3 ms·

Compared to "traditional" password managers: Pros: - you don't have to store/transfer the encrypted vault (usually few kB in size) Cons: - can't rotate pass

Compared to "traditional" password managers: Pros: - you don't have to store/transfer the encrypted vault (usually few kB in size) Cons: - can't rotate passwords if service needs you to change it (leak, periodic rotation etc.) - it can't support two factor auth (for the manager itself) - it does not support auto-fill (but theoretically can, through a browser extension) - it's web only (harder to trust) - if one of your passwords leak, it's as if your whole password vault leaked -- the attacker can just brute force "master passwords" until they arrive at the same password, after which they can generate all of your other passwords

shudza 4y ago
Wdym "just brute force master passwords"? You use password + secret key to generate a password. Hardly brute-forceable.
- krissemicolon 4y ago
  Think about what would happen if everyone uses this tool and its known around the world.
  - DoctorOW 4y ago
    Sure, if everyone used this, you'd have a copy of the algorithm used. But you're trying to solve for two unique variables, master password and secret key.
  - Piskvorrr 4y ago
    The basic principle still holds: "Kerckhoff's principle is the concept that a cryptographic system should be designed to be secure, even if all its details, except for the key, are publicly known" - which seems to be happening here (caveat emptor, also this should be self-hostable). In other words, the security still hinges on the secret key, except you're not directly using the password Secr3tKey#website.example, but its hash. If everyone used this, the password strength would still be only dependent on the secret key strength, and wouldn't provide an easier avenue to a preimage (i.e. can't find the key otherwise than bruteforce; even though the explanation has some worrying confusion between hashing and encryption). Fairly straightforward, except some opsec concerns (e.g. "domain name lapses in a few years and Evil Operator starts logging the secret keys", or "site is unavailable for initial load, even though it does work offline afterwards")
- PufPufPuf 4y ago
  If your password leaks from a single service, and I somehow know that you use this tool, I could then try all the combinations of the secret key until the service produces the same password as the one leaked. Now I have your secret key, and can derive your other passwords. Notice how traditional password managers don't have this problem at all. If a password leaks, it tells you absolutely nothing about the other passwords.
  - NayamAmarshe 4y ago
    That would still be very difficult I believe. The algorithm is CPU and Memory intensive because I'm using scrypt internally.
  - shudza 4y ago
    Yes but if I use a proper secret key, you won't be able to brute force it. You can't brute force anything 20+ chars in a billion years (inaccurate approximation)
sigio 4y ago
More cons: You still need to remember the exact spelling/variant of the URL, username and password-settings I'll just stick with passwordstore.org and bitwarden/vaultwarden
danbruc 4y ago
You might also run into trouble with random password format requirements - too long, too short, not enough special characters, the wrong kind of special characters, ...

shudza 4y ago

Wdym "just brute force master passwords"? You use password + secret key to generate a password. Hardly brute-forceable.

krissemicolon 4y ago
Think about what would happen if everyone uses this tool and its known around the world.
- DoctorOW 4y ago
  Sure, if everyone used this, you'd have a copy of the algorithm used. But you're trying to solve for two unique variables, master password and secret key.
- Piskvorrr 4y ago
  The basic principle still holds: "Kerckhoff's principle is the concept that a cryptographic system should be designed to be secure, even if all its details, except for the key, are publicly known" - which seems to be happening here (caveat emptor, also this should be self-hostable). In other words, the security still hinges on the secret key, except you're not directly using the password Secr3tKey#website.example, but its hash. If everyone used this, the password strength would still be only dependent on the secret key strength, and wouldn't provide an easier avenue to a preimage (i.e. can't find the key otherwise than bruteforce; even though the explanation has some worrying confusion between hashing and encryption). Fairly straightforward, except some opsec concerns (e.g. "domain name lapses in a few years and Evil Operator starts logging the secret keys", or "site is unavailable for initial load, even though it does work offline afterwards")
PufPufPuf 4y ago
If your password leaks from a single service, and I somehow know that you use this tool, I could then try all the combinations of the secret key until the service produces the same password as the one leaked. Now I have your secret key, and can derive your other passwords. Notice how traditional password managers don't have this problem at all. If a password leaks, it tells you absolutely nothing about the other passwords.
- NayamAmarshe 4y ago
  That would still be very difficult I believe. The algorithm is CPU and Memory intensive because I'm using scrypt internally.
- shudza 4y ago
  Yes but if I use a proper secret key, you won't be able to brute force it. You can't brute force anything 20+ chars in a billion years (inaccurate approximation)

sigio 4y ago

More cons: You still need to remember the exact spelling/variant of the URL, username and password-settings I'll just stick with passwordstore.org and bitwarden/vaultwarden

danbruc 4y ago

You might also run into trouble with random password format requirements - too long, too short, not enough special characters, the wrong kind of special characters, ...