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> They [inspections] do not ensure that operators adhere to proper operating procedures and decision-making processes – two areas that are much more important f

> They [inspections] do not ensure that operators adhere to proper operating procedures and decision-making processes – two areas that are much more important for mitigating risks at sea. As a former tall ship captain: No Shit. Ships stopped sinking when we started requiring inspections and design rules around stability and watertight compartments. We largely eliminated a common failure mode, designer error, through inspections and classing, so now we are left with the harder failure modes: operator error. I’m curious if the flag state will get involved here. It’s one thing to push the limits with experimental design (happens all the time in boats, airplanes and cars). It’s a while other thing to use experimental designs in commercial applications. There’s a good reason that the FAA doesn’t allow commercial operators to use experimental registered aircraft…

lozenge 3y ago
Titan didn't have a flag, it only operated in international waters. But the surface support vessel has a Canadian flag, and Canada's launching an investigation.
- notreallyauser 3y ago
  The Guardian is reporting the submersible as registered in the Bahamas
  - JimtheCoder 3y ago
    A place known for tight regulations
    - smitty1e 3y ago
      Albeit perhaps not water-tight.
      - JimtheCoder 3y ago
        Depends one how much pressure is applied...
    - TeMPOraL 3y ago
      As the proverb goes, even a broken vise grips tightly when there are enough journalists in the workshop.
  - hadlock 3y ago
    Flag of convenience. Where the country of record allows ships to register under their name as a way of generating revenue from foreigners. Bahamas will not do more than issue a statement, if that. You step foot on a flag of convenience boat with no prior reputation and you are effectively waiving any expectation safety.
    - hgsgm 3y ago
      It's like a .io domain or using Bitcoin. If you intentionally exit jurisdiction of a country you trust, you are on your own. I hope the rescue teams sue the perpetrators' estates and corpos for their costs.
DeRock 3y ago
Their reasoning is fundamentally flawed. > The vast majority of marine (and aviation) accidents are a result of operator error, not mechanical failure. As a result, simply focusing on classing the vessel does not address the operational risks. Aka "classing doesn't mitigate all problems, so we're not going to do it at all"
- xupybd 3y ago
  I've heard the same argument against unit testing and strong typing.
  - pessimizer 3y ago
    I've heard the same argument against not using heroin. It's a generic pretend argument: You say doing(or not doing) this thing will be risky. So that means you're saying that people who don't do(or do) the thing have perfect lives with no risks and free ice cream? You're strangling innovation/A coward!
  - brookst 3y ago
    And app sandboxing, and masks during covid, and seatbelts, and gun control, and … The relative merits differ, and any given thing is debatable, but “it doesn’t solve everything so it’s no better than nothing” is a nakedly dishonest argument.
  - phkahler 3y ago
    If I recall correctly, even NASA found unit testing to be of limited value, finding a small fraction of software bugs. That's not to say "don't do it" but my stance is that the developer should do some ad-hoc testing for everything they write, just don't formalize and document it or you'll land on the wrong end of cost/benefit. I can point to some subtle logic bugs that no sane unit test would have caught.
    - sitkack 3y ago
      Because their development process before a unit test would ever run is so rigorous!
cjensen 3y ago
Yep. This is like saying "who needs building codes because it's more important the owner maintains the roof and paint?" To have something properly function you need both a solid build and maintenance. Doing one well doesn't absolve you of doing the other.
- sacnoradhq 3y ago
  Emperor's new clothes syndrome of the naïve and/or arrogant.
  - TeMPOraL 3y ago
    As much as I love the show, I'd call it Star Trek's approach to OSHA. I mean, Starfleet officers are so well-trained and perfect that they don't need safeguards such as guardrails on elevators moving engineers up and down a three story high room that ends up shaking at least twice per episode. And let's not even talk about seatbelts.
    - deleted 3y ago
      [deleted]
    - jtriangle 3y ago
      Well, idk, every time the ship gets hit some console on the bridge shorts out and the arcflash blows some noname ensign across the room. So, star trek probably isn't the example I'd pull from.
      - jsjohnst 3y ago
        GP was using Star Trek as a bad example, similar to you.
      - smoyer 3y ago
        You don't need guardrail s on startrek ... You need the right color shirt!
sacnoradhq 3y ago
Arrogance and overconfidence lead inexorably to hubris and they won a Darwin Award for thinking they "knew better". It's obvious they skimped on testing and were too cavalier with unproven "innovation".
Gwypaas 3y ago
As another tall ship, and for that matter in-shore commercial captain I found this quite telling. > While classing agencies are willing to pursue the certification of new and innovative designs and ideas, they often have a multi-year approval cycle due to a lack of pre-existing standards, especially, for example, in the case of many of OceanGate’s innovations, such as carbon fiber pressure vessels and a real-time (RTM) hull health monitoring system. Bringing an outside entity up to speed on every innovation before it is put into real-world testing is anathema to rapid innovation. For example, Space X, Blue Origin and Virgin Galactic all rely on experienced inside experts to oversee the daily operations, testing, and validation versus bringing in outsiders who need to first be educated before being qualified to ‘validate’ any innovations. Gamble with money all you want. Don't gamble with people. Things get fixed, people don't. That is quite a hard lesson for inexperienced people to learn.
- gerdesj 3y ago
  You guys are tall ship masters. Your vessels are generally well understood these days but let's not forget some comparable disasters: Vasa and Mary Rose. Yes both are from a long time ago but both were based on top of a lot of good solid engineering but both pushed the envelope somewhat and perished. Vasa design basically forgot to sort out the various CoGs for a ship - it was top heavy. Mary Rose loss is a bit more complicated but for me water ingress via lower open gun ports, compounded by heavier loading was a possible failure scenario. I'll also recall the sinking of the Herald Of Free Enterprise - a roll on/roll off ferry that departed Zeebrugge and "rolled over" in shallow water due to the bow door being left open - ie stupidity and a lack of monitoring. That wasn't a tall ship but the same general rules apply. Those are three samples from 400 years of maritime history. The Vasa was a daft design from the outset (meta vs cog), Mary Rose a daft refit after 30 years of service (it was OK for 30 years and then wasn't) and Herald was basically abused by her crew and lacked monitoring. Now submarines are pretty new. We do have a fairly long history of making pressure hulls from steel and some other materials but they all build upon earlier designs and they have all been tested with a lot of loss of life for failed designs - the history of submarines is pretty sad. I gather that all very deep sea hulls are basically spherical. The Titan's pressure hull was made of carbon fibre which I gather no one else has used like that. As well as a novel material its shape was elongated to allow more passengers - that's two changes. Finally we also have a viewing port at the front that was actually tested but never rated for 4000m. No one really knows what happens to carbon fibre pressure hulls when they go from one atmosphere to 180 and back again, repeatedly, then they are picked up out of the water - more stress and strain. Also, no one really knows what happens at the interface of a "window" to carbon fibre at 180 atmospheres. There are lots more questions to be answered but frankly I see a company trying to run a submarine with DevOps attitude (move fast and break things) rather than proper maritime grade engineering. At 180 times atmospheric pressure, you die within seconds. No ifs and no buts. I absolutely stand with you guys in insisting on standards for this sort of thing. It isn't the same as running up Everest or going into space. Deep sea is way, way more dangerous.
belter 3y ago
"...OceanGate CEO once said Titan sub's hull was made with carbon fiber from Boeing that was past its airplane shelf life..." - https://www.insider.com/oceangate-ceo-said-titan-made-old-material-bought-boeing-report-2023-6?amp https://www.insider.com/oceangate-ceo-said-titan-made-old-ma...

