6 ms·

This is true in the US and Canada as well.

H8crilA 3y ago
Crucially this is also true in Ukraine. The Ukrainian Air Force has found a new clever way to keep using normal air bases. After a hangar got bombed by cruise/ballistic missiles they would print a 1:1 aerial/satellite picture of the rubble, hang it over the actual rubble and then clean up under the print. It took quite a few weeks for the Russians to understand this ruse. The doctrine of always having air superiority in NATO (and thus not needing makeshift runways) is so far rather justified given the hilarious level of incompetence shown by the VKS. Although the RAF seems to be more anxious about it, they definitely know much more than me. We do need a lot more air defense though, it's clear that before the next NATO-Russia confrontation they will have a rich arsenal of flying trashcans like the Shahed, as well as some decent missiles.
- VWWHFSfQ 3y ago
  > After a hangar got bombed by cruise/ballistic missiles they would print a 1:1 aerial/satellite picture of the rubble, hang it over the actual rubble and then clean up under the print. It took quite a few weeks for the Russians to understand this ruse. This sounds very interesting! Any sources?
  - H8crilA 3y ago
    RUSI wrote about it, page 25 of this report: https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/preliminary-lessons-conventional-warfighting-russias-invasion-ukraine-february-july-2022 https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-r... BTW, if you like reading longer reports on the technical/military aspects of this war then I can recommend RUSI. I haven't seen a better source so far. They release a report every now and then.
    - wongarsu 3y ago
      Relevant quote from the report (the entire report seems extremely worth reading): A critical weakness of the Russian strike campaign was battle damage assessment. First, the Russian military appears to have presumed that if an action had been ordered and carried out then it had succeeded, unless there was direct evidence to the contrary. Evidence of success appears to have disproportionately relied on three data points: confirmation from pilots that they hit their target; confirmation from Russian satellites that a site showed damage; and confirmation from signals intelligence (SIGINT) that Ukrainians reported a strike and damage to their equipment. Russian satellite reconnaissance proved very limited, even though Russian survey space reconnaissance of Ukraine has been conducted since at least 2012, and detailed reconnaissance, in the interests of invasion planning, since mid-2021. A probable reason for this may be the insufficient number of satellites in the orbital grouping of the VKS and the overestimation of their technical capabilities. Indirect confirmation of this explanation is provided by the fact that the AFRF began buying additional satellite images of the territory of Ukraine and individual military facilities on the world market in April 2022. One of the visible failures of satellite intelligence is the inability to detect on time a significant volume of strategic railway movements by the UAF, which, in March 2022 amounted to three–four echelons per day. The poor Russian battle damage assessment process made the Russian military highly vulnerable to deception, which has been consistent throughout the conflict. Early strikes on Ukrainian airfields, for example, destroyed many hangars. By photographing this damage and printing the resulting pattern on to sheets, it became possible to clear the rubble and erect covers for aircraft to return to the site, sheltering in positions that the Russians would confirm as destroyed. This led – somewhat amusingly – to the Russians debating whether Ukrainian fighter aircraft were operating from subterranean shelters at several sites. Repeated strikes on dummy air-defence positions also saw a considerable wastage of ammunition, while Ukrainian troops could confirm that sites were destroyed over the radio even when they were still functioning, causing Russian aircraft to ignore air-defence systems in their mission planning. The already-publicly reported use of dummy HIMARS (high mobility artillery rocket system) later in the war to lure Russian fires is indicative of the systematic use of deception to ensure survivability by the UAF, and it has proven widely effective. The presumption of success caused the Russian military to take several unjustifiable risks in the disposition of its forces during the first 72 hours of the conflict. Aircraft did not fly with EW pods during the opening phase as they were not deemed necessary following the presumed success of the strike campaign. Similarly, Russian manoeuvre forces were not properly supported by air-defence units and Russian air-defence units were told to presume that aircraft were friendly. This enabled a significant number of ground-attack sorties by the Ukrainian Air Force, including using UAVs such as TB2, against Russian formations, even when they had attached air-defence units. Ukraine suffered aircraft losses in air-to-air engagements, however.
