4 ms·

> “You cannot create a back door that only the good guys can go through,” Alright, technical argument here. This is false and tech talking heads are spreading

by _8j50 3y ago

> “You cannot create a back door that only the good guys can go through,” Alright, technical argument here. This is false and tech talking heads are spreading this lie for ideological reasons. You don't need to backdoor the protocol, just the specific targeted client. Now, if Signal said this is unfair because competitors won't also backdoor their app then I am with them. What the UK should probably have done is to force phone makers as opposed to app makers to facilitate a backdoor. Signal can scan messages before encryption and report to the authorities just fine. Whatever the UK government desires, Signal should accept it as the will of the UK people, especially given that politicians' stance on this has been public and endured election cycles. I do get their stance, people will stop using them if they cave in and the UK gov should know that as well. I don't know UK law but dragnet surveillance is illegal in the US but targeted warrantful requests to backdoor apps is lawful.

chacham15 3y ago
I didnt read that as a technical argument, but as a sociological one. If there are two apps, one which is easy/legal to obtain, but has a backdoor and another which may be harder/illegal to obtain but has no backdoor, which is the bad guy going to choose? Unless you can somehow force every app to use the backdoor, you cant make the bad guy go through it. Therefore, "You cannot create a back door that only the good guys can go through"
- _8j50 3y ago
  The proposal is to scan every message and report if only there is a match. What bad guy can possibly take advantage of that without coercing Signal? And if Signal can be coerced, they can backdoor it all to begin with. Call it a feature instead if a backdoor if it sounds better lol. Control of the list which is used to scan your messages has the same security properties as the code of signal itself and a threat actor that can exploit the system must control both that and access the match reporting system (signal servers). An actor that controls these does not need to abuse this system, it would be easier to just push a rat alongside signal. > "You cannot create a back door that only the good guys can go through" Perhaps for crypto protocols. Software systems do this all the time in form of software updates, usage monitoring and even unattended remote support accounts. And also, just because it might be possible to find a vuln in a system in the future that does not mean it is vulnerable at the time of design. Not only are clean backdoors possible, software engineers can design them cleanly and make them sound nice and fluffy when they are the ones accessing the backdoor.
deleted 3y ago
[deleted]
howinteresting 3y ago
It is a moral duty to oppose majoritarianism that disproportionately harms minorities, the so-called will of the people be damned.
- _8j50 3y ago
  Ok, if you believe that I have no desire to tell you that you are wrong on your views, all I am saying is let's be technically honest about what is and isn't possible.
Hizonner 3y ago
> You don't need to backdoor the protocol, just the specific targeted client. Distinction without a difference. Either way, the total system is delivering the same plaintext to the same third parties. On edit: and, just to be clear, they want the apps to scan for specific hashes from a master list, and/or apply ML to find "suspicious" material that's NOT in any lists, on EVERY client, not just "targeted" ones. That's true for the UK "Online Safety Bill", for the EU "chat control" or "anti-CSA" proposal, and in fact for the practical effect they're trying to get in the US with the "Earn It Act", "Stop CSAM Act", and to some degree with the "Kids Online Safety Act".
- _8j50 3y ago
  Ok, so what's your point? Mine was to alleviate the burden on Signal. Fact is, this can be done and done well. Real harm is happening and this popular bandwagon is part of the problem, not solution. Find a better way for govs to have an advantage against CSAM and other boogeymen. Technical people are supposed to find optimal technical solutions, not pretend to be technocrats or underdogs fighting against governments who are all unjust and out there to get us.
  - int_19h 3y ago
    So, technical people are supposed to "just follow orders"? Nope. If what the government is trying to do is unjust in my own ethical judgment, then I have no obligation to help them find an "optimal technical solution" to do it - on the contrary, I have a moral duty to make it as hard as possible for them to do that. The usual argument is that if we don't "help" them, the regime that's actually enacted will be much worse all around. Which is likely true, but also exactly the point - let them be heavy-handed and incite more popular resistance that way. We'll see how much of the public still supports all this stuff when the "for CSAM only, pinky promise" tech will start being routinely used to bust them for stuff like drug use.
    - _8j50 3y ago
      > So, technical people are supposed to "just follow orders"? No, just be honest about technical matters. You can refuse to publish your software entirely or ideally in this case, make it available only outside the UK and let UK users seek it out on their own or use vpns. You can also protest the measure and try to prevent the law from being passed on ideological grounds. > on the contrary, I have a moral duty to make it as hard as possible for them to do that. So long as you are not being dishonest because then why would anyone trust you with anything else. You can comply with laws by doing it well or simply refuse to participate in publishing software there. What is happening now is they want to publish software there but refuse to obey the law of the land. What kind of law do you get to follow, only when you agree with it? > We'll see how much of the public still supports all this stuff when the "for CSAM only, pinky promise" tech will start being routinely used to bust them for stuff like drug use. That's sort of my point. You can disagree with it ideologically, saying it will be abused. But if the people trust the government and think preventing CSAM is more important then it is their right to self-determine and find out for themeselves and repeal the law later on. You are not the people's nanny, they made their bed. Perhaps we can talk about phones without app stores and OSes people can use whatever unbackdooree app they want then?
maqp 3y ago
>You don't need to backdoor the protocol, just the specific targeted client. So how are you backdooring the client that -- where ever you download it from -- can be dumped from the phone and compared against self compiled client with a cryptographic hash? Introducing intentional, ubiquitous vulnerabilities is also a terrible idea, because exploits for those can leak or be stolen (that has already happened, see Shadow Brokers case), and that's catastrophic in operating systems, because they're massively scalable. Rootkits injected via such vulnerabilities can covertly make systems so that the vulnerability and backdoor are unpatchable, and that would be a catastrophic scenario. >Signal can scan messages before encryption and report to the authorities just fine Writing a script that comments out the lines of code for such scanning, and that compiles the application from source is trivial. People write E2EE layers on top of existing messaging apps. One example is OTR plugin for Pidgin/Gaim, another is CryptoCat that at one point had a system that operated on top of Facebook web UI. The genie is out of the bottle, and the bad guys are willing to go the distance to get secure comms. Bin Laden was using airgaps. Criminals are buying crypto phones (that ANOM case was fun example of smart targeted attack though, maybe that can be used to catch some criminals in future too). What's left is the security of normal people from banana dictatorships, mass surveillance tools etc. When you backdoor privacy tools, that's who you'll get, and if that's who you're going after, then you have no right to wield such power.
- _8j50 3y ago
  > Introducing intentional, ubiquitous vulnerabilities is also a terrible idea No e2ee app has compromised device part of their threat model. People get ratted all the time on their phones bu criminals. This is the same thing except the gov is nice enough to not look ar everything, just scan for content > Writing a script that comments out the lines of code for such scanning, and that compiles the application from source is trivial. People write E2EE layers on top of existing messaging apps. > One example is OTR plugin for Pidgin/Gaim, another is CryptoCat that at one point had a system that operated on top of Facebook web UI. Doesn't matter. Those apps can be backdoored too. The whole OS can. And the gov doesn't mind playing whack-a-mole. You can disagree with their policy but I disagree with openly collaborating on lying to policy makers on technical facts.

