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I believe the biggest issue is that they are functionally passwords when used in a user-friendy way, but security-wise they are still viewed as MFA. When I use

by crote 4y ago

I believe the biggest issue is that they are functionally passwords when used in a user-friendy way, but security-wise they are still viewed as MFA. When I use a non-proprietary passkeys implementation, it is essentially just a file on my harddrive, just like my KeePass database containing my passwords is. It is still a huge single-point-of-failure, and unlike proper MFA should not be treated as if it provides any additional security. Switching to passkeys is a downgrade from password+2FA token and should be treated as such.

noahtallen 4y ago
I don’t think it’s a complete downgrade. You get phishing protections, single-site super-strong “passwords”, if the public key is leaked, it doesn’t impact you, etc. If the only attack vector is someone having to crack into your encrypted hard drive, and then decrypt whatever stores the passkeys… that’s still both pretty strong and also probably not the biggest security issue most people face. The biggest issues most non-tech people face are 1. reusing simple passwords, and 2. getting phished through similar UIs/emails. It’d be much better for most people to use passkeys.
sebk 4y ago
Passkeys are not quite passwords even if backed by software and stored in the same memory space as other applications running on the OS. They're still asymmetric, cryptographically secure, and domain-bound. It's true that being "just a file on your hard drive" changes the threat model as compared to a hardware security key, but that file is wrapped at rest, potentially with a hardware security key as well. Whether it's a downgrade or not depends on your specific threat model, and whether it's a downgrade for you or for the userbase at large.
- manquer 4y ago
  All of that encryption at rest applies to any password manager too. In comparison with a password manger managed password +2FA , just software passkeys are a downgrade. Whether it is acceptable downgrade can depend on your threat model, the fact that it downgrade or not is not
  - sebk 4y ago
    Please read the comment again, because that wasn't the argument I was making. I'll restate in case I wasn't clear -- the fact that it's wrapped addresses the "just a file"; meaning it's not sufficient to attack the filesystem to steal it, just like a password manager vault is. As for how it's not a downgrade (or upgrade, mind you), it's domain-bound using standard browser APIs, meaning it's less likely than the comparable autofill used by a password manager to not leak passwords to the wrong site (LastPass suffered this issue in the past, for example). It prevents reuse across sites, it's not vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle in the same way a password or TOTP secret is, and guarantees strong assymetric crypto as opposed to whatever a server decides to do with a password and a secret. Additionally, and especially when compared to password managers, most of them now offer to also store and autofill TOTP secrets leaving us in the same spot were at with virtual authenticator backed passkeys, but with worse cryptography.

by crote 4y ago

noahtallen 4y ago

I don’t think it’s a complete downgrade. You get phishing protections, single-site super-strong “passwords”, if the public key is leaked, it doesn’t impact you, etc. If the only attack vector is someone having to crack into your encrypted hard drive, and then decrypt whatever stores the passkeys… that’s still both pretty strong and also probably not the biggest security issue most people face. The biggest issues most non-tech people face are 1. reusing simple passwords, and 2. getting phished through similar UIs/emails. It’d be much better for most people to use passkeys.

sebk 4y ago

Passkeys are not quite passwords even if backed by software and stored in the same memory space as other applications running on the OS. They're still asymmetric, cryptographically secure, and domain-bound. It's true that being "just a file on your hard drive" changes the threat model as compared to a hardware security key, but that file is wrapped at rest, potentially with a hardware security key as well. Whether it's a downgrade or not depends on your specific threat model, and whether it's a downgrade for you or for the userbase at large.

manquer 4y ago
All of that encryption at rest applies to any password manager too. In comparison with a password manger managed password +2FA , just software passkeys are a downgrade. Whether it is acceptable downgrade can depend on your threat model, the fact that it downgrade or not is not
- sebk 4y ago
  Please read the comment again, because that wasn't the argument I was making. I'll restate in case I wasn't clear -- the fact that it's wrapped addresses the "just a file"; meaning it's not sufficient to attack the filesystem to steal it, just like a password manager vault is. As for how it's not a downgrade (or upgrade, mind you), it's domain-bound using standard browser APIs, meaning it's less likely than the comparable autofill used by a password manager to not leak passwords to the wrong site (LastPass suffered this issue in the past, for example). It prevents reuse across sites, it's not vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle in the same way a password or TOTP secret is, and guarantees strong assymetric crypto as opposed to whatever a server decides to do with a password and a secret. Additionally, and especially when compared to password managers, most of them now offer to also store and autofill TOTP secrets leaving us in the same spot were at with virtual authenticator backed passkeys, but with worse cryptography.