- Lukas_Skywalker 3y ago
  Boeing did a similar thing during WW2, and drew an entire city above a factory in Seattle. The article has some impressive pictures: https://99percentinvisible.org/article/prop-town-fake-rooftop-suburb-hid-whole-wwii-airplane-factory/ https://99percentinvisible.org/article/prop-town-fake-roofto...
- WeylandYutani 3y ago
  I immensely respect Ukraine but a US-China war would involve the best technology this planet has to offer and the Chinese have been preparing for it since the 1970s.
  - H8crilA 3y ago
    NATO is not involved with China directly. Some/many member countries probably will get involved if shit hits the fan, depending on why and how exactly it will happen, if it happens. But yeah you're right, national and collective defense strategies should not rely too much on VKS' weaknesses, that's not the only potential problem.
  - genmud 3y ago
    Maybe, their ambitions are definitely that they stand toe to toe with the US. However, the fact they are just now starting to issue body armor to their soldiers and have not had any real combat experience in the modern age might be difficult challenges to overcome. It's a lot different to push around your effectively unarmed neighbors than the US, who has been in large scale military conflicts since the 40's. To put it in perspective, the US spends over 800 billion dollars per year on the military. It's more than the next 10 countries, combined.
    - nradov 3y ago
      The official figures on China's military budget are total lies. What they actually spend on a PPP basis is now comparable to the USA. https://chinapower.csis.org/military-spending/ https://chinapower.csis.org/military-spending/
      - genmud 3y ago
        Hmm, well, if those are accurate numbers than the us spends more than the next 9 countries combined. Still, the us spends more than 2.5x per year than China.
phil21 3y ago
> This is true in the US As far as I could tell after a bar argument, this is more or less an urban legend[0]. While the referenced article only debunks the "Every 5 miles" myth, further (brief) reading led me to believe if there were ever any designed airstrips into the interstate system they were short-lived and likely very one-offish style programs. [0] - https://highways.dot.gov/public-roads/mayjune-2000/one-mile-five-debunking-myth https://highways.dot.gov/public-roads/mayjune-2000/one-mile-...
- aardvarkr 3y ago
  Instead the government funds thousands of unprofitable municipal airports to ensure that we have airstrips everywhere in case we were ever invaded
  - kunwon1 3y ago
    Are airports supposed to be profitable, or are they there to provide a service? Should airports that are not profitable be shut down? Does the public good factor into that decision? Sorry for offtopic, but I (evidently) got triggered by the inclusion of the word 'unprofitable' in your reply
    - leetcrew 3y ago
      I can see the value in operating airports at a loss in truly remote areas. sometimes it's the only way to maintain connectivity to the rest of the world. for example there are communities in alaska that are literally not connected to the contiguous US by road or train. but otherwise yes? I don't think airports like IAD should run at a loss. they are very expensive to operate and primarily serve commercial airlines. the gate fees and retail rents should absolutely offset that, and if they don't, the airport should be closed.
      - jacobr1 3y ago
        > should absolutely offset that, and if they don't, the airport should be closed. Or restructured to be profitable. IAD is a good example of where there is clearly enough demand and example of similar scale airports being run effectively. So if they are running at big losses (no idea, not something I've researched) then that to me implies bad management (or poor political constraints) rather a fundamental business model problem.
gte525u 3y ago
The US trains for this but I'm not sure it's needed domestically. FAA funds local and regional airports - there are plenty of airstrips all over that could accommodate a fighter or a C130.

