4 ms·

As a vegan with things like sardines and insects is that, at least currently, we can't gauge if they can suffer or not, so err on the side of caution and don't

As a vegan with things like sardines and insects is that, at least currently, we can't gauge if they can suffer or not, so err on the side of caution and don't eat them.

slothtrop 4y ago
That's as meaningful as saying you can't gauge whether plants suffer or not - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wound_response_in_plants#MAMPs/_DAMPS_&_Signaling_Pathways https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wound_response_in_plants#MAMPs... I think we can get a pretty good ballpark estimate, by virtue that suffering categorically requires a certain level consciousness.
- someNameIG 4y ago
  Plants have no brains or analog at all, plats reacting and signalling is no different than a bacteria moving along a concentration gradient. The animals I mentioned do, even if very simple ones. If you really want to question this bivalves are a better example, as I've seen many debates in vegan circles about them.
  - slothtrop 4y ago
    > plats reacting and signalling is no different than a bacteria moving along a concentration gradient. No different than pain receptors, you mean. > Plants have no brains or analog at all No brain, yes. But what of "no analog" if the qualifier for suffering is deliberately clouded in ambiguity? The only reason the brain matters qua suffering is owing to the capacity for consciousness. Plants have no brain, well, sardines have no cerebral cortex. If you're going to trivialize the cerebral cortex based on whim/feeling, you can do the same for the whole brain. By extension it makes as much sense to attribute the possibility of consciousness to insects as it does to plants, because you're throwing the particulars of the brain out the window. Some "magical unknown thing 'X'" is giving them consciousness - but there's no reason "magical unknown thing 'X'" has to be specific to a brain.
    - Dylan16807 4y ago
      > No different than pain receptors, you mean. Not the best argument. I don't really mind my pain receptors going off if the signal doesn't make it to my spine. Do you?
      - slothtrop 4y ago
        If the signal "doesn't make it", it's an ineffectual signal. Are you suggesting plants have ineffectual signals?
        Dylan16807 4y ago
        I'm suggesting that more localized signals are not the same as a pain response in a centralized blob of neurons.
- DangitBobby 4y ago
  I've seen this "argument" offered up many times, but never see a satisfying conclusion. The goal is to minimize suffering. What could you possibly do with the information that plants feel pain? Your options are to: 1. Die 2. Decide there are no perfect options and give up on minimizing harm completely 3. Do your best to pick a diet and lifestyle which minimizes harm with actionable heuristics What exactly do you suggest?
  - slothtrop 4y ago
    > What could you possibly do with the information that plants feel pain? Keep the goalpost planted at "suffering" which requires consciousness. So we're still at #3. The analogy of the plant is just to reflect that there's sloppy conjecture used to project the capacity for suffering onto certain animals that by all the counts should not (where suffering entails a conscious awareness of pain and despair).

As a vegan with things like sardines and insects is that, at least currently, we can't gauge if they can suffer or not, so err on the side of caution and don't eat them.

slothtrop 4y ago

That's as meaningful as saying you can't gauge whether plants suffer or not - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wound_response_in_plants#MAMPs/_DAMPS_&_Signaling_Pathways https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wound_response_in_plants#MAMPs... I think we can get a pretty good ballpark estimate, by virtue that suffering categorically requires a certain level consciousness.

someNameIG 4y ago
Plants have no brains or analog at all, plats reacting and signalling is no different than a bacteria moving along a concentration gradient. The animals I mentioned do, even if very simple ones. If you really want to question this bivalves are a better example, as I've seen many debates in vegan circles about them.
- slothtrop 4y ago
  > plats reacting and signalling is no different than a bacteria moving along a concentration gradient. No different than pain receptors, you mean. > Plants have no brains or analog at all No brain, yes. But what of "no analog" if the qualifier for suffering is deliberately clouded in ambiguity? The only reason the brain matters qua suffering is owing to the capacity for consciousness. Plants have no brain, well, sardines have no cerebral cortex. If you're going to trivialize the cerebral cortex based on whim/feeling, you can do the same for the whole brain. By extension it makes as much sense to attribute the possibility of consciousness to insects as it does to plants, because you're throwing the particulars of the brain out the window. Some "magical unknown thing 'X'" is giving them consciousness - but there's no reason "magical unknown thing 'X'" has to be specific to a brain.
  - Dylan16807 4y ago
    > No different than pain receptors, you mean. Not the best argument. I don't really mind my pain receptors going off if the signal doesn't make it to my spine. Do you?
    - slothtrop 4y ago
      If the signal "doesn't make it", it's an ineffectual signal. Are you suggesting plants have ineffectual signals?
      - Dylan16807 4y ago
        I'm suggesting that more localized signals are not the same as a pain response in a centralized blob of neurons.
DangitBobby 4y ago
I've seen this "argument" offered up many times, but never see a satisfying conclusion. The goal is to minimize suffering. What could you possibly do with the information that plants feel pain? Your options are to: 1. Die 2. Decide there are no perfect options and give up on minimizing harm completely 3. Do your best to pick a diet and lifestyle which minimizes harm with actionable heuristics What exactly do you suggest?
- slothtrop 4y ago
  > What could you possibly do with the information that plants feel pain? Keep the goalpost planted at "suffering" which requires consciousness. So we're still at #3. The analogy of the plant is just to reflect that there's sloppy conjecture used to project the capacity for suffering onto certain animals that by all the counts should not (where suffering entails a conscious awareness of pain and despair).