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I've always been afraid to invest in something like a yubikey or even to use the TPM on any devices I own. I don't ever want to depend on "something I have" tha
by LoganDark 4y ago
I've always been afraid to invest in something like a yubikey or even to use the TPM on any devices I own. I don't ever want to depend on "something I have" that can't be backed up or recovered in any way.
As an example, when I started using a password manager last year, I also made sure to start hosting the (encrypted) passwords database publicly (on a web server) so that if I ever lose it for any reason (SSD fails, etc) I'll be able to download it back onto a computer and unlock it with my master password.
If I ever lose my passwords database I'll also lose access to every internet account I've ever made. It would be far too risky to make it rely on any physical possession of mine.
Some people (most people??) would feel safe knowing that it's impossible for anyone to get into their accounts without their yubikey, but I'd just always be afraid of losing the yubikey.
- aaomidi 4y agoHave more than one Yubikey, use paperbackup keys.
- user3939382 4y agoBest practice is to have multiple Yubikeys, at least 2-3. You could leave one with a trusted person or family member. The odds of losing all of them simultaneously are slim.
- tjoff 4y agoOh, I need a new account. Hang on, can we book a new meeting in two weeks? I have to gather all my security keys first.
- NoZebra120vClip 4y agoThis is great, if you rarely add/update secrets and you also have easy, quick access to that offsite storage. It's not so great if you're constantly tapping your friend because you need to swap Yubikeys again and you both just get sick of that rigmarole. When setting up Yubikey, I discovered a tool, I think it's called "paperkey" and it lets you print out a GPG key after minting it. Have fun typing that back in! OCR ahoy! It's lower-tech, but my solution is to always have a comprehensive catalog of plaintext backup secrets stored offsite. This won't rely on anything electronic and it's easy to use. You just have to make a good effort to guard it from prying eyes, at least any eyes that also know your username and password. And likewise to some of the GPs, I'm skeptical of anything based on possession of an electronic thing that functions properly. The Yubikey is the best yet, because it's simple, purpose-built, and "virtually indestructible" as the marketing copy says. I would even love one of those RSA gadgets with a built-in display for purpose-built TOTP functionality. But paper's the best backup yet. Don't discount paper!
- drowsspa 4y agoI've read this a lot, but honestly is this really the future of security? Keep a Yubikey in your wallet, another in a bank safe, bury another in the family's farm... It doesn't scale at all. And in the end, it's all social-dependent, because one can always cry out in a Hacker News post or in a viral Twitter thread and you'll get access to your account back. But if things happened the way security experts seem to want, losing your two Yubikeys means you should just start life from scratch. I'd rather we find a way to actually involve real-world security instead of pretending the digital world doesn't depend on it.
- nathants 4y agodevices like trezor offer fido2 and backup/restore.
- kimburgess 4y agoThere's a fairly excellent guide on creating a robust key system here: https://github.com/drduh/YubiKey-Guide https://github.com/drduh/YubiKey-Guide. Primary and backup Yubikey for use, offline cert keys, and paper backups. If you're wanting to protect things further you can also also split your backups via a secret sharing scheme (like http://point-at-infinity.org/ssss/ http://point-at-infinity.org/ssss/) and distribute the fragments to people or places your at least partially trust.
- RockRobotRock 4y agoyubikey support for GPG has always been meh for me. FIDO2 ssh keys seem really promising. GPG definitely still has its place though
- kimburgess 4y agoBoth are useful. GPG is good for signing, particularly when that signature is written into some form of immutable history (e.g. git). That signing key can be revoked or time windowed to expire. There are mechanism for distributing that revocation and its validity at the time of signing can be verified at any point in the future. SSH keys are excellent for authentication. They are simple to verify at the time of use, and can also be revoked or for a specific system or usage context. Using these short-term keys for potentially long-term proofs is going to lead to some avoidable pain IMO.
- palata 4y agoOnce setup, for me it's working like a charm. I use GPG for signing (git commits + java jars/aars/apks), it just works.
