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The question then is, what observed property of consciousness is not computational? If there is no such property, then the anti-materialists can be safely igno

The question then is, what observed property of consciousness is not computational? If there is no such property, then the anti-materialists can be safely ignored.

AnimalMuppet 3y ago
But the way you state your question is also assuming the answer to the larger question. What observed properties of consciousness are computational? Are provably computational? If you rigorously and consistently don't assume materialism, what can be proven?
- PixyMisa 3y ago
  > What observed properties of consciousness are computational? Are provably computational? All of them. > If you rigorously and consistently don't assume materialism, what can be proven? Nothing. Without that premise (or a compatible one), all you have is handwaving.
  - AnimalMuppet 3y ago
    All of them are proven computational? Mind laying out your evidence for that statement? Because it sounds like what you have is a presupposition, not evidence. I note that, in your reply to GMoromisato, you asked for evidence. I ask you to meet the standard you expect of others.
    - simonh 3y ago
      I wouldn’t say they are proven computational, but I would say they can be explained in terms of processes on information. Sense data, body awareness, perceptions, noticing things, evaluating situations and options all seem to me to relate to information and processes on it. We use these experiences to form memories and make decisions. Both these are processes on information. Those are all things that consciousness actually does. Is there any function of consciousness we’re aware of that doesn’t relate to information? That leaves the experience itself. It’s an experience of informational content, but is there more going on than transformations of information? What could that be? Maybe a physical substance, or a physical structure, in which case we should be able to physically synthesis consciousness stuff, or assemble a consciousness structure. What else is there?
      - AnimalMuppet 3y ago
        Re. your second paragraph: Like others in this thread, you're assuming the answer. Or rather, you're assuming the presupposition. And that's fine, if you want to do that. But be aware that you're doing it, and that it's unproven. (And maybe be aware how much you're doing it.) > Is there any function of consciousness we’re aware of that doesn’t relate to information? Maybe awareness of your own emotional state? (Though I'm sure that there are views where that also is information processing, and nothing more.)
GMoromisato 3y ago
Pain. Pain (and related feelings) cannot be definitively reduced to computation. I’m open (and even predisposed) to believing it is just computation, but it’s not intuitively obvious. We don’t even know how to test whether an arbitrary system feels pain.
- mysecretaccount 3y ago
  > Pain (and related feelings) cannot be definitively reduced to computation. This is an assumption. Sensation cannot currently be observed, definitively.
  - GMoromisato 3y ago
    I was sloppy, and I think we agree. I meant that pain cannot currently be reduced to computation. I’m open to believing it’s just computation, but it’s not obvious that it is, unless you assume that everything the brain does is. But then you’re the one assuming.
  - simonh 3y ago
    Whatever else is going on inside our brains, there's definitely information processing happening and we also know that we have a first person experience of it. Our perceptions are informational, they are experiences of data. Colour, feelings, pain, desires. These are all informational and we use them to make decisions. So whatever consciousness is, what it does is process information. If consciousness itself is not a process on information, then what is it? Another possibility is that it is a substance. Chess is a set of relationships between symbols, but the wetness of a rainstorm is physical water. So is consciousness an actual substance? Where does it go when we don't have it? Is it a chemical that forms at certain times, and is re-combined into another chemical when we lose consciousness? In which case we could synthesis a beaker full of consciousness fluid, or whatever it is. Dualists say it's a non-material 'substance', but I don't think that's a coherent concept. It must interact with matter, or it couldn't receive sensations and cause effects when we make decisions. But how can it interact with matter and be non-material? If it does interact with matter, then it can be detected and manipulated physically. So why can't we find it? We've been looking at brain chemistry, signals and processes for a while and not found a hint of such a thing. Any other ideas?

The question then is, what observed property of consciousness is not computational? If there is no such property, then the anti-materialists can be safely ignored.

AnimalMuppet 3y ago

But the way you state your question is also assuming the answer to the larger question. What observed properties of consciousness are computational? Are provably computational? If you rigorously and consistently don't assume materialism, what can be proven?

PixyMisa 3y ago
> What observed properties of consciousness are computational? Are provably computational? All of them. > If you rigorously and consistently don't assume materialism, what can be proven? Nothing. Without that premise (or a compatible one), all you have is handwaving.
- AnimalMuppet 3y ago
  All of them are proven computational? Mind laying out your evidence for that statement? Because it sounds like what you have is a presupposition, not evidence. I note that, in your reply to GMoromisato, you asked for evidence. I ask you to meet the standard you expect of others.
  - simonh 3y ago
    I wouldn’t say they are proven computational, but I would say they can be explained in terms of processes on information. Sense data, body awareness, perceptions, noticing things, evaluating situations and options all seem to me to relate to information and processes on it. We use these experiences to form memories and make decisions. Both these are processes on information. Those are all things that consciousness actually does. Is there any function of consciousness we’re aware of that doesn’t relate to information? That leaves the experience itself. It’s an experience of informational content, but is there more going on than transformations of information? What could that be? Maybe a physical substance, or a physical structure, in which case we should be able to physically synthesis consciousness stuff, or assemble a consciousness structure. What else is there?
    - AnimalMuppet 3y ago
      Re. your second paragraph: Like others in this thread, you're assuming the answer. Or rather, you're assuming the presupposition. And that's fine, if you want to do that. But be aware that you're doing it, and that it's unproven. (And maybe be aware how much you're doing it.) > Is there any function of consciousness we’re aware of that doesn’t relate to information? Maybe awareness of your own emotional state? (Though I'm sure that there are views where that also is information processing, and nothing more.)

GMoromisato 3y ago

Pain. Pain (and related feelings) cannot be definitively reduced to computation. I’m open (and even predisposed) to believing it is just computation, but it’s not intuitively obvious. We don’t even know how to test whether an arbitrary system feels pain.

mysecretaccount 3y ago
> Pain (and related feelings) cannot be definitively reduced to computation. This is an assumption. Sensation cannot currently be observed, definitively.
- GMoromisato 3y ago
  I was sloppy, and I think we agree. I meant that pain cannot currently be reduced to computation. I’m open to believing it’s just computation, but it’s not obvious that it is, unless you assume that everything the brain does is. But then you’re the one assuming.
- simonh 3y ago
  Whatever else is going on inside our brains, there's definitely information processing happening and we also know that we have a first person experience of it. Our perceptions are informational, they are experiences of data. Colour, feelings, pain, desires. These are all informational and we use them to make decisions. So whatever consciousness is, what it does is process information. If consciousness itself is not a process on information, then what is it? Another possibility is that it is a substance. Chess is a set of relationships between symbols, but the wetness of a rainstorm is physical water. So is consciousness an actual substance? Where does it go when we don't have it? Is it a chemical that forms at certain times, and is re-combined into another chemical when we lose consciousness? In which case we could synthesis a beaker full of consciousness fluid, or whatever it is. Dualists say it's a non-material 'substance', but I don't think that's a coherent concept. It must interact with matter, or it couldn't receive sensations and cause effects when we make decisions. But how can it interact with matter and be non-material? If it does interact with matter, then it can be detected and manipulated physically. So why can't we find it? We've been looking at brain chemistry, signals and processes for a while and not found a hint of such a thing. Any other ideas?