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Liquid democracy: two experiments on delegation in voting
- gardenfelder 4y agohttps://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w30794/w30794.pdf https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w30794/w307...
- mistermann 4y ago> The two designs are very different, but the experiments reach the same result: in both, delegation rates are unexpectedly high and higher than abstention rates, and LD underperforms relative to both universal voting and abstention. What might be the meaning of "underperforms" in this context?
- StefanKarpinski 4y agoWas confused by that as well. Sounds like Liquid Democracy doesn't do well compared to the alternatives, which would certainly be an interesting result, but doesn't fit with what the rest of the abstract seems to be suggesting.
- pc86 4y agoWhat might be the meaning of "doesn't do well" in this context?
- anigbrowl 4y agoLess good at identifying a correct answer than just polling people.
- pc86 4y agoIt's rare that a policy vote has an objectively right or wrong outcome.
- anigbrowl 4y agoAgreed, I think the authors of this study oversold the conclusions. They have a valid point insofar as delegation is not a magic bullet, and people often over-delegate. Perhaps that latter is because they are OK with representative democracy in principle, but want the capacity to revoke & reallocate their vote without waiting months or years for an election. I found the study disappointingly shallow and conclusory by comparison to the usually excellent standards of the NBER, but it might be that the cost of surveying people limited the depth of their investigation.
- mistermann 4y agoIt's likely not actually rare as much as we haven't developed the means to measure such things, so as a result we guess.
- yorwba 4y agoIn the experiments, there are two options, exactly one of which is designated correct, and voters are given the task of voting for the correct option using imperfect information as to which one that is. "Underperforms" then means that the correct option is chosen less often. (If you want a more precise mathematical statement, the explanation of the model starts on page 8.) Basically, the model subscribes to the "mistake theory" of political disagreement ( https://old.reddit.com/r/slatestarcodex/comments/74vpwm/socialism_communism_and_marxism_pt_1_on_trust_and/ https://old.reddit.com/r/slatestarcodex/comments/74vpwm/soci... ) that there is a single outcome that's best for everyone and disagreements only happen because sometimes people are mistaken as to which outcome that is. In a "conflict-theoretical" experiment where voters are trying to maximize their benefit even at the expense of others, I suspect people would do quite well at identifying a member of their own tribe to delegate their vote to.
- mistermann 4y ago> Basically, the model subscribes to the "mistake theory" of political disagreement ( https://old.reddit.com/r/slatestarcodex/comments/74vpwm/soci https://old.reddit.com/r/slatestarcodex/comments/74vpwm/soci... ) that there is a single outcome that's best for everyone and disagreements only happen because sometimes people are mistaken as to which outcome that is. Ok thanks for this....it doesn't make it make sense, but it's useful to know where people's errors lie.
- heisenzombie 4y ago"" For example, consider one of the parametrizations we study: a group of 15 voters of which 3 are experts; the experts’ information is correct with probability 70%, while the precision of non-experts’ signals can take any value between 50 and 70%, with equal probability. Then only non-experts with signals of precision close to random should delegate: a non-expert with information that she knows is only 55% likely to be correct should not delegate to experts whom she knows to be correct with probability 70%. "" This is not about politics, or subjective questions about complicated situations. It imagines a world in which there is one correct answer and the reason that different people vote differently is due to a lack of information about that truth. This is very much a simplified "game" they're playing with. In this context, the result -- I think -- is more like an outcome of the central limit theorem. Basically, if you get lots of people each with a 55% chance of being correct to vote on a binary choice, they're very likely to pick the correct choice in aggregate. If you have one person who is 70% correct vote, they're 30% likely to get it wrong. So you actually don't want too many of the 55% people to delegate their decision to the 70% person, which is a bit counter-intuitive. This is sort of interesting, and I think says something useful about the Liquid Democracy concept. However I think the experiment is simplified to the point that it's a categorically different thing than even moderately interesting political questions, and so I don't think it's an argument against applying liquid democracy to politics.
