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Those criticisms are not about the technical capability of missile defenses, but the scale at which they are deployed. If you can shoot down anything, but you o

by jjk166 3y ago

Those criticisms are not about the technical capability of missile defenses, but the scale at which they are deployed. If you can shoot down anything, but you only have 40 shots, obviously you can be defeated by anyone who can make 41 of even the crudest missiles. Likewise the best tank in the world is much less effective after it runs out of ammo. But if the issue is merely scale, all you need to do is make more interceptors, which is a finite and predictable expense, as opposed to developing a new technology which could be a massive money pit that ultimately fails. The US maintains a rather small inventory of interceptors because for the past few decades only small strikes by rogue nations or accidental launches by major powers have been considered likely threats, and a large number of interceptors jeopardizes mutually assured destruction, which has been a much more cost effective counter against large scale nuclear exchanges. But there's nothing saying the US needs to stick to the current number if the global geopolitical situation changes.

walrus01 3y ago
Although they are clearly not coming right out and saying it, the quantity of individual launch-cell-installed ballistic missile interceptors deployed in Alaska right now is clearly meant to deal with a threat from North Korea, not from Russia or China. The technology might exist but we would need something like a modern DEW line of many, many more of the same interceptors installed at bases spread throughout northern Canada to deal with a larger threat. It is assumed right now that the threat from Russia and China is met by the concept of mutually assured destruction, as neither Russia or China have a vast quantity of missile interceptors that could be truly relied upon to destroy hundreds of incoming US missiles. And the fact that US missiles can come from almost anywhere via submarine launch platforms.
throw_nbvc1234 3y ago
> Curdest of missiles https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/ruaf-glide-bombs-ukraine-mass-use https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/ruaf-glide-bombs-u... For example, using gliding bombs rather then missiles or dropping dumb bombs from overhead.
- jjk166 3y ago
  You don't use or need missile interceptors to deal with bombers.
MichaelZuo 3y ago
> But if the issue is merely scale, all you need to do is make more interceptors, which is a finite and predictable expense, as opposed to developing a new technology which could be a massive money pit that ultimately fails. Except it costs many times more to make an anti-ballistic-missile interceptor then the original ballistic missile. There's a fundamental asymmetry here, because interceptors have to be extremely high performance to be useful but the launching missiles can be as cheap as possible as long as it can throw enough penetration aids into the approximate trajectory. So regardless of how much is spent on such a program, any country could spend a small fraction to fully defeat it, maybe as little as 10%.
- ALittleLight 3y ago
  Unless we gradually produce enough interceptors over many years to disarm MAD. Then we could notice some other state building a lot of ballistic missiles and preemptively strike.
  - MichaelZuo 3y ago
    Hence why countries carefully monitor breakout capabilities, including interceptors.
  - vkou 3y ago
    Or, if the other country is not ran by fools, they'll notice that you're building enough interceptors to break MAD and pre-emptively strike you.
    - deleted 3y ago
      [deleted]
    - ALittleLight 3y ago
      I would think unnecessarily invoking MAD would make the other country fools.
      - bigyikes 3y ago
jojobas 3y ago
A single R-36MUTTKh missile from the 80s carries 10 warheads and an unspecified number of light and heavy decoys. A single regiment (10 missiles) will saturate anything and everything. That's ballistic warheads, add any maneuvering re-entry capability and ABM defences are complete joke. Luckily for the humanity, MAD is alive and well.
- jjk166 3y ago
  That's the scale argument, yes.
T-A 3y ago
> Those criticisms are not about the technical capability of missile defenses, but the scale at which they are deployed. https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/disastrous-us-approach-strategic-missile-defense https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/disastrous-us-approach-stra... https://www.latimes.com/projects/la-na-missile-defense/ https://www.latimes.com/projects/la-na-missile-defense/ https://www.theverge.com/2017/5/30/15713966/ballistic-missile-attack-department-of-defense-pentagon-north-korea https://www.theverge.com/2017/5/30/15713966/ballistic-missil... https://www.extremetech.com/defense/182175-the-united-states-missile-defense-system-will-never-work-which-is-why-were-spending-more-money-on-it https://www.extremetech.com/defense/182175-the-united-states... https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2019/05/28/pentagon-hits-pause-on-redesign-of-critical-homeland-missile-defense-component/ https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2019/05/28/pentagon-hit... https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2019/08/21/dod-tanks-redesigned-kill-vehicle-program-for-homeland-defense-interceptor/ https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2019/08/21/dod-tanks-re... https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-10/news/pentagon-seeks-new-missile-interceptor https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-10/news/pentagon-seeks-... https://missilethreat.csis.org/a-new-generation-of-homeland-missile-defense-interceptors/ https://missilethreat.csis.org/a-new-generation-of-homeland-...
vinaypai 3y ago
> But if the issue is merely scale, all you need to do is make more interceptors, Attackers can choose where to attack. Defenders have to defend every city. For example, THAAD can protect about a 200km radius, so for every ICBM and SLBM, you need to add an additional missile to EVERY one of hundreds of sites. They also need to all be kept ready at all times, replaced periodically etc.
- frogblast 3y ago
  You're making the single most common misunderstanding of the United State's ICBM defense capability, because you assume the goal is to "defend every city". The real goal is quite different. The math starts to look very different when the defender can choose where to defend. Assume a first strike against the US. The US has ~400 siloed missiles and a handful of airbases that can launch bombers. A reasonable goal for a first strike is to destroy those, preventing or substantially limiting a counterattack. Assuming some failure rate, using 2 warheads per silo gives you some redundancy, so 800 warheads needed for this phase of the attack. What good is 40 intercepters against 800 incoming warheads? The US can choose which of those 800 to target. 40 intercepters can protect 20 silos from two incoming each. And that means the US can counterattack. To guarantee killing every single silo, the attacker must now have 20+2 warheads targeted at every single silo. The attacker has to build far far more offensive weapons than the defender needs to build intercepters, if the attacker wishes to avoid a counterattack. Protection of the population comes from MAD alone, not by interception. (this of course isn't a reassuring thought, so this case isn't really made to the public). That is why maneuvering hypersonics are considered such a threat: it removes the predictability of which warheads are going to land where, preventing that kind of choice of where to defend.
  - rgmerk 3y ago
    The US doesn’t need missile defence to maintain second strike capability. That’s what SSBNs are for.
    - frogblast 3y ago
somenameforme 3y ago
> 'all you need to do is make more interceptors' There's a lot more it to than that. These systems are not only absurdly expensive (Patriots [1] costs about $1 billion for the system, and $4 million for a missile - probably more nowadays on both accounts), but also entail extensive training, operational, repair, and general logistic issues. A single Patriot requires a skilled crew of ~90 to operate with a peak theoretic range of < 100 miles. And the systems are not invincible. When Russia either damaged or destroyed one recently in Ukraine, it seems they did the most obvious strategy and simply drained its battery (which seemed to hold ~32 missiles) before going after the system itself. Finally I'd also add in manufacturing and other issues. The manufacturing of alot of these systems has major practical raw material constraints (to say nothing of the manufacturing itself) when you talk about doing things at truly large scale. --- That said, I agree this idea sounds more like a MIC money grab than anything else. You'd need a ridiculous number of these systems to provide sufficient coverage, it'd entail completely scrapping the Outer Space Treaty creating an overt weaponization race, and also create some really juicy targets for relatively cheap anti-satellite missile systems. The reality is that there is no such thing as a perfect defense because it's just so much easier, and cheaper, to create a +1 version of offense, in the scenario of a peer to peer battle. [1] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MIM-104_Patriot https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MIM-104_Patriot
- dilyevsky 3y ago
  That $1B patriot tag includes a lot of missiles. In fact majority if cost is missiles
  - _kbh_ 3y ago
    He is also missing that the each Kinzhal reportedly costs upwards of 10 million USD which is more than 2x the cost of a Patriot missile, its closer to 3x.
    - wolpoli 3y ago
      I have read some posts claiming that they observed multiple patriot missiles (3x) were fired for each threat. If so, it might even the cost out a bit.

