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The argument against machine sentience and the possibility of machine suffering, is that because Turing machines run in a non-physical substrate, they can never

The argument against machine sentience and the possibility of machine suffering, is that because Turing machines run in a non-physical substrate, they can never be truly embodied. The algorithms it would take to model the actual physics of the real world cannot run on a Turing machine. So talk of “brain uploading“ etc. is especially dangerous, because an uploaded brain could act like the person it’s trying to copy from the outside, but on the inside the lights are off. Edit to add link to more discussion: https://twitter.com/jchris/status/1607946807467991041 https://twitter.com/jchris/status/1607946807467991041

quotemstr 4y ago
Your argument is an assertion of the existence of a soul, but with extra steps. I've seen no evidence that the mind is anything other than computation, and computation is substrate-independent. Dualists have been rejecting the computational mind concept for centuries, but IMHO they've never had a grounding for their rejection of materialism that isn't ultimately rooted in some unfounded belief in the specialness of humans.
- derivagral 4y ago
  I took GP as more about data processing than dualism. A language model can take language and process it into probable chains, but the point is more along the line of needing to also simulate the full body experience, not just some text. The difference between e.g. a text-only game, whatever Fortnite's up to, and real meatspace.
  - jchanimal 4y ago
    And furthermore no simulation can have a “what it’s like to be them”
- freejazz 4y ago
  No it's not, it's an assertion that there is an essential biological or chemical function that occurs in the brain that results in human mental phenomenon. It has nothing to do with a soul. That's ridiculous.
- jchanimal 4y ago
  Here's a more academic argument, although not quite mine: https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/opphil-2022-0225/html https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/opphil-2022-0...
  - quotemstr 4y ago
    If consciousness is a computation (and I think it is), and if you fork() that computation (as the article imagines as its core thought experiment), you end up with two conscious entities. I don't see the philosophical difficulty.
    - jchanimal 4y ago
      If consciousness is substrate independent, it can never be embodied like we are. If evolution explores solution space regardless of what science understands, it's likely minds operate on laws of physics that aren't appreciated yet. It's possible that having experience requires being real. As in the computable numbers are a subset of the real numbers, and only real life real time implementations can experience, because the having of experience can't be simulated. Here's a relevant bit from the article: > More generally, we acknowledge that positions on ethics vary widely and our intention here is not to argue that computational theorists who accept these implications have an irreconcilable ethical dilemma; rather we suggest they have a philosophical duty to respond to it. They may do so in a range of ways, whether accepting the ethical implications directly or adopting/modifying ethical theories which do not give rise to the issue (e.g., by not relating ethics to the experiences of discrete conscious entities or by specifying unitary consciousness as necessary but not sufficient for moral value).

quotemstr 4y ago

Your argument is an assertion of the existence of a soul, but with extra steps. I've seen no evidence that the mind is anything other than computation, and computation is substrate-independent. Dualists have been rejecting the computational mind concept for centuries, but IMHO they've never had a grounding for their rejection of materialism that isn't ultimately rooted in some unfounded belief in the specialness of humans.

derivagral 4y ago
I took GP as more about data processing than dualism. A language model can take language and process it into probable chains, but the point is more along the line of needing to also simulate the full body experience, not just some text. The difference between e.g. a text-only game, whatever Fortnite's up to, and real meatspace.
- jchanimal