- smaudet 4y agoI think the other (IMO completely valid) concern is that you don't know what the Yubikey does, really. The protocols are open source, sure, but how sure are you there aren't back-doors in them? The firmware tends to be closed source, I found https://onlykey.io/ https://onlykey.io/ but I can't speak to how truly open they are, having never used them (do they have e.g. specialized hardware/software requirements for building one?) In the end, it strikes me as a security over-complication - 1. have key, 2. keep secret, 3. match key/password to situation (don't re-use keys). These dongles do 1. and 2. but miss the mark wildly on 3. You can say all you like about "backups" but in the end I actually want some things to be less secure than others - if I have to throw out a device every time I forget a password, life becomes some combination of expensive, wasteful, un-tennable, unsafe. I should never need a password to get into my fridge, e.g., and after the key is in the ignition the car should just "work", no messing with SSO while changing lanes.
- ikiris 4y agoThis is a fundamental misunderstanding of how this security model works. You don't have to throw away anything, it just means you reinit that specific key. Have multiple of them for redundancy, trust them all at your central auth point and this isn't an issue.
- smaudet 4y agoI disagree > Have multiple of them for redundancy. Yes so when I have 40 such tokens then I must worry about which ones to bring when for which devices, it's a usability nightmare. I contend you should rarely if ever use one, they are (often) more trouble than they are worth. Or, you are reusing them everywhere, and so you violate the principle of re-use. Yeah, you can daisy chain things and the like, but now you are just making your life needlessly complicated and error prone.
- ikiris 4y agoAgain you are fundamentally misunderstanding how this works. The key proves who you are. You don’t need 40 different ones. Just at least one.
- foobiekr 4y agoI used to be very pro yubikey for a long time but have mostly concluded it doesn't really solve any of the problems people think it solves. It basically just provides a (1) a means to prove that you have access to a key, which isn't actually yubikey dependent, and (2) a way to demonstrate that said key is bound to a hardware device that makes it hard to steal/exfiltrate. People are incredibly laissez faire about their yubikeys - leaving them plugged in, leaving them on their keys, etc. They are an obvious DOS vulnerability. Another basic issue that key theft is actually mostly not a real attack that matters for most people. Spearphishing and faked sites are handled by any password manager worth using. If your threat is protection from key loggers, either don't use a wired keyboard or you are likely in a place where your local device is assumed to be already compromised (by the logger and probably a RAT) so now things like session cookies theft, TOCTOU swapping between authenticated operations, etc. are all in scope and the yubikey offers essentially nothing. On top of that, most sites that "support FIDO", including google, will almost always be configured to fall back to other means. It does allow one to make a clever device into a shibboleth, though.
- Hamuko 4y agoWhat's wrong with having your Yubikeys on your keys?
- foobiekr 4y agoEvil maid attacks for pin theft, stolen YubiKey and denial of service, etc. it depends on whether you’re one of the people who leaves their keys sitting on their desk.
- konha 4y ago> People are incredibly laissez faire about their yubikeys - leaving them plugged in, leaving them on their keys, etc. You can (should) protect your YubiKey with a pin. They will lock/reset after a couple of failed attempts. > On top of that, most sites that "support FIDO", including google, will almost always be configured to fall back to other means. Google accounts can be configured to require hardware tokens for 2FA without fallback to less secure methods. [0] Apple has a similar program. [1] [0] https://landing.google.com/advancedprotection/ https://landing.google.com/advancedprotection/ [1] https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212520 https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212520
- sneak 4y ago> I don't ever want to depend on "something I have" that can't be backed up or recovered in any way. Just put one in each computer and one on your key ring and one in a safe. I have like 7. authorized_keys can have multiple lines in it.
- LoganDark 4y ago> authorized_keys can have multiple lines in it. I'm talking about more than just SSH keys—it just happens to include SSH keys as well. This isn't an opinion against Secretive specifically, for what it's worth, but rather against "something you have" in general, which includes TPMs (or Secure Enclaves, as it may be). It's my personal reason for not relying on something like that.
- sneak 4y agoAlmost everyone who supports U2F or WebAuthn also supports enrolling multiple keys.
- trallnag 4y agoThis sounds ridiculous.
- sneak 4y agoI have a lot of computers because some of my clients are in regulated industries and if I ever get subpoenaed I can prune my company's proprietary non-customer-specific dotfiles and just hand over that laptop in full with 100% of that specific client's data on it and not compromise any personal/my-company's data or any other client data. I don't like switching yubikeys and they make little tiny ones that live 24/7 in a USB-C port and they are cheap, so I literally just put one in each and every computer I type on. It's simple and easy.