by jjk166 3y ago

walrus01 3y ago

Although they are clearly not coming right out and saying it, the quantity of individual launch-cell-installed ballistic missile interceptors deployed in Alaska right now is clearly meant to deal with a threat from North Korea, not from Russia or China. The technology might exist but we would need something like a modern DEW line of many, many more of the same interceptors installed at bases spread throughout northern Canada to deal with a larger threat. It is assumed right now that the threat from Russia and China is met by the concept of mutually assured destruction, as neither Russia or China have a vast quantity of missile interceptors that could be truly relied upon to destroy hundreds of incoming US missiles. And the fact that US missiles can come from almost anywhere via submarine launch platforms.

throw_nbvc1234 3y ago

> Curdest of missiles https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/ruaf-glide-bombs-ukraine-mass-use https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/ruaf-glide-bombs-u... For example, using gliding bombs rather then missiles or dropping dumb bombs from overhead.

jjk166 3y ago
You don't use or need missile interceptors to deal with bombers.

MichaelZuo 3y ago

> But if the issue is merely scale, all you need to do is make more interceptors, which is a finite and predictable expense, as opposed to developing a new technology which could be a massive money pit that ultimately fails. Except it costs many times more to make an anti-ballistic-missile interceptor then the original ballistic missile. There's a fundamental asymmetry here, because interceptors have to be extremely high performance to be useful but the launching missiles can be as cheap as possible as long as it can throw enough penetration aids into the approximate trajectory. So regardless of how much is spent on such a program, any country could spend a small fraction to fully defeat it, maybe as little as 10%.

ALittleLight 3y ago
Unless we gradually produce enough interceptors over many years to disarm MAD. Then we could notice some other state building a lot of ballistic missiles and preemptively strike.
- MichaelZuo 3y ago
  Hence why countries carefully monitor breakout capabilities, including interceptors.
- vkou 3y ago
  Or, if the other country is not ran by fools, they'll notice that you're building enough interceptors to break MAD and pre-emptively strike you.
  - deleted 3y ago
    [deleted]
  - ALittleLight 3y ago
    I would think unnecessarily invoking MAD would make the other country fools.
    - bigyikes 3y ago

jojobas 3y ago

A single R-36MUTTKh missile from the 80s carries 10 warheads and an unspecified number of light and heavy decoys. A single regiment (10 missiles) will saturate anything and everything. That's ballistic warheads, add any maneuvering re-entry capability and ABM defences are complete joke. Luckily for the humanity, MAD is alive and well.

jjk166 3y ago
That's the scale argument, yes.

