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Indeed. But, it's foundational for why people have reserved some judgement about the software and the service. I didn't know Phil Zimmerman but I "trust" PGP be
by ggm 3y ago
Indeed. But, it's foundational for why people have reserved some judgement about the software and the service. I didn't know Phil Zimmerman but I "trust" PGP because of the amount of eyes on the code. That was the substantive point here about Moxie.
Unless and until somebody audits and reviews, I would believe code he wrote remains in the application suite and head-end services? Should I "trust" that implicitly?
> It is absolutely not the case that cryptography engineers generally interact with NIST employees, and certainly not NSA employees.
Day to day? no. Communications are confined to matters of substance between them. But I see NIST people at IETF standards meetings, Mailing to lists. I see engineers who submit algorithms to the NIST beauty contests talking online about who they discussed things with. I knew researchers in Australia who were engaged in NSA related study and it was simply understood no technology entered the building with them, to go and do face to face but the fact they met was not secret, and there are lots of people in bodies like IETF who meet these people on an as-needs basis.
Around the time of IETF being held in Beijing a number of people wound up being asked or told not to take their normal laptop with them into that economy. A lot more than I would have expected simply because of commercial in confidence reasons of risk.
"generally" might be too sweeping. It's not forbidden. It might be unusual.
- tptacek 3y agoPhil Zimmerman also has very little to do with the design of modern PGP, and the influence he did have was malign (if not deliberately so). Signal is so well studied it won the Levchin Prize at RWC. I don't understand why you believe cryptography engineers generally participate in standards bodies. A comparable percentage of cryptography engineers do that as do software engineers with software standards bodies.
- ggm 3y agoWinning the Levchin Prize is good. That helps build trust.
- ggm 3y agoI think you're reading too much into this. I only mean that the cohort of cryptography engineers I meet are the ones in IETF. I have no intent to imply they are a majority, or even significant against the number of mathematicians who work at NSA, GCHQ, DSD &c. If the ratios are similar then sure, there's hundreds (thousands) who don't. The point of substance is, these people can be asked what they think about software and systems. I haven't asked for a while.
- idlewords 3y ago"Don't take your laptop or phone into China" is a completely standard and unremarkable piece of security advice for anyone in our field. I'm not sure how it ties into your point.
- ggm 3y agoI've been to China 7 times in the last 20 years and never been placed in any constraint of need here. No employer, or travel advisory has ever been placed on me or recommended to me. I was not issued a burner phone or laptop. Ever. One meeting I went to in Nepal, the attendee from a US company had a personal minder (with gun) and car. That's about as close as I've come to a heightened sense of need facing attendance at standards and policy meetings internationally. So maybe to YOU this is unremarkable. My anecdata is that it's more said, than done. However some people who work in these fields are placed under specific requirement. Perhaps it goes to your seniority and importance: I am glad I've never been held to that burden in 42 years.
- kasey_junk 3y agoJust for more anecdotes every tech company I’ve worked for that has reason to travel to China has had a blanket (all employees independent of role or seniority) policy requiring using burner laptops and phones when traveling there.