4 ms·

PRC/TW conflict already legally ongoing civil war. PRC a2d2 extends all the way to guam, west tw shore trivially deniable from even mainland, not that there's m

PRC/TW conflict already legally ongoing civil war. PRC a2d2 extends all the way to guam, west tw shore trivially deniable from even mainland, not that there's major ports/landing options or that mountains and limited connections make east/west logisitcs unfeasible. Mining sealanes and destroying airfields = west couldnt run blockade even if they wanted.

lumost 4y ago
> Mining sealanes and destroying airfields = west couldnt run blockade even if they wanted. The Berlin airlift had a similar dynamic. The USSR could have shot down the planes - but they did not as it would have brought them too close to war. If the US/Japan sends an escorted "relief" convoy via air or sea - China is unlikely to intercept without triggering a direct conflict. A direct war between the US/Japan/Australia/EU(?) and China benefits no one and runs dangerously close to a world war. In a similar way that Russia could attempt to stop arms flows from Poland and Germany into Ukraine - they don't really have the option without risking a full war which they cannot win. In a hypothetical "narrow" conflict over the Taiwan straight between the US and China, a Chinese victory would mean 20k+ American casualties and an absent Pacific/Indian Ocean fleet. In the best case, China will no longer enjoy US protected global shipping lanes due to an absent USN. Worst case, the US threatens nuclear escalation to arrest the conflict (or follows through on the threat). A US victory would mean that the Chinese mainland is under direct attack from US carrier groups - Nuclear escalation would be almost inevitable. The likely outcome is that the US and other Taiwan allies would be allowed to supply Taiwan without intervention in order to avoid a wider war.
- missedthecue 4y ago
  China doesn't have to destroy US airplanes, only port and aircraft infrastructure in Taiwan. They would not have to risk direct conflict with the US.
  - lumost 4y ago
    Directly attacking food shipments/landings would invite more sanctions and increase the likelihood of more weapons being delivered to defend said infrastructure. Past studies have shown that even nukes have trouble knocking out rail and port infrastructure. It’s highly unlikely that china would be capable of achieving and holding full air supremacy in Taiwan. Particularly if SAM systems are readily replaced. The two thousand cruise missiles launched by Russia into Ukraine have failed to degrade infrastructure. Even with 20k+ cruise missiles - makeshift ports were constructed in days during ww2.
    - missedthecue 4y ago
      There are 22 airports in Taiwan and only 4 with the infrastructure to handle cargo flights. China has over 100,000 rockets and missiles estimated to be in their inventory, and the best manufacturing system in the world to produce more. A 747 cannot land on a ripped up and shredded runway, and it cannot offload goods into burning warehouses. Not to mention the ridiculous idea of trying to feed, clothe, and care for 25 million people living on the island of Taiwan with aircraft. It cannot be compared to the berlin airlift which supplied a fraction of the people with a fraction of the goods, and whose flights lasted less than an hour. Flights to Taiwan would likely come from Tokyo, which is an 8 hour round trip. And they would probably need complex refueling operations on at least one of the legs, because Taiwan would run out of jet fuel immediately. The US doesn't have enough of a tanker fleet to support something like this, or enough cargo aircraft fitted with refueling probes. As for ports, China does need to level them, they just need to place some of their 200,000+ sea mines in the approaches to Taiwan. They can do this with subs, aircraft, high speed watercraft and even with rocket launchers. Luckily for China, the major Taiwanese ports are on the coast which faces the strait rather than the open pacific, simplifying matters.
      - lumost 4y ago
        Build more ports on the pacific? The Berlin airlift was conducted in 1948 - technology and shipping capacity has improved dramatically since. While china may have many mines - it is not unreasonable that an open seas mission could bring up to 5 carrier strike groups to the pacific coast of Taiwan. Enough to deter mine laying operations as well as conduct mine clearing operations. Based on the game theory outlined above, the optimal strategy would be for Taiwan Allie’s to deploy enough military power that a Chinese strike on naval assets would immediately translate to full scale war. 5 carrier strike groups is also sufficient to block sea trade into china from further out than land based missiles can reach. This was also part of the nato strategy with Ukraine. There is enough military on standby in Eastern Europe to dissuade any attack against nato territory. China needs a fast war that doesn’t escalate to win. Taiwan needs only not to lose. I don’t think china can simultaneously target food and American aircraft carriers without triggering a full war.
