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> I've been trying to engage in good faith, You put words in my mouth and seemed to be misconstruing my point. I didn't assume bad faith, but I didn't assume g

> I've been trying to engage in good faith, You put words in my mouth and seemed to be misconstruing my point. I didn't assume bad faith, but I didn't assume good faith either given that. > you have a lot of dismissive, low to no-content replies Yeah, probably. A lot of people are saying ignorant things, like the people claiming if someone got root on SELinux they could just change the SELinux policies. > you don't have a great way to gauge my knowledge on this When people say something egregiously wrong, it's helps gauge. It's like if someone is telling me something about the English President I'm probably not going to put too much weight in anything they say about geopolitics. > I'm not really defending pledge, and I'm not offended by the prospect that SELinux might provide superior security. Well, that's great, because that's been my only real point, yet plenty of people do seem to be offended by exactly what you say you personally are not. > I'm just trying to have a discussion with you. I apologize profusely for being more hostile than is warranted then. I much prefer to discuss this stuff as I am passionate about it. But there are a ton of people responding emotionally with tired arguments, and it becomes a chore to reply when no good faith discussion is taking place. > I will suggest that there may be other axes on which to evaluate a security solution. For example, maybe I don't want the complexity of SELinux (it is, by any measure, complex) and OpenBSD's security lets me address my threat model while avoiding SELinux' complexity. Or in other words, maybe I don't care that I can't restrict nginx to only bind to a specific port, I just don't want it serving up arbitrary files out of my filesystems: chroot to the rescue. I wouldn't dispute that for a second. I agree SELinux or similar isn't needed for every use case. My point was that OBSD, if it wants to be a security focused OS and taken seriously as such, should offer something along those lines. It doesn't have to be as complex, but they should have something. Instead, you have people suggesting and advocating for things that are not remotely similar, but are the closest and best OpenBSD has to offer along those lines, which IMO are not good enough. > "Hrmph, I'm just sure it's possible because of the power of root", Pretty much, yeah, except it's hardly a stretch like you are making it seem. If I can run code as root, I can find those files as devices if I'm determined enough, absolutely, even if I have to interact with devices directly and bypass the filesystem. > Hrmph, I'm just sure there's tons of junk bugs in the monstrous SELinux code base, not to mention unintended interactions with features and other subsystems Sure, although unlikely. Pretty sure SELinux (not Linux) has a better track record than OBSD for serious bugs, and none that have allowed full compromise unlike with OpenBSD. The point, again, is not so much to advocate for SELinux (I prefer RSBAC myself anyway), but that OpenBSD should have something that fills the same niche. It doesn't have to be as complex, it doesn't have to be a full implementation, but they should have something. And they don't. > "cute" and "play some tricks" are dismissive Yes, because I'm dismissive of those technologies in the context they were brought up in. > "toys" is dismissive. Yup. > Multiple people have tried to engage with you to try to discuss SELinux vs. OpenBSD's other security features, and your replies have uniformly been, "do some more reading on SELinux", only more rude. OSS OSes like OBSD are tribal. People defend them out of emotion very often, just as much as people defend sports teams or religions. A lot of the replies are bad. There are people defending OpenBSD claiming it does what SELinux, or trying to discredit SELinux without seemingly even knowing core basics about it. As far as I'm concerned, the quality of my replies is proportional to the comments I am replying to.