by _8j50 3y ago

chacham15 3y ago

I didnt read that as a technical argument, but as a sociological one. If there are two apps, one which is easy/legal to obtain, but has a backdoor and another which may be harder/illegal to obtain but has no backdoor, which is the bad guy going to choose? Unless you can somehow force every app to use the backdoor, you cant make the bad guy go through it. Therefore, "You cannot create a back door that only the good guys can go through"

_8j50 3y ago
The proposal is to scan every message and report if only there is a match. What bad guy can possibly take advantage of that without coercing Signal? And if Signal can be coerced, they can backdoor it all to begin with. Call it a feature instead if a backdoor if it sounds better lol. Control of the list which is used to scan your messages has the same security properties as the code of signal itself and a threat actor that can exploit the system must control both that and access the match reporting system (signal servers). An actor that controls these does not need to abuse this system, it would be easier to just push a rat alongside signal. > "You cannot create a back door that only the good guys can go through" Perhaps for crypto protocols. Software systems do this all the time in form of software updates, usage monitoring and even unattended remote support accounts. And also, just because it might be possible to find a vuln in a system in the future that does not mean it is vulnerable at the time of design. Not only are clean backdoors possible, software engineers can design them cleanly and make them sound nice and fluffy when they are the ones accessing the backdoor.

deleted 3y ago

[deleted]

howinteresting 3y ago

It is a moral duty to oppose majoritarianism that disproportionately harms minorities, the so-called will of the people be damned.

_8j50 3y ago
Ok, if you believe that I have no desire to tell you that you are wrong on your views, all I am saying is let's be technically honest about what is and isn't possible.

