2 ms·
If you think the natural limitation of target CPU time is enough to stop a brute force and the best description is "extremely limited", you are massively overes
by Dylan16807 4y ago
If you think the natural limitation of target CPU time is enough to stop a brute force and the best description is "extremely limited", you are massively overestimating the average password.
Keep in mind there is one-ish account in this scenario.
https://web.archive.org/web/20150327031521/http://research.microsoft.com/pubs/74164/www2007.pdf https://web.archive.org/web/20150327031521/http://research.m...
Going by this, a huge fraction of passwords are in the 30 bit range. And lots of basic web servers can do tens of thousands up to a hundred thousand requests per second per core. Which translates to 2^35 - 2^38 attempts per month per core you saturate, if the login implementation is lazy. Let alone the very many passwords in the 20 bit tier. And I think this paper didn't even consider dictionary words in their analysis of password strength, in which case it's giving much too high ratings to lots of passwords.