camgunz 4y ago
> You put words in my mouth and seemed to be misconstruing my point. I'm just trying to put meat on the bones of your argument, which I thought was: "'secure by default' by OBSD basically just means everything disabled by default." Seems reasonable to infer that you meant if I enabled some stuff I'd have significantly more remote holes, which didn't seem true. You then said that wasn't your argument: > Generally for a server people are running some kind of services, and that's going to include third party software. Not always, but often, and that software is not audited by OBSD team. Even say adding a module to httpd may allow for remote compromise I think "an insecure PHP app" qualifies as third party software, and it sounds like unveil/pledge/chroot mitigates the scenario you're describing. Can you explain why that's a bad example, and do you have a better one? > like the people claiming if someone got root on SELinux they could just change the SELinux policies In fairness, this isn't unlike your claim that you can bit-twiddle raw devices in a chroot to find a filesystem ("If you have root, you have access to the files, period. Someone determined enough could search, read and write to the disk directly, bypassing the filesystem"). Well, there are differences: in a chroot you don't have access to the raw devices and OpenBSD's default securelevel already mounts them read-only besides. > My point was that OBSD, if it wants to be a security focused OS and taken seriously as such, should offer something along those lines. > Pretty sure SELinux (not Linux) has a better track record than OBSD for serious bugs, and none that have allowed full compromise unlike with OpenBSD. SELinux has a huge attack surface, and has had a lot of privilege escalation and code execution bugs [0]. I know it's kind of a polemic, but hard to not call it a rootkit at this point. I think OpenBSD deciding to not build something like it is a pretty good security choice. It's probably a good idea that root is just another user, but privesc means becoming any user, so in the wake of those vulns that design choice doesn't buy you very much. > As far as I'm concerned, the quality of my replies is proportional to the comments I am replying to. I get where you're coming from here--and I've definitely done it myself--but that's the kind of thing that lowers the quality of discussion here. You can't control what other people post, but you can control how you respond. [0]: https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvekey.cgi?keyword=selinux https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvekey.cgi?keyword=selinux
- Zurrrrr 4y ago
  > I'm just trying to put meat on the bones of your argument, If you were uncertain about something, why not just ask? > I think "an insecure PHP app" qualifies as third party software, mod_php would be, not the php app itself. > and it sounds like unveil/pledge/chroot mitigates the scenario you're describing. Can you explain why that's a bad example, and do you have a better one? It's a bad example because it's not really a separate app so much as it is a slight extension to httpd that might introduce some insecurities. A better example would be running an actual app...a database for example, maybe an irc server, a jabba server, anything that listens on it's own port and accepts network connections. unveil/pledge/chroot won't mitigate any scenario where an attacker has remote root to satisfaction. > In fairness, this isn't unlike your claim that you can bit-twiddle raw devices in a chroot to find a filesystem It's radically different. You would have to leverage root to gain access to another user that isn't managed by the system, and where you have no real access despite being root. There is no pathway to do what you suggest. At all. > in a chroot you don't have access to the raw devices We're not going to agree on this at all lol. chroot as protection is just fundamentally weaker and it should ONLY be part of defense in depth, while you and other people seem to be happy with it as almost a final solution. chroots can be escaped, the openbsd team even warn of this on the manpage for their own chroot. > SELinux has a huge attack surface, and has had a lot of privilege escalation and code execution bugs Sure, but none of which can be utilized in the way you suggest is possible. Got an example that shows otherwise? > but hard to not call it a rootkit at this point. Well that's ridiculous. > I think OpenBSD deciding to not build something like it is a pretty good security choice. And that's flat out wrong. You're not keen on selinux because of the complexity, but not all implementations have to be that complex. Look at things like rsbac and apparmor. > so in the wake of those vulns that design choice doesn't buy you very much. This just doesn't make sense, period. On an SELinux system, you won't be able to simply switch to the policy administrator and give yourself whatever access you want. That shows IMO a fundamental misunderstanding of how SELinux works. > https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvekey.cgi?keyword=selinux https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvekey.cgi?keyword=selinux So which of these allow for a restricted root to switch a user with a role that can administer SELinux policies, and how would the attacker find out which user that is?