T-A 3y ago

> Those criticisms are not about the technical capability of missile defenses, but the scale at which they are deployed. https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/disastrous-us-approach-strategic-missile-defense https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/disastrous-us-approach-stra... https://www.latimes.com/projects/la-na-missile-defense/ https://www.latimes.com/projects/la-na-missile-defense/ https://www.theverge.com/2017/5/30/15713966/ballistic-missile-attack-department-of-defense-pentagon-north-korea https://www.theverge.com/2017/5/30/15713966/ballistic-missil... https://www.extremetech.com/defense/182175-the-united-states-missile-defense-system-will-never-work-which-is-why-were-spending-more-money-on-it https://www.extremetech.com/defense/182175-the-united-states... https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2019/05/28/pentagon-hits-pause-on-redesign-of-critical-homeland-missile-defense-component/ https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2019/05/28/pentagon-hit... https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2019/08/21/dod-tanks-redesigned-kill-vehicle-program-for-homeland-defense-interceptor/ https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2019/08/21/dod-tanks-re... https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-10/news/pentagon-seeks-new-missile-interceptor https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-10/news/pentagon-seeks-... https://missilethreat.csis.org/a-new-generation-of-homeland-missile-defense-interceptors/ https://missilethreat.csis.org/a-new-generation-of-homeland-...

vinaypai 3y ago

> But if the issue is merely scale, all you need to do is make more interceptors, Attackers can choose where to attack. Defenders have to defend every city. For example, THAAD can protect about a 200km radius, so for every ICBM and SLBM, you need to add an additional missile to EVERY one of hundreds of sites. They also need to all be kept ready at all times, replaced periodically etc.

frogblast 3y ago
You're making the single most common misunderstanding of the United State's ICBM defense capability, because you assume the goal is to "defend every city". The real goal is quite different. The math starts to look very different when the defender can choose where to defend. Assume a first strike against the US. The US has ~400 siloed missiles and a handful of airbases that can launch bombers. A reasonable goal for a first strike is to destroy those, preventing or substantially limiting a counterattack. Assuming some failure rate, using 2 warheads per silo gives you some redundancy, so 800 warheads needed for this phase of the attack. What good is 40 intercepters against 800 incoming warheads? The US can choose which of those 800 to target. 40 intercepters can protect 20 silos from two incoming each. And that means the US can counterattack. To guarantee killing every single silo, the attacker must now have 20+2 warheads targeted at every single silo. The attacker has to build far far more offensive weapons than the defender needs to build intercepters, if the attacker wishes to avoid a counterattack. Protection of the population comes from MAD alone, not by interception. (this of course isn't a reassuring thought, so this case isn't really made to the public). That is why maneuvering hypersonics are considered such a threat: it removes the predictability of which warheads are going to land where, preventing that kind of choice of where to defend.
- rgmerk 3y ago
  The US doesn’t need missile defence to maintain second strike capability. That’s what SSBNs are for.
  - frogblast 3y ago

somenameforme 3y ago

> 'all you need to do is make more interceptors' There's a lot more it to than that. These systems are not only absurdly expensive (Patriots [1] costs about $1 billion for the system, and $4 million for a missile - probably more nowadays on both accounts), but also entail extensive training, operational, repair, and general logistic issues. A single Patriot requires a skilled crew of ~90 to operate with a peak theoretic range of < 100 miles. And the systems are not invincible. When Russia either damaged or destroyed one recently in Ukraine, it seems they did the most obvious strategy and simply drained its battery (which seemed to hold ~32 missiles) before going after the system itself. Finally I'd also add in manufacturing and other issues. The manufacturing of alot of these systems has major practical raw material constraints (to say nothing of the manufacturing itself) when you talk about doing things at truly large scale. --- That said, I agree this idea sounds more like a MIC money grab than anything else. You'd need a ridiculous number of these systems to provide sufficient coverage, it'd entail completely scrapping the Outer Space Treaty creating an overt weaponization race, and also create some really juicy targets for relatively cheap anti-satellite missile systems. The reality is that there is no such thing as a perfect defense because it's just so much easier, and cheaper, to create a +1 version of offense, in the scenario of a peer to peer battle. [1] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MIM-104_Patriot https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MIM-104_Patriot

dilyevsky 3y ago
That $1B patriot tag includes a lot of missiles. In fact majority if cost is missiles
- _kbh_ 3y ago
  He is also missing that the each Kinzhal reportedly costs upwards of 10 million USD which is more than 2x the cost of a Patriot missile, its closer to 3x.
  - wolpoli 3y ago
    I have read some posts claiming that they observed multiple patriot missiles (3x) were fired for each threat. If so, it might even the cost out a bit.