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Identity provider’s signing keys are probably the most powerful secrets in the modern world. For example, they are much more powerful than TLS keys. They are
by userbinator 3y ago
Identity provider’s signing keys are probably the most powerful secrets in the modern world. For example, they are much more powerful than TLS keys.
They are in many ways equivalent to certificate authoritities' keys.
Organizations using Microsoft and Azure services should take steps to assess potential impact.
People don't seem to know that old saying about not putting all your eggs in one basket anymore.
- SoftTalker 3y agoYep my employer is all-in on Office 365, Teams, the whole thing. I have a supply of popcorn ready for when it all comes crashing down. One thing I know is they won't blame themselves.
- notimetorelax 3y agoI’m with you on that I prefer not to use MS tech. That said, you might be creating an unhealthy dynamic for yourself by expecting it all crash and burn down. Objectively, MS tech still gets the job done.
- croes 3y agoDoesn't matter if they get the job done if one big mistake can hurt millions of people it a bad idea. Mono culture is always a bad idea and thinks like MS cloud services are the basis for creating a technical pandemic.
- blowski 3y agoAh yes, I long for the halcyon days of IT stability… oh wait, business has always been fraught with risk and trade-offs. You get insurance, put mitigations in place, and hope when it does go bad, you can blame Microsoft anyway.
- croes 3y agoEver heard of single point of failure. Yes, you can hack every company but he have to target them one by one. Now you only need to take down MS
- notimetorelax 3y agoI understand your point, but the probability math works against you as the number of platforms grows, unless you have excellent data segregation and access controls. What happens in most cases, each new platform serves as an attack vector to be exploited to gain access to all of the data.
- croes 3y agoAnd now you data segregation and access controls are worthless because you need Azure AD for SSO. The expected value rises.
- Obscurity4340 3y agoI, too, long for Halcyon days.
- vladvasiliu 3y ago> Objectively, MS tech still gets the job done Mostly, if you don't have too high expectations. My employer has had to invest I don't even want to know how much in an EDR (or whatever it's called nowadays) and a slew of services around this circus just to pretend their Windows systems are secure. Didn't catch a home-grown cryptolocker, though, and happily allowed it to encrypt its own files. They mostly use web-bases SAAS applications anyway, so could trivially replace windows with an OS with a better security track record. Plus, AzureAD always seemed kludgy. Until recently, they insisted on having SMS or phone as a second factor for password recovery. Which allowed you to reset the stronger 2nd factor used for auth. They only started supporting Fido tokens like a year or so ago for regular 2fa. Their authenticator is a joke: until recently, you had no idea what you were approving. It still doesn't support group inheritance, so if you base it on your local AD as the source of truth, you have to jump through more hoops and add more ad-hoc groups and maintain them. Good times.
- blackoil 3y agoMake sure they have long enough expiry.
- mschuster91 3y ago> One thing I know is they won't blame themselves. Which is precisely why they went all in on Microsoft Cloud. Using an in-house stack (no matter if it's Jira, Confluence, Exchange, AD, Postfix, Exim, OpenLDAP, Samba, ...) will always lead to people blaming the C level for any outage, hack, whatever. Miss one tiny little patch and insurance won't pay. Go for Atlassian Cloud/Microsoft/AWS/GCP? You can now deflect any blame onto the cloud provider. No personal liability, nothing. You followed industry best practices, so insurance pays out.
- themoonisachees 3y agoFrom the point of view of the employer it's stupid not to put all your eggs in one basket. For $10 a month per account, you get email (unless you have thousands of accounts, this is already worth it), instant messages and a softphone solution, office tools that you needed to buy anyway, and centralized user management for it all. All alternatives involve either still contracting it out to a probably les competent team, or hosting it in house at significant cost. On top of that, the day it all crashes down and burns their business to the ground, insurance pays out because it was cretified and wasn't an in-house solution that the insurer can point at and drag you to court with.
- ChatGTP 3y agoHow can you avoid it though? There are basically 4 tech companies now?