lozenge 3y ago

Titan didn't have a flag, it only operated in international waters. But the surface support vessel has a Canadian flag, and Canada's launching an investigation.

notreallyauser 3y ago
The Guardian is reporting the submersible as registered in the Bahamas
- JimtheCoder 3y ago
  A place known for tight regulations
  - smitty1e 3y ago
    Albeit perhaps not water-tight.
    - JimtheCoder 3y ago
      Depends one how much pressure is applied...
  - TeMPOraL 3y ago
    As the proverb goes, even a broken vise grips tightly when there are enough journalists in the workshop.
- hadlock 3y ago
  Flag of convenience. Where the country of record allows ships to register under their name as a way of generating revenue from foreigners. Bahamas will not do more than issue a statement, if that. You step foot on a flag of convenience boat with no prior reputation and you are effectively waiving any expectation safety.
  - hgsgm 3y ago
    It's like a .io domain or using Bitcoin. If you intentionally exit jurisdiction of a country you trust, you are on your own. I hope the rescue teams sue the perpetrators' estates and corpos for their costs.

DeRock 3y ago

Their reasoning is fundamentally flawed. > The vast majority of marine (and aviation) accidents are a result of operator error, not mechanical failure. As a result, simply focusing on classing the vessel does not address the operational risks. Aka "classing doesn't mitigate all problems, so we're not going to do it at all"

xupybd 3y ago
I've heard the same argument against unit testing and strong typing.
- pessimizer 3y ago
  I've heard the same argument against not using heroin. It's a generic pretend argument: You say doing(or not doing) this thing will be risky. So that means you're saying that people who don't do(or do) the thing have perfect lives with no risks and free ice cream? You're strangling innovation/A coward!
- brookst 3y ago
  And app sandboxing, and masks during covid, and seatbelts, and gun control, and … The relative merits differ, and any given thing is debatable, but “it doesn’t solve everything so it’s no better than nothing” is a nakedly dishonest argument.
- phkahler 3y ago
  If I recall correctly, even NASA found unit testing to be of limited value, finding a small fraction of software bugs. That's not to say "don't do it" but my stance is that the developer should do some ad-hoc testing for everything they write, just don't formalize and document it or you'll land on the wrong end of cost/benefit. I can point to some subtle logic bugs that no sane unit test would have caught.
  - sitkack 3y ago
    Because their development process before a unit test would ever run is so rigorous!