- dirtyid 4y ago
  PRC will not allow TW to be resupplied by west simply because legally that means foreign hardware operating on Chinese soil to support separatists during Chinese civil war. Optically that's a none starter. The likely outcome is PRC will mine TW shores and continues to crater TW airfields that TW allies can't supply TW even if they wanted to because no one is going to even attempt to supply under such dangerous conditions, and at TW scale there's need to call on civilian contractors who will nope just like civilian black sea agriculture flows can't operate without RU cooperation. Important point being PRC doesn't have to intercept, it can passively deny via mines and cratering airfields blockade running at scale needed to support the island is not technically feasible. Besides the ludicrous notion of Berlin airlifting an island of 24M people - western global strategic airlift doesn't remotely have capacity even pulling civilian assets. What's most likely going to happen is once TW slowly starves and dehydrated PRC will offer to supply from strait side (being one of the few powers by size and geography that actually can supply 24m mouths), TW genpop by this time may likely be fatigued to point of capitulation (it won't be UKR where shelves still stocked with food and civilians defy with full bellies), and deliver relief along with military, with returning mainland trips exfiltrating foreign nationals using has human shields to limit escalation. >they cannot win PRC can very well win against US regional allies, and in many ways, a broader war is preferable because limited war means US IndoPac security infra remains untouched and others in region free to hedge with US security after TW damocles off the table. The greatest PRC strategic vision is to kick US security out of east asia and for that she needs a broad war where PRC demonstrates US cannot fulfill security commitments by destroying a protectorate so utterly that no one else would consider bandwagoning under US security umbrella after TW. Even in case of draw/loss, having opportunity to knock out extensive US IndoPac military infra (i.e. PineGap in AU) cripples US threatre capability for potentially decades. Who wins is relative, one side can win more. PRC and US both losing similar amount of blue water hulls = PRC can STILL assert military projection in her backyard with land based air assets, VS US basically gets kicked out of the Asian power projection and perhaps global hegemony game. The loss is not symmetric. Also PRC doesn't need USN to protect global shipping, that's more Zeihan wank that hasn't been relevant for decade+. What PRC has been doing is freeloading off US, but it's more than capable to assuming own protection duties. I've wrote elsewhere about how seriously PRC historically takes nuclear escalation with respect to security interests - it doesn't - having fought with US, USSR, IND, threatened UK, proxy FR over things much less important in TW. US carrier groups are unlikely to threaten mainland with PRC a2ad which again extends to Guam, well past even CSG sprint + stand off extended range. And even lul recent balloon drama aside, PRC rocket force can reciprocate hitting CONUS infra conventionally. If the US takes war to PRC mainland, expect critical infra to be gone on CONUS. It will take a few years for mutual vulnerability to filter way through western analysis, but all the US wank expeditionary warfare is contingent on it being unilateral, with homeland remaining un-disrupted. That's not true with PRC anymore, with PRC ability to strike CONUS only increasing with time, which will greatly circumscribe what the US will do in the TW scenario. And with precise rapid strikes being developed (PRC parlance for prompt global strike), we're talking about every US capital asset being a port visit away from being scrap. Including upcoming B21s that still needs hanger dramaqueen time. West keeps focusing on US deterrence efforts around TW without realizing PRC is also simultaneously building up intervention deterrence. Except PRC deterrence development is much more significant - US could always hit targets in mainland, that calculation was baked it. It's when PRC can hit CONUS that real deterrence math changes.

