3 ms·
Amateur-me thinks that it would not be too hard to prevent such an attack: Have a voltage fault detection circuit at all (TPM-relevant) supply pins that hard-lo
by moring 3y ago
Amateur-me thinks that it would not be too hard to prevent such an attack: Have a voltage fault detection circuit at all (TPM-relevant) supply pins that hard-locks the chip until it gets power cycled, and have those circuits be powered by on-chip capacitors that survive just a little longer than their time-to-trigger. Would that be feasible?
- cwerling 3y agoYour idea roughly goes into the direction of what the industry has started implementing: Tunable Replica Circuits: https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/newsroom/news/the-story-behind-new-intel-security-feature.html https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/newsroom/news/the-st...
- Tuna-Fish 3y agoThis mitigation helps until the attackers stop confining themselves to the supply pins. You can do voltage fault injection through any exposed metal (or metal that can be made exposed), and the attacker can be entirely happy with attacks where they don't actually pull the voltage plane down, but instead just make some specific circuit a bit iffy by injecting an opposite voltage at some specific point and with low enough current that it's undetectable when looking at the chip as whole. Approaches such as yours do make the attack require a lot more skill to accomplish.
- ilyt 3y agoIf you spike the voltage on other pin you'd most likely trigger ESD protection which is just a diode that's connected to one of the power rails, and spike the chip's power supply. Which would be detected if internal watchdog monitors voltages. But if spikes are short enough they might be pretty hard (or just expensive) to detect.