Hizonner 3y ago

> You don't need to backdoor the protocol, just the specific targeted client. Distinction without a difference. Either way, the total system is delivering the same plaintext to the same third parties. On edit: and, just to be clear, they want the apps to scan for specific hashes from a master list, and/or apply ML to find "suspicious" material that's NOT in any lists, on EVERY client, not just "targeted" ones. That's true for the UK "Online Safety Bill", for the EU "chat control" or "anti-CSA" proposal, and in fact for the practical effect they're trying to get in the US with the "Earn It Act", "Stop CSAM Act", and to some degree with the "Kids Online Safety Act".

_8j50 3y ago
Ok, so what's your point? Mine was to alleviate the burden on Signal. Fact is, this can be done and done well. Real harm is happening and this popular bandwagon is part of the problem, not solution. Find a better way for govs to have an advantage against CSAM and other boogeymen. Technical people are supposed to find optimal technical solutions, not pretend to be technocrats or underdogs fighting against governments who are all unjust and out there to get us.
- int_19h 3y ago
  So, technical people are supposed to "just follow orders"? Nope. If what the government is trying to do is unjust in my own ethical judgment, then I have no obligation to help them find an "optimal technical solution" to do it - on the contrary, I have a moral duty to make it as hard as possible for them to do that. The usual argument is that if we don't "help" them, the regime that's actually enacted will be much worse all around. Which is likely true, but also exactly the point - let them be heavy-handed and incite more popular resistance that way. We'll see how much of the public still supports all this stuff when the "for CSAM only, pinky promise" tech will start being routinely used to bust them for stuff like drug use.
  - _8j50 3y ago
    > So, technical people are supposed to "just follow orders"? No, just be honest about technical matters. You can refuse to publish your software entirely or ideally in this case, make it available only outside the UK and let UK users seek it out on their own or use vpns. You can also protest the measure and try to prevent the law from being passed on ideological grounds. > on the contrary, I have a moral duty to make it as hard as possible for them to do that. So long as you are not being dishonest because then why would anyone trust you with anything else. You can comply with laws by doing it well or simply refuse to participate in publishing software there. What is happening now is they want to publish software there but refuse to obey the law of the land. What kind of law do you get to follow, only when you agree with it? > We'll see how much of the public still supports all this stuff when the "for CSAM only, pinky promise" tech will start being routinely used to bust them for stuff like drug use. That's sort of my point. You can disagree with it ideologically, saying it will be abused. But if the people trust the government and think preventing CSAM is more important then it is their right to self-determine and find out for themeselves and repeal the law later on. You are not the people's nanny, they made their bed. Perhaps we can talk about phones without app stores and OSes people can use whatever unbackdooree app they want then?

maqp 3y ago

>You don't need to backdoor the protocol, just the specific targeted client. So how are you backdooring the client that -- where ever you download it from -- can be dumped from the phone and compared against self compiled client with a cryptographic hash? Introducing intentional, ubiquitous vulnerabilities is also a terrible idea, because exploits for those can leak or be stolen (that has already happened, see Shadow Brokers case), and that's catastrophic in operating systems, because they're massively scalable. Rootkits injected via such vulnerabilities can covertly make systems so that the vulnerability and backdoor are unpatchable, and that would be a catastrophic scenario. >Signal can scan messages before encryption and report to the authorities just fine Writing a script that comments out the lines of code for such scanning, and that compiles the application from source is trivial. People write E2EE layers on top of existing messaging apps. One example is OTR plugin for Pidgin/Gaim, another is CryptoCat that at one point had a system that operated on top of Facebook web UI. The genie is out of the bottle, and the bad guys are willing to go the distance to get secure comms. Bin Laden was using airgaps. Criminals are buying crypto phones (that ANOM case was fun example of smart targeted attack though, maybe that can be used to catch some criminals in future too). What's left is the security of normal people from banana dictatorships, mass surveillance tools etc. When you backdoor privacy tools, that's who you'll get, and if that's who you're going after, then you have no right to wield such power.

_8j50 3y ago
> Introducing intentional, ubiquitous vulnerabilities is also a terrible idea No e2ee app has compromised device part of their threat model. People get ratted all the time on their phones bu criminals. This is the same thing except the gov is nice enough to not look ar everything, just scan for content > Writing a script that comments out the lines of code for such scanning, and that compiles the application from source is trivial. People write E2EE layers on top of existing messaging apps. > One example is OTR plugin for Pidgin/Gaim, another is CryptoCat that at one point had a system that operated on top of Facebook web UI. Doesn't matter. Those apps can be backdoored too. The whole OS can. And the gov doesn't mind playing whack-a-mole. You can disagree with their policy but I disagree with openly collaborating on lying to policy makers on technical facts.