Crucially this is also true in Ukraine. The Ukrainian Air Force has found a new clever way to keep using normal air bases. After a hangar got bombed by cruise/ballistic missiles they would print a 1:1 aerial/satellite picture of the rubble, hang it over the actual rubble and then clean up under the print. It took quite a few weeks for the Russians to understand this ruse. The doctrine of always having air superiority in NATO (and thus not needing makeshift runways) is so far rather justified given the hilarious level of incompetence shown by the VKS. Although the RAF seems to be more anxious about it, they definitely know much more than me. We do need a lot more air defense though, it's clear that before the next NATO-Russia confrontation they will have a rich arsenal of flying trashcans like the Shahed, as well as some decent missiles.

VWWHFSfQ 3y ago
> After a hangar got bombed by cruise/ballistic missiles they would print a 1:1 aerial/satellite picture of the rubble, hang it over the actual rubble and then clean up under the print. It took quite a few weeks for the Russians to understand this ruse. This sounds very interesting! Any sources?
- H8crilA 3y ago
  RUSI wrote about it, page 25 of this report: https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/preliminary-lessons-conventional-warfighting-russias-invasion-ukraine-february-july-2022 https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-r... BTW, if you like reading longer reports on the technical/military aspects of this war then I can recommend RUSI. I haven't seen a better source so far. They release a report every now and then.
  - wongarsu 3y ago
    Relevant quote from the report (the entire report seems extremely worth reading): A critical weakness of the Russian strike campaign was battle damage assessment. First, the Russian military appears to have presumed that if an action had been ordered and carried out then it had succeeded, unless there was direct evidence to the contrary. Evidence of success appears to have disproportionately relied on three data points: confirmation from pilots that they hit their target; confirmation from Russian satellites that a site showed damage; and confirmation from signals intelligence (SIGINT) that Ukrainians reported a strike and damage to their equipment. Russian satellite reconnaissance proved very limited, even though Russian survey space reconnaissance of Ukraine has been conducted since at least 2012, and detailed reconnaissance, in the interests of invasion planning, since mid-2021. A probable reason for this may be the insufficient number of satellites in the orbital grouping of the VKS and the overestimation of their technical capabilities. Indirect confirmation of this explanation is provided by the fact that the AFRF began buying additional satellite images of the territory of Ukraine and individual military facilities on the world market in April 2022. One of the visible failures of satellite intelligence is the inability to detect on time a significant volume of strategic railway movements by the UAF, which, in March 2022 amounted to three–four echelons per day. The poor Russian battle damage assessment process made the Russian military highly vulnerable to deception, which has been consistent throughout the conflict. Early strikes on Ukrainian airfields, for example, destroyed many hangars. By photographing this damage and printing the resulting pattern on to sheets, it became possible to clear the rubble and erect covers for aircraft to return to the site, sheltering in positions that the Russians would confirm as destroyed. This led – somewhat amusingly – to the Russians debating whether Ukrainian fighter aircraft were operating from subterranean shelters at several sites. Repeated strikes on dummy air-defence positions also saw a considerable wastage of ammunition, while Ukrainian troops could confirm that sites were destroyed over the radio even when they were still functioning, causing Russian aircraft to ignore air-defence systems in their mission planning. The already-publicly reported use of dummy HIMARS (high mobility artillery rocket system) later in the war to lure Russian fires is indicative of the systematic use of deception to ensure survivability by the UAF, and it has proven widely effective. The presumption of success caused the Russian military to take several unjustifiable risks in the disposition of its forces during the first 72 hours of the conflict. Aircraft did not fly with EW pods during the opening phase as they were not deemed necessary following the presumed success of the strike campaign. Similarly, Russian manoeuvre forces were not properly supported by air-defence units and Russian air-defence units were told to presume that aircraft were friendly. This enabled a significant number of ground-attack sorties by the Ukrainian Air Force, including using UAVs such as TB2, against Russian formations, even when they had attached air-defence units. Ukraine suffered aircraft losses in air-to-air engagements, however.
Lukas_Skywalker 3y ago
Boeing did a similar thing during WW2, and drew an entire city above a factory in Seattle. The article has some impressive pictures: https://99percentinvisible.org/article/prop-town-fake-rooftop-suburb-hid-whole-wwii-airplane-factory/ https://99percentinvisible.org/article/prop-town-fake-roofto...
WeylandYutani 3y ago
I immensely respect Ukraine but a US-China war would involve the best technology this planet has to offer and the Chinese have been preparing for it since the 1970s.
- H8crilA 3y ago
  NATO is not involved with China directly. Some/many member countries probably will get involved if shit hits the fan, depending on why and how exactly it will happen, if it happens. But yeah you're right, national and collective defense strategies should not rely too much on VKS' weaknesses, that's not the only potential problem.
- genmud 3y ago
  Maybe, their ambitions are definitely that they stand toe to toe with the US. However, the fact they are just now starting to issue body armor to their soldiers and have not had any real combat experience in the modern age might be difficult challenges to overcome. It's a lot different to push around your effectively unarmed neighbors than the US, who has been in large scale military conflicts since the 40's. To put it in perspective, the US spends over 800 billion dollars per year on the military. It's more than the next 10 countries, combined.
  - nradov 3y ago
    The official figures on China's military budget are total lies. What they actually spend on a PPP basis is now comparable to the USA. https://chinapower.csis.org/military-spending/ https://chinapower.csis.org/military-spending/
    - genmud 3y ago
      Hmm, well, if those are accurate numbers than the us spends more than the next 9 countries combined. Still, the us spends more than 2.5x per year than China.

phil21 3y ago

> This is true in the US As far as I could tell after a bar argument, this is more or less an urban legend[0]. While the referenced article only debunks the "Every 5 miles" myth, further (brief) reading led me to believe if there were ever any designed airstrips into the interstate system they were short-lived and likely very one-offish style programs. [0] - https://highways.dot.gov/public-roads/mayjune-2000/one-mile-five-debunking-myth https://highways.dot.gov/public-roads/mayjune-2000/one-mile-...

aardvarkr 3y ago
Instead the government funds thousands of unprofitable municipal airports to ensure that we have airstrips everywhere in case we were ever invaded
- kunwon1 3y ago
  Are airports supposed to be profitable, or are they there to provide a service? Should airports that are not profitable be shut down? Does the public good factor into that decision? Sorry for offtopic, but I (evidently) got triggered by the inclusion of the word 'unprofitable' in your reply
  - leetcrew 3y ago
    I can see the value in operating airports at a loss in truly remote areas. sometimes it's the only way to maintain connectivity to the rest of the world. for example there are communities in alaska that are literally not connected to the contiguous US by road or train. but otherwise yes? I don't think airports like IAD should run at a loss. they are very expensive to operate and primarily serve commercial airlines. the gate fees and retail rents should absolutely offset that, and if they don't, the airport should be closed.
    - jacobr1 3y ago
      > should absolutely offset that, and if they don't, the airport should be closed. Or restructured to be profitable. IAD is a good example of where there is clearly enough demand and example of similar scale airports being run effectively. So if they are running at big losses (no idea, not something I've researched) then that to me implies bad management (or poor political constraints) rather a fundamental business model problem.

gte525u 3y ago

The US trains for this but I'm not sure it's needed domestically. FAA funds local and regional airports - there are plenty of airstrips all over that could accommodate a fighter or a C130.