- POiNTx 4y agoI'm a fan of liquid democarcy on a conceptual level so this result is surprising to me. Started a side project to test it out in a game environment, basically an online Nomic[1] although I have abandoned it for now. Reading through some of the paper makes me realize I didn't think it through as deep as the authors and I'm probably not smart enough. I understand they used a perceptual test to figure out who the experts are. And 'over delegation' results in losing benefits of delegates who have information that might be useful? This is not clear to me: "...it (over delegation) reduces the variety of independent information sources" In a perceptual task where one is found to be better than the other participants, why wouldn't it be the case that voting for the best participent (the expert) gives you the best result? I think I'm missing something [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nomic https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nomic
- heisenzombie 4y agoAssume we're deciding on a binary choice. Also assume that there is one correct and one wrong answer, and the only reason people choose wrong is a lack of information. Next assume each participant in the vote has a particular chance of getting the right answer. Lets take an extreme case where you have a million people each with a 55% chance of getting the right answer, and one expert with an 80% chance of getting the right answer. If you have a normal vote, the right answer is EXTREMELY likely to win. But if everyone delegates to the expert (after all 80% is better than 55%) then the right answer only has an 80% chance of winning. Worse outcome.
- POiNTx 4y agoAh this is helpful thank you. So it's a variance thing? So by this logic, expanding the amount of experts who are delegates would probably fix the issue? Let's say you have a 100 experts in charge who have an average of 70% right answer, it would still be extremely likely the right answer gets chosen. It seems more experts would be selected in a real world system as it doesn't have all the assumptions you mentioned. - No binary choice (multiple solutions to one problem) - Not always a right or wrong answer (a lot of issues are preferential)
- amelius 4y agoBiggest threat to democracy is echo chambers and fake news. How does this help with that?
- hedgedoops2 4y agoBiggest threat to democracy is moral panics about fake enemies instigated by politicians (specifically, demagogues). This helps with that by replacing politicians with direct democracy. It's more feasible than full-on direct democracy since it avoids the need for everyone to become an expert on every legal area. You can delegate your vote to a non-politician expert you know personally - and to different people depending on the proposal.
- amelius 4y agoOk. How will we not end up with echo chambers where there are one or two people collecting all the vote-rights for that particular chamber?
- orthecreedence 4y agoYou might not. But at least you have the option not to do that.
- bee_rider 4y agoEven if we agree that this is the biggest threat (in fact I think echo chambers are not a problem — as long as the ideas echoing around them match my preferences, haha!), I’m not sure why we’d evaluate these experiment by that metric. Maybe they are trying to solve some other problem.
- anigbrowl 4y agoThere is a clear, immediate problem: are experts correctly identified? But there is also a second, more subtle, but also more fundamental question: even if the experts are correctly identified, delegation deprives the electorate of the richness of noisy but abundant information distributed among all voters. Unless the extent of delegation is modulated correctly, Condorcet has taught us that a smaller number of independent voters, even if more accurate, may well lead to worse decision-making. This very basic trade-off is the necessary point of departure of Liquid Democracy and is the focus of this paper. Seems highly tendentious to me. How is abundance synonymous with richness when processing costs are ignored? The whole point of delegation is that it's not efficient or enjoyable for everyone to get up to speed on everything. Representative democracy is ass because representatives' own intellectual capacity is limited and the incentives for self-dealing vastly outweigh those for probity. Liquid democracy proposes to delegate on a per-issue basis, but the cost of expert identification is necessarily a function of the cost of expertise acquisition. Further, the payoffs for right or wrong decisions isn't always apparent in size or time. These latter considerations don't seem to have been factored in, causing the paper to read as a dismissal of a proposed heuristic by comparison to an impractical ideal.
- JumpCrisscross 4y ago> proposes to delegate on a per-issue basis, but the cost of expert identification is necessarily a function of the cost of expertise acquisition Isn’t part of being an expert recognising expertise?
- zdragnar 4y agoI'm not really sure that "expert" is objectively quantifiable. Plenty of experts have their own biases, especially when it comes to information that conflicts with positions they have long advocated for. I'm thinking specifically here of the various stories that crop up when a grad student can't publish work that contradicts their advisor's own published work, but there are also plenty of examples in other fields as well. At the end of the day, you have people who have either studied a thing or have direct experience working with it, and you assign them some amount of trust since they've done it more than you have. You don't need to know much about a particular sub field of biology to recognize that someone claims to have expertise in biology. Knowing some yourself helps you see if they're making it up. Even if you don't know much, you can still pick up on whether they are open to new ideas, though. All of this is to say that reducing "expertise" to a quantifiable binary answer is not an easy thing.
- vore 4y agoWhat prevents someone from just buying someone's delegation in liquid democracy? If you were destitute, someone buying your vote might sound like a pretty good deal...
- jwood27 4y agoThe same thing that prevents someone from buying your vote now - there would be no way to prove the delegation.