- Xeamek 3y ago>People don't seem to know that old saying about not putting all your eggs in one basket anymore. Probably because by the time this saying was forged, there wasn't this big push from chickens to integrate as many features as possible and improve their functionality and QoL that's only avaible when you do put all the eggs in the same place
- Roark66 3y agoExactly... People just don't learn. For example currently there is a huge number of companies here in Poland that are migrating all of their cloud apps to GCP (Google cloud) from AWS. Why? Because Google has opened a region in Poland. AWS has live customer support you can ring (if you pay for it) and frequently as a client you get an account manager you can call in case of trouble and that person has direct access to support teams. These support peoole can actually fix stuff for you. Back in the day I've handled lots of support cases like this. Google on their website claims they also offer live support, but I read enough stories with headlines like "Google deleted my business overnight and there's no one to talk to" to question it's usefulness. I haven't had a chance to deal with Google's GCP support yet so I don't know how good or bad it might be, but I had a couple of support cases raised for other products (play store, book publishing etc) and it was obvious people that work there can't really do anything if stuff breaks. They're there just for Google to be able to say "we too have live support" and to tell you how to do stuff in lieu of documentation. When stuff breaks... You get an email "we're escalating it _to_developers_" to never hear from them again (or you get an email every month asking you if the issue is still ongoing) So I think it is the biggest case of "putting all your eggs in one basket" I saw in a while. If anyone has contrary experience of GCP support I'd love to hear it.
- victor106 3y agoWhile I was always suspicious of using “Google” for any critical business purposes, I have also learnt that “Google” the search engine is different than “Google Cloud” the internal division within “Google” that runs GCP. I am yet to see any examples of “Google Cloud” shutting down services on their own whim or not providing a human custom service agents.
- crote 3y agoIf these keys are so important, why are they not treated with similar security measures as CA keys? Why is it just a handful of keys shared by dozens, hundreds, or likely even thousands of servers? Where is the HSM-backed root key, per-DC intermediate, and per-server transient signing key? Where is the certificate revocation list? Is it even possible to secure a bearer token from an attack like this? Should we go back to a nonce which we present to the originating service to securely retrieve the payload?
- vladvasiliu 3y agoIt's not clear to me why there aren't more signing keys. After all, the public part is exposed at an URL you can retrieve whenever you're verifying the token. I've seen service provider implementations where the access token is exchanged for a cookie or other similar token, in which case you can't really do anything about it anymore for the lifetime of the cookie. But if you're always verifying the access token with a reasonably short cached key list, the service provider should be able to refuse the token reasonably quickly once the key is no longer advertised.
- ThomasRooney 3y agoAnecdotally, I ran an experiment with Envoy to see how far the number of signing keys could scale. This was for a B2B “API Key” auth solution; we wanted user keys to be self revocable, but just be a relatively standard JWT format for maintainability. The hypothesis was that, rather than running a whitelist or blacklist, we could improve the security signature by have 1 signing key for each JWT. When we ran some stress tests, turned out Envoy could happily run with ~300K signing keys in its JWK Set before noticeable service degradation occurred. Even then, by bumping up the memory on the validation servers, there was a small sacrifice of a few ms per extra 100K keys. This makes me fully agree that, for many applications, there’s probably an opportunity to vastly improve the security surface by bumping up the number of signing keys dramatically. As long as both Keys and Signing keys define a KID, key verification is prefaced only by a hash table lookup or a tight loop through a keyset to find the appropriate Signing Key, before the slower verification procedure.
- tinus_hn 3y agoSo how would you suggest to spread the eggs? Just use another party that wouldn’t have lost their key?
- bob1029 3y agoWhich is easier to secure? One big chicken coop, or many smaller chicken coops scattered across the ranch?
- Thiez 3y agoAssuming square coops, four small coops have literally double the attack surface compared to one big coop of equal total area. The ratio only gets worse when you divide them up further. The impact of a breach may be less for many small coops, but breaches will happen more often as well.
- smegsicle 3y agowhat's the threat model?
- tinus_hn 3y agoSo what do you suggest doing to turn it into ‘many smaller chicken coops’ and how is it more secure?