cjensen 3y ago

Yep. This is like saying "who needs building codes because it's more important the owner maintains the roof and paint?" To have something properly function you need both a solid build and maintenance. Doing one well doesn't absolve you of doing the other.

sacnoradhq 3y ago
Emperor's new clothes syndrome of the naïve and/or arrogant.
- TeMPOraL 3y ago
  As much as I love the show, I'd call it Star Trek's approach to OSHA. I mean, Starfleet officers are so well-trained and perfect that they don't need safeguards such as guardrails on elevators moving engineers up and down a three story high room that ends up shaking at least twice per episode. And let's not even talk about seatbelts.
  - deleted 3y ago
    [deleted]
  - jtriangle 3y ago
    Well, idk, every time the ship gets hit some console on the bridge shorts out and the arcflash blows some noname ensign across the room. So, star trek probably isn't the example I'd pull from.
    - jsjohnst 3y ago
      GP was using Star Trek as a bad example, similar to you.
    - smoyer 3y ago
      You don't need guardrail s on startrek ... You need the right color shirt!

sacnoradhq 3y ago

Arrogance and overconfidence lead inexorably to hubris and they won a Darwin Award for thinking they "knew better". It's obvious they skimped on testing and were too cavalier with unproven "innovation".

Gwypaas 3y ago

As another tall ship, and for that matter in-shore commercial captain I found this quite telling. > While classing agencies are willing to pursue the certification of new and innovative designs and ideas, they often have a multi-year approval cycle due to a lack of pre-existing standards, especially, for example, in the case of many of OceanGate’s innovations, such as carbon fiber pressure vessels and a real-time (RTM) hull health monitoring system. Bringing an outside entity up to speed on every innovation before it is put into real-world testing is anathema to rapid innovation. For example, Space X, Blue Origin and Virgin Galactic all rely on experienced inside experts to oversee the daily operations, testing, and validation versus bringing in outsiders who need to first be educated before being qualified to ‘validate’ any innovations. Gamble with money all you want. Don't gamble with people. Things get fixed, people don't. That is quite a hard lesson for inexperienced people to learn.

gerdesj 3y ago
You guys are tall ship masters. Your vessels are generally well understood these days but let's not forget some comparable disasters: Vasa and Mary Rose. Yes both are from a long time ago but both were based on top of a lot of good solid engineering but both pushed the envelope somewhat and perished. Vasa design basically forgot to sort out the various CoGs for a ship - it was top heavy. Mary Rose loss is a bit more complicated but for me water ingress via lower open gun ports, compounded by heavier loading was a possible failure scenario. I'll also recall the sinking of the Herald Of Free Enterprise - a roll on/roll off ferry that departed Zeebrugge and "rolled over" in shallow water due to the bow door being left open - ie stupidity and a lack of monitoring. That wasn't a tall ship but the same general rules apply. Those are three samples from 400 years of maritime history. The Vasa was a daft design from the outset (meta vs cog), Mary Rose a daft refit after 30 years of service (it was OK for 30 years and then wasn't) and Herald was basically abused by her crew and lacked monitoring. Now submarines are pretty new. We do have a fairly long history of making pressure hulls from steel and some other materials but they all build upon earlier designs and they have all been tested with a lot of loss of life for failed designs - the history of submarines is pretty sad. I gather that all very deep sea hulls are basically spherical. The Titan's pressure hull was made of carbon fibre which I gather no one else has used like that. As well as a novel material its shape was elongated to allow more passengers - that's two changes. Finally we also have a viewing port at the front that was actually tested but never rated for 4000m. No one really knows what happens to carbon fibre pressure hulls when they go from one atmosphere to 180 and back again, repeatedly, then they are picked up out of the water - more stress and strain. Also, no one really knows what happens at the interface of a "window" to carbon fibre at 180 atmospheres. There are lots more questions to be answered but frankly I see a company trying to run a submarine with DevOps attitude (move fast and break things) rather than proper maritime grade engineering. At 180 times atmospheric pressure, you die within seconds. No ifs and no buts. I absolutely stand with you guys in insisting on standards for this sort of thing. It isn't the same as running up Everest or going into space. Deep sea is way, way more dangerous.

belter 3y ago

"...OceanGate CEO once said Titan sub's hull was made with carbon fiber from Boeing that was past its airplane shelf life..." - https://www.insider.com/oceangate-ceo-said-titan-made-old-material-bought-boeing-report-2023-6?amp https://www.insider.com/oceangate-ceo-said-titan-made-old-ma...