camgunz 4y ago

> You put words in my mouth and seemed to be misconstruing my point. I'm just trying to put meat on the bones of your argument, which I thought was: "'secure by default' by OBSD basically just means everything disabled by default." Seems reasonable to infer that you meant if I enabled some stuff I'd have significantly more remote holes, which didn't seem true. You then said that wasn't your argument: > Generally for a server people are running some kind of services, and that's going to include third party software. Not always, but often, and that software is not audited by OBSD team. Even say adding a module to httpd may allow for remote compromise I think "an insecure PHP app" qualifies as third party software, and it sounds like unveil/pledge/chroot mitigates the scenario you're describing. Can you explain why that's a bad example, and do you have a better one? > like the people claiming if someone got root on SELinux they could just change the SELinux policies In fairness, this isn't unlike your claim that you can bit-twiddle raw devices in a chroot to find a filesystem ("If you have root, you have access to the files, period. Someone determined enough could search, read and write to the disk directly, bypassing the filesystem"). Well, there are differences: in a chroot you don't have access to the raw devices and OpenBSD's default securelevel already mounts them read-only besides. > My point was that OBSD, if it wants to be a security focused OS and taken seriously as such, should offer something along those lines. > Pretty sure SELinux (not Linux) has a better track record than OBSD for serious bugs, and none that have allowed full compromise unlike with OpenBSD. SELinux has a huge attack surface, and has had a lot of privilege escalation and code execution bugs [0]. I know it's kind of a polemic, but hard to not call it a rootkit at this point. I think OpenBSD deciding to not build something like it is a pretty good security choice. It's probably a good idea that root is just another user, but privesc means becoming any user, so in the wake of those vulns that design choice doesn't buy you very much. > As far as I'm concerned, the quality of my replies is proportional to the comments I am replying to. I get where you're coming from here--and I've definitely done it myself--but that's the kind of thing that lowers the quality of discussion here. You can't control what other people post, but you can control how you respond. [0]: https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvekey.cgi?keyword=selinux https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvekey.cgi?keyword=selinux

Zurrrrr 4y ago
> I'm just trying to put meat on the bones of your argument, If you were uncertain about something, why not just ask? > I think "an insecure PHP app" qualifies as third party software, mod_php would be, not the php app itself. > and it sounds like unveil/pledge/chroot mitigates the scenario you're describing. Can you explain why that's a bad example, and do you have a better one? It's a bad example because it's not really a separate app so much as it is a slight extension to httpd that might introduce some insecurities. A better example would be running an actual app...a database for example, maybe an irc server, a jabba server, anything that listens on it's own port and accepts network connections. unveil/pledge/chroot won't mitigate any scenario where an attacker has remote root to satisfaction. > In fairness, this isn't unlike your claim that you can bit-twiddle raw devices in a chroot to find a filesystem It's radically different. You would have to leverage root to gain access to another user that isn't managed by the system, and where you have no real access despite being root. There is no pathway to do what you suggest. At all. > in a chroot you don't have access to the raw devices We're not going to agree on this at all lol. chroot as protection is just fundamentally weaker and it should ONLY be part of defense in depth, while you and other people seem to be happy with it as almost a final solution. chroots can be escaped, the openbsd team even warn of this on the manpage for their own chroot. > SELinux has a huge attack surface, and has had a lot of privilege escalation and code execution bugs Sure, but none of which can be utilized in the way you suggest is possible. Got an example that shows otherwise? > but hard to not call it a rootkit at this point. Well that's ridiculous. > I think OpenBSD deciding to not build something like it is a pretty good security choice. And that's flat out wrong. You're not keen on selinux because of the complexity, but not all implementations have to be that complex. Look at things like rsbac and apparmor. > so in the wake of those vulns that design choice doesn't buy you very much. This just doesn't make sense, period. On an SELinux system, you won't be able to simply switch to the policy administrator and give yourself whatever access you want. That shows IMO a fundamental misunderstanding of how SELinux works. > https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvekey.cgi?keyword=selinux https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvekey.cgi?keyword=selinux So which of these allow for a restricted root to switch a user with a role that can administer SELinux policies, and how would the attacker find out which user that is?