- JumpCrisscross 4y ago> same thing that prevents someone from buying your vote now - there would be no way to prove the delegation This is an oft-overlooked downside to mail-in ballots. (I still broadly support them.)
- vore 4y agoWell, only kind of right? You can tell someone one thing then totally just go into the polling booth and vote for someone else, but liquid democracy means you literally just transferred your vote to someone else.
- _-david-_ 4y agoWell, except for the part about mail in ballots. You can sell your ballot and signed envelope to a person so they can guarantee the vote is cast the way they want.
- jerojero 4y agoAlthough I'm all for exploring different avenues of democratic decision making and liquid democracy is definitely something I'm interested in and so this article is really valuable information; for a while now I've been much more interested in forms of participation that require more from it's participants and not less. I think for this reason I'm much more interested in the experiments done with citizens assemblies and minipublics. They seem to be much more better suited for combating misinformation as well as most of the perverse incentives of traditional politics, the latter being problems that wouldn't go away with delegation as I would imagine most people would end up delegating because it's so similar to our current form of participation which is representative voting. To me, one of the biggest issues right now in politics is that politicians have pretty much stopped trying to build a country together as much just trying to keep things going in ways that don't affect them too much. As in, people from both parties have very similar interests: keep themselves in power. This doesn't seem to lead to good decisions being made, but when you have referendums that is top down direct democracy it seems to be, now a days, a process that can be very easily manipulated to spread misinformation. We can look at the Colombian referendum for peace, brexit and the recent Chilean referendum for a new constitution. With this in mind, it seems to me like we need designs that are a bit more complex and I do think citizens assemblies fit the bill. I encourage anyone that's interested to take a look at Helene Landemore's Open Democracy.
- hash872 4y agoThe big problem with sortition (which Landemore appears to be arguing for) is that it's uh non-democratic. Instead of allowing citizens to vote for their representatives, you're literally removing the fundamental basis of democracy and doing something else entirely. I'm sure neither the author nor you see that as a stepping stone to authoritarianism, but it kind of is. I'd be open to exploring citizens assemblies that are democratically elected & assembled for a set period of time to tackle one specific issue. But they have to be voted in, random sortition is unacceptable
- jerojero 4y agoThat's not really something I agree with? I find sortition to be one of the most democratic form of participation. Modern political systems in the west, that is to say, liberal democracy through representative voting is entirely oligarchical. Look at parliaments all over the world and how they correlate with the population as whole in terms of socioeconomic indicators, race, gender, etc. They are not representative at all of who makes up the population but instead they represent who the population believes and who the system allows to be capable of making decisions. And this final part is what I really want to put emphasis on: who makes the actual decisions? I think here we might have different views but to me, who makes the decisions is the most important even more important than making the optimal decisions. I believe a system is more democratic if the decisions are being made by people who are actually, materially, involved in the consequences of said decisions. And with that in mind, I think sortition is indeed much more democratic than voting because in sortition you get a group of people that are truly, socially, economically, gender-wise, race-wise, representative of the wider population. Not only that but in sortition everyone has the same chance of being able to access power, whereas in voting only those that are appealing to big demographics will be. I mean, it is not a coincidence that politicians tend to be extroverted and charismatic... but what about people who are shy and introverted? Is the only method of participation for them the vote? So I guess in a few words: I believe sortition is more democratic because everyone gets the same chance to do active participation, rather than most people simply being able to vote for the few people who actually have the chance to debate, review and make decisions. I really encourage you to read maybe Camila Vergara's book "Systemic Corruption" if you have a chance to get it which might change your perspective in terms of sortition and voting. Though in fairness, she suggests a system that's based on a network of local assemblies; but also argues in favor of sortition for certain position (as opposed to voting).
- machina_ex_deus 4y agoLiquid democracy, direct democracies and all these shenanigans sound good on paper but they are incredibly easy to manipulate by the government. Only paper ballots, with humans counting them, and humans observing them, can properly be "Proof of human": proof that there's an actual human being behind the vote. The fundamental problem in "Proof of human" is that fake identities are easily fabricated, dead humans can keep on voting if the government "forgets" about them, and finally, backdoors can be inserted into software systems creating a single point of failure, and the incentives of the government funding these systems is to get re-elected. Mail ballots, voting machines, and early voting where there are months of voting and volunteers don't have time to oversee months of voting, it's all problematic. The fundamental measure in "Proof of human" is how many humans you need to trust to have confidence in the results. Do you need million election workers to go rogue? 100,000? 100? or maybe only 20 election workers in the right position can completely change the result? That's what makes the difference between fraud being a conspiracy and plausible: the number of people who need to be part of the conspiracy. Getting a cryptographic backdoor in electronic voting systems is not even in conspiracy land, it requires only handful of people to be a part of it, and it can even happen remotely by an adversary country (such as Russia).