lumost 4y ago

> Mining sealanes and destroying airfields = west couldnt run blockade even if they wanted. The Berlin airlift had a similar dynamic. The USSR could have shot down the planes - but they did not as it would have brought them too close to war. If the US/Japan sends an escorted "relief" convoy via air or sea - China is unlikely to intercept without triggering a direct conflict. A direct war between the US/Japan/Australia/EU(?) and China benefits no one and runs dangerously close to a world war. In a similar way that Russia could attempt to stop arms flows from Poland and Germany into Ukraine - they don't really have the option without risking a full war which they cannot win. In a hypothetical "narrow" conflict over the Taiwan straight between the US and China, a Chinese victory would mean 20k+ American casualties and an absent Pacific/Indian Ocean fleet. In the best case, China will no longer enjoy US protected global shipping lanes due to an absent USN. Worst case, the US threatens nuclear escalation to arrest the conflict (or follows through on the threat). A US victory would mean that the Chinese mainland is under direct attack from US carrier groups - Nuclear escalation would be almost inevitable. The likely outcome is that the US and other Taiwan allies would be allowed to supply Taiwan without intervention in order to avoid a wider war.

missedthecue 4y ago
China doesn't have to destroy US airplanes, only port and aircraft infrastructure in Taiwan. They would not have to risk direct conflict with the US.
- lumost 4y ago
  Directly attacking food shipments/landings would invite more sanctions and increase the likelihood of more weapons being delivered to defend said infrastructure. Past studies have shown that even nukes have trouble knocking out rail and port infrastructure. It’s highly unlikely that china would be capable of achieving and holding full air supremacy in Taiwan. Particularly if SAM systems are readily replaced. The two thousand cruise missiles launched by Russia into Ukraine have failed to degrade infrastructure. Even with 20k+ cruise missiles - makeshift ports were constructed in days during ww2.
  - missedthecue 4y ago
    There are 22 airports in Taiwan and only 4 with the infrastructure to handle cargo flights. China has over 100,000 rockets and missiles estimated to be in their inventory, and the best manufacturing system in the world to produce more. A 747 cannot land on a ripped up and shredded runway, and it cannot offload goods into burning warehouses. Not to mention the ridiculous idea of trying to feed, clothe, and care for 25 million people living on the island of Taiwan with aircraft. It cannot be compared to the berlin airlift which supplied a fraction of the people with a fraction of the goods, and whose flights lasted less than an hour. Flights to Taiwan would likely come from Tokyo, which is an 8 hour round trip. And they would probably need complex refueling operations on at least one of the legs, because Taiwan would run out of jet fuel immediately. The US doesn't have enough of a tanker fleet to support something like this, or enough cargo aircraft fitted with refueling probes. As for ports, China does need to level them, they just need to place some of their 200,000+ sea mines in the approaches to Taiwan. They can do this with subs, aircraft, high speed watercraft and even with rocket launchers. Luckily for China, the major Taiwanese ports are on the coast which faces the strait rather than the open pacific, simplifying matters.
    - lumost 4y ago
      Build more ports on the pacific? The Berlin airlift was conducted in 1948 - technology and shipping capacity has improved dramatically since. While china may have many mines - it is not unreasonable that an open seas mission could bring up to 5 carrier strike groups to the pacific coast of Taiwan. Enough to deter mine laying operations as well as conduct mine clearing operations. Based on the game theory outlined above, the optimal strategy would be for Taiwan Allie’s to deploy enough military power that a Chinese strike on naval assets would immediately translate to full scale war. 5 carrier strike groups is also sufficient to block sea trade into china from further out than land based missiles can reach. This was also part of the nato strategy with Ukraine. There is enough military on standby in Eastern Europe to dissuade any attack against nato territory. China needs a fast war that doesn’t escalate to win. Taiwan needs only not to lose. I don’t think china can simultaneously target food and American aircraft carriers without triggering a full war.
dirtyid 4y ago
PRC will not allow TW to be resupplied by west simply because legally that means foreign hardware operating on Chinese soil to support separatists during Chinese civil war. Optically that's a none starter. The likely outcome is PRC will mine TW shores and continues to crater TW airfields that TW allies can't supply TW even if they wanted to because no one is going to even attempt to supply under such dangerous conditions, and at TW scale there's need to call on civilian contractors who will nope just like civilian black sea agriculture flows can't operate without RU cooperation. Important point being PRC doesn't have to intercept, it can passively deny via mines and cratering airfields blockade running at scale needed to support the island is not technically feasible. Besides the ludicrous notion of Berlin airlifting an island of 24M people - western global strategic airlift doesn't remotely have capacity even pulling civilian assets. What's most likely going to happen is once TW slowly starves and dehydrated PRC will offer to supply from strait side (being one of the few powers by size and geography that actually can supply 24m mouths), TW genpop by this time may likely be fatigued to point of capitulation (it won't be UKR where shelves still stocked with food and civilians defy with full bellies), and deliver relief along with military, with returning mainland trips exfiltrating foreign nationals using has human shields to limit escalation. >they cannot win PRC can very well win against US regional allies, and in many ways, a broader war is preferable because limited war means US IndoPac security infra remains untouched and others in region free to hedge with US security after TW damocles off the table. The greatest PRC strategic vision is to kick US security out of east asia and for that she needs a broad war where PRC demonstrates US cannot fulfill security commitments by destroying a protectorate so utterly that no one else would consider bandwagoning under US security umbrella after TW. Even in case of draw/loss, having opportunity to knock out extensive US IndoPac military infra (i.e. PineGap in AU) cripples US threatre capability for potentially decades. Who wins is relative, one side can win more. PRC and US both losing similar amount of blue water hulls = PRC can STILL assert military projection in her backyard with land based air assets, VS US basically gets kicked out of the Asian power projection and perhaps global hegemony game. The loss is not symmetric. Also PRC doesn't need USN to protect global shipping, that's more Zeihan wank that hasn't been relevant for decade+. What PRC has been doing is freeloading off US, but it's more than capable to assuming own protection duties. I've wrote elsewhere about how seriously PRC historically takes nuclear escalation with respect to security interests - it doesn't - having fought with US, USSR, IND, threatened UK, proxy FR over things much less important in TW. US carrier groups are unlikely to threaten mainland with PRC a2ad which again extends to Guam, well past even CSG sprint + stand off extended range. And even lul recent balloon drama aside, PRC rocket force can reciprocate hitting CONUS infra conventionally. If the US takes war to PRC mainland, expect critical infra to be gone on CONUS. It will take a few years for mutual vulnerability to filter way through western analysis, but all the US wank expeditionary warfare is contingent on it being unilateral, with homeland remaining un-disrupted. That's not true with PRC anymore, with PRC ability to strike CONUS only increasing with time, which will greatly circumscribe what the US will do in the TW scenario. And with precise rapid strikes being developed (PRC parlance for prompt global strike), we're talking about every US capital asset being a port visit away from being scrap. Including upcoming B21s that still needs hanger dramaqueen time. West keeps focusing on US deterrence efforts around TW without realizing PRC is also simultaneously building up intervention deterrence. Except PRC deterrence development is much more significant - US could always hit targets in mainland, that calculation was baked it. It's when PRC can hit CONUS that real deterrence math changes.