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I bought an external drive of theirs a few years ago and they were so into selling me the cloud storage on the back of it. I'm glad that I'm old-fashioned enoug
by anigbrowl 4y ago
I bought an external drive of theirs a few years ago and they were so into selling me the cloud storage on the back of it. I'm glad that I'm old-fashioned enough to have most stuff stored locally on my mediocre home-build systems rather than the super-duper high performance cloud servers in a data center somewhere.
What mystifies me about ransomware attacks is how many targets don't notice that vast quantities of data are being systematically exfiltrated. I can see how it might be particularly difficult for a cloud provider (assuming the hackers didn't pull it all through a single set of credentials), but for many targets, any sort of unfamiliar outgoing data stream larger than a gigabyte ought to be suspicious.
- outworlder 4y ago> I can see how it might be particularly difficult for a cloud provider It is really not, though. Unless they take it very slowly and to locations that are not suspicious. Even something like GuardDuty on AWS will flag 'interesting' traffic to new locations.
- Zuiii 4y agoI know we already have open source IDS/IPS systems, but do we have something like GuardDuty we can run locally that would detect unusually large outbound traffic over a specific timeframe?
- jacquesm 4y ago> What mystifies me about ransomware attacks is how many targets don't notice that vast quantities of data are being systematically exfiltrated. They are not necessarily so. Plenty of times the hackers just pretend they have a copy when in fact they don't. Also encryption 'in place' or overwriting data with noise doesn't do much other than a bunch of IO without any network traffic besides the initial commands.
- anigbrowl 4y agoOK, but in some cases they definitely do have a copy and the amount of data involved is large. It's those cases I'm perplexed by.
- jacquesm 4y agoOne of the things I look at when doing tech DD on companies is whether or not there is exfiltration detection in place. The typical answer is 'what?'. Rarely does the counterparty know what it even is and even more rare that they have it set up.
- neodymiumphish 4y agoBased on my experience with these ransomware actors (I've negotiated at least a couple per month since December), they definitely have the data they claim they have. Usually they only pull PDFs, Office docs, etc, so the entirety of their exfiltrated data for a large corp might only be 50-100GB.
- djbusby 4y agoWould love to read more. Blog posts?
- neodymiumphish 4y agoYou can also check out the company blog, which my team contributes to. Guidepointsecurity.com/blog
- charlie0 4y agoAsking for a friend?
- neodymiumphish 4y agoThat's a great idea! I do have a blog that I'm eventually going to re-invigorate with malware reverse engineering and probably some ransomware negotiation content. Here's the site, although there's nothing relevant to this stuff on there yet: https://neodymiumphi.sh https://neodymiumphi.sh
- CodesInChaos 4y agoFor example, I once encountered some mongodb ransomware, which listed all databases and then dropped them one by one. Reading no data at all. But the message did claim to have downloaded the whole database.
- dylan604 4y ago>how many targets don't notice that vast quantities of data are being systematically exfiltrated. how many people do you know that is constantly monitoring their outbound traffic? hell, how many people do you know that even know what that means? edit: do you mean corporate targets? if so, yeah, i'd expect a competent IT department to be monitoring that kind of activity. i was coming from the home user suffering the malware
- A4ET8a8uTh0 4y ago<< hell, how many people do you know that even know what that means? I will push it even one step further. I knew in an abstract and it was still not until I saw pihole visualizations that I changed my mind about a lot of things. It is one thing to know, but it is quite another to see it with your own peepers. It is a shame, because it means I might be not processing things fully when I consider them in an abstract.
- CJefferson 4y agoFlagging data streams larger than a gigabyte is going to tag every high quality Microsoft teams call that goes on for longer than an hour. Also, sometimes I have to upload a disc image or docker image somewhere. I can’t imagine a company where you had to justify yourself every time that happened.
- djbusby 4y agoThose are in known IP space, perhaps from well known IPs on corp-net. I think up-thread is talking about known-internal IP doing loads of traffic to new-untrusted IP which would indicate exfiltration.
- tatersolid 4y agoMost of the time the exfil doesn’t go to Russian IP space or anything like that. It goes to an S3 bucket controlled by the attacker, and looks exactly like backup or replication traffic. Network-layer security devices are pretty useless in 2023. Everything is encrypted and everything talks to everything else as part of “normal” operations.
- jstarfish 4y ago> What mystifies me about ransomware attacks is how many targets don't notice that vast quantities of data are being systematically exfiltrated. What is your understanding of ransomware? The point isn't to exfiltrate every byte of data, it's to encrypt it in-place (sabotage, not theft). Is some data exfiltrated in some cases? Sure. I'd argue those are espionage cases masquerading as ransomware, and your question holds. But by design ransomware is supposed to fly under the radar.