- JanisErdmanis 4y agoThe proof of human problems is actually addressable. We can imagine that the state publishes all public keys of its citizens in persistent storage, perhaps engraved in the stone, along with the name and where to find the person. To verify that the state is keeping the record of citizens, accurate auditors come in. They can select 100 individuals verifiably random (for instance, taking hash function and sorting) and try to reach out to these individuals and check that they indeed own the keys they have been assigned, for instance, signing an auditor-given message. The number of individuals who did not have the correct keys or were unreachable could then be used to infer the legitimacy of elections being run.
- machina_ex_deus 4y agoYou still didn't prove the non existence of cryptographic backdoor, hardware backdoor or anything else in the chain. There's also a decent chance the audit fail, then now what do you do? A person can be unreachable. Do you now cancel the entire system because a person was unreachable? If the answer is no, the audit is useless. It was already proved many times that audits which don't have any penalty or contingency when they fail are meaningless. Moreover, You can't trust anyone's random other than your own. In this case, the so called auditors are also a small point of failure, and if you allow any1 to audit, people will eventually find someone who's missing. Audits are like stack cookies, they are terrible security practice. You need to have security boundaries and defend them to have a good security system. Attempting to check if the horses left the stable is not a reliable boundary, it's good only as supplemental security measure. Just like having a blue team and a red team isn't enough, you need to have firewalls, you need to have defensible network architecture. You need endpoint protection, and you need to keep everything updated.
- auctoritas 4y agoThe idea that decision making in a democracy is some definable optimization problem that "experts" can solve better than the average voter, or that the very purpose of democratic decision making is to optimize anything in the first place is laughably naive. Any non-trivial decision that must be made in a democracy is made amongst a set of choices with outcomes that are incomparable to one another in a single objective domain. For instance: should we raise taxes? If the question were simply to optimize how much money we can raise, then yes, the question could be modeled as an optimization problem; the outcome of each possible choice will be some amount of tax revenue that can be ranked. But rather, the question is should we be raising taxes or should we be lowering them. There are no outcomes to be compared here, but rather - generously - philosophies to be debated or - cynically - power struggles to be played out. When there is no objective way to rank the outcomes of a set of decisions "expert" opinion is of little value.
- nickff 4y agoI think you’re vastly overestimating the average voter. I would recommend reading Caplan’s “The Myth of the Rational Voter”; it’s a rather bracing book.
- auctoritas 4y agoI'm not really making a claim that the average voter is "as good" as an expert when voting. Rather I'm saying it's often not possible to optimize anything in the context of voting, so the degree of someone's expertise in some domain is really not relevant to begin with.
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- nickff 4y agoThe voting base's systematic biases are a significant obstacle to good decision-making. But the book covers a lot more than just that one problem.
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- tgsovlerkhgsel 4y agoLiquid Democracy was tried in practice in the Pirate Party of Germany. Some people amassed a small bunch of delegations while the system was new and interesting, then usage dropped off. Since the delegations didn't expire, individual votes didn't matter - these "super delegates" had so much voting power that they'd generally outvote the remaining active users of the system. Combine this with the high cost of participating yourself (you need to repeatedly inform yourself and engage with the system) compared to delegation (just pick a person that seems reasonable once and forget it). The lack of having any meaningful voice further discouraged people from participating, both in the system and the party as a whole. It sounds good in theory, but I'm not sure this practical hurdle can be overcome. There will usually be a majority of mostly passive users, and the corrective power of Liquid Democracy ignores this and assumes users change their vote if their delegate votes against their interest. The Swiss system (a sufficiently large group of people can initiate a referendum or popular initiative, then the matter is put to a one-person-one-vote vote) seems like a very practical solution to the problem where you want the "boring" decisions handled by someone else, while keeping them in check and allowing controversial decisions to be overturned.
- throwawaaarrgh 4y agoWouldn't the Swiss system also encourage controversial decisions to be rapidly validated by a majority? Part of the supposed appeal of representative government is to prevent the rabble for voting for free bread and no taxes, right?
- anonymouskimmer 4y ago>"voting for free bread and no taxes, right?" Large farms and capital owners don't strike me as the "rabble".
- whitemary 4y agoI'm glad someone spoke up!
- tgsovlerkhgsel 4y ago
- Sophistifunk 4y agoInstead of trying to tweak how we select the people that want to control every aspect of our lives, we simply reduce the power the state has to do so? The less power the machine has, the fewer incentives there are to get control of it, and the less damage is done when the wrong people do so.
- hgsgm 4y agoThat's a solution to a different problem.
- User23 4y agoHow do you effectively reduce the power of an organization with a monopoly on violence?
- panick21_ 4y agoBecause organizations don't have power, people do. And peoples individual power is always limited by making their actions depended on the consent of other people. And then those other people require consent of even more people and so on.
- Sophistifunk 4y agoBecause that's not what they (the machine, not any particular persons or parties) are using to do most of their ill. The weapons most often wielded against the citizens who get uppity aren't rifles and batons, but the media and financial institutions, and centralisation in general. Alternative decentralised and temporary systems built on math are the answer.
- jasonhansel 4y agoGiven the high rates of delegation, we could just make delegation the default. Then we could have people vote, not on issues directly, but to choose delegates who will "represent" them. We could even call them "representatives," and call the resulting system "representative democracy." There, I fixed it! You don't need to have fixed geographical districts, of course; party-list proportional representation is pretty close to just deciding how you want to delegate your share of power.
- mistermann 4y agoAt least one noteworthy difference is that in Liquid Democracy, individuals can choose who they delegate their vote to, as opposed to choosing between two people who have been chosen for them, who often differ little in behavior (despite telling very different stories).
- fedeb95 4y agowhere experts are correctly identified So never?
- renewiltord 4y agoI think this will eventually be unnecessary. Delegation solves the problem that interaction is costly. But with modern AI trained on my opinions, it could conceivably take normative positions and then only inform me when it's something I care about. Then you can have it act on your behalf normally and notify you when it's something you care about.
- cf141q5325 4y agoIf i understand it correctly, there seems to be a big problem in the design of the evaluation. Namely the assumption that you only have to identify expert voices. That sounds great for simple and isolated problems, but those are not the ones we are facing today. We live in a complex system were every expert has a very narrow perspective and problems are too complex for any one individual to grasp all relevant aspects of. The difficulty is not finding the one person that is competent enough to fix the problem for you but finding someone that is able and willing to create a process/environment in which the relevant perspectives/expert opinions are collected and a cooperative solution is found (to address the relevant perspectives on the problem). By voting or delegating for a solution finding process instead the selection of one solution you overcome the "everyone needs to be an expert and inertia / disinterest sets in" problem identified here. tldr: I believe the study tests for compatibility to a non-functioning legacy/simplified approach to decision making. ---------------------- edit: From the paper >The first experiment was designed for the lab and follows the theory very closely. We study groups of either 5 voters (of which 1 is an expert) or 15 voters (of which 3 are experts). We observe the frequency of delegation and the fraction of group decisions that yield the correct outcome. >Our second experiment then is meant to capture a voting environment where voters have “some sense” of how well-informed they are and how likely they are to be correct, and similarly of how likely experts are to be correct, but such sense is vague and instinctive. The assumption that you have to simply identify the person that has the correct solution is fundamentally flawed.
- wortelefant 4y agoThe German initiative/cooperative "aula" already implemented liquid democracy / delegated voting software in schools for several years, as part of building a culture of participation in schools. Great results so far. https://www.aula.de/was-ist-aula/liquid-democracy/ https://www.aula.de/was-ist-aula/liquid-democracy/
- AlbertoGP 4y agoI don’t think that our current problems come from the failings of our voting methods, but rather from a lack of political vision of what we want to achieve. Citing Adam Curtis’ “HyperNormalisation”, 2016, at 2:19:12: > And the other revolutions were also failing. > The Occupy camps had become trapped in endless meetings and it became clear that there was a terrible confusion at the heart of the movement. > The radicals had believed that if they could create a new way of organizing people, then a new society would emerge. > But what they did not have was a picture of what that society would be like, a vision of the future. > The truth was that their revolution was not about an idea, it was about how you manage things. > And those who had started the revolution in Egypt came face to face with the same terrible fact: social media had helped to bring people together in Tahir square, but once there the Internet gave no clue as to what kind of new society they could create in Egypt. > The movement stalled, and a group that did have a powerful idea, the Muslim Brotherhood, rushed in to fill the vacuum. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=thLgkQBFTPw&t=8345s https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=thLgkQBFTPw&t=8345s