuild phone where the user could switch between an attested build and a non-attested build and have access to services whose security requires attestation with just a reboot. Otherwise, you would use different devices for different purposes, as I do today. It's unfortunate, but if you really need something that isn't supported by the existing Android APIs, that's the only way.
  - ori_b 3y ago
    Or, just don't do remote attestation. The cure is worse than the disease.
    - simbolit 3y ago
      That is viable in 2023. Think about "don't use a smartphone" in 2013. That was viable back then. It isn't anymore. What you can do is live smartphone-lite, using it only as a secondary device (as grandparent suggested). The same will be true in a couple years (if the big G is successful). Until, then, yea, don't use it, actively campaign against it.
      - thefurdrake 3y ago
        If this happens the way google wants, I'll have to have a separate physical box set up specifically to access google's shiternet for things like banking and shopping. I'd be glad to stick to websites that have no need or interest for WEI otherwise. The internet was already going increasingly-downhill anyway. thisisfine.png
    - lern_too_spel 3y ago
      Good luck convincing corp security to allow you to use your device on your corporate network without remote attestation.
deleted 3y ago
[deleted]
lxgr 3y ago
> so you have to decide whether you trust communications from that device "You" in this scenario being, most likely, an engineer at a large, regulated, risk-averse corporation that might have to justify this choice during an audit. What would your decision be?

realusername 3y ago

Then you are back to square one pretty much since the safetynet result doesn't tell you anything about the security of the device.

wmf 3y ago

Does anyone use SafetyNet "right"? I assume not due to the user outcry issue.

lern_too_spel 3y ago
Most (all?) corporate endpoint security systems use it right in my experience. Even when using it right, you would have to block third party builds and cause outcry. You would additionally block some builds that SafetyNet (or Play Integrity) attests.
- franga2000 3y ago
  > Even when using it right, you would have to block third party builds Unless you have an obvious and accessible way of getting secure third party builds whitelisted, this is still a very anti-user approach, which is not justifiable unless the user of the device isn't its owner (like with company-owned work phones).
  - lern_too_spel 3y ago
    That's up to the service to decide on the appropriate level of security risk in whether they allow unknown builds. They already don't allow custom builds on any other mobile OS, so this is really the best you can get as a user. What is your proposed solution?
    - justinclift 3y ago
      > They already don't allow custom builds on any other mobile OS ... Keep in mind that Pinephones and similar are a thing. Lots of people are hoping they don't fizzle out and die off like previous "open" phone projects. :)
      - lern_too_spel 3y ago
        And Pinephones and similar don't have apps for these services that require attestation and never will. If some allow web access without build attestation, that works on custom Android builds as well.
    - Dylan16807 3y ago
      > What is your proposed solution? Ban attestation methods that owners can't control.
      - hoffs 3y ago
        What does that even mean? It sounds like your proposal makes attestation pointless since owner can attest in whatever way they want.
        Dylan16807 3y ago
        It only makes it pointless for DRM purposes. If a company wants control over devices they own, that's still fine.
      - lern_too_spel 3y ago
        So regulation. I can get into that. Until such regulation exists, phone manufacturers have no incentive to maintain different SKUs.
- realusername 3y ago
  > Most (all?) corporate endpoint security systems use it right in my experience. I've never seen a usage of Safetynet which I would consider right, pretty much everybody thinks it creates some kind of "security" whereas it doesn't. One very rare useful usage for it could be removing bots for game leaderboards but certainly not banking apps.

ori_b 3y ago

In other words, it's virtually impossible to use right without also being the entity that hands out phones to users.

lern_too_spel 3y ago
Potentially, a manufacturer could make a multibuild phone where the user could switch between an attested build and a non-attested build and have access to services whose security requires attestation with just a reboot. Otherwise, you would use different devices for different purposes, as I do today. It's unfortunate, but if you really need something that isn't supported by the existing Android APIs, that's the only way.
- ori_b 3y ago
  Or, just don't do remote attestation. The cure is worse than the disease.
  - simbolit 3y ago
    That is viable in 2023. Think about "don't use a smartphone" in 2013. That was viable back then. It isn't anymore. What you can do is live smartphone-lite, using it only as a secondary device (as grandparent suggested). The same will be true in a couple years (if the big G is successful). Until, then, yea, don't use it, actively campaign against it.
    - thefurdrake 3y ago
      If this happens the way google wants, I'll have to have a separate physical box set up specifically to access google's shiternet for things like banking and shopping. I'd be glad to stick to websites that have no need or interest for WEI otherwise. The internet was already going increasingly-downhill anyway. thisisfine.png
  - lern_too_spel 3y ago
    Good luck convincing corp security to allow you to use your device on your corporate network without remote attestation.

deleted 3y ago

[deleted]

lxgr 3y ago

> so you have to decide whether you trust communications from that device "You" in this scenario being, most likely, an engineer at a large, regulated, risk-averse corporation that might have to justify this choice during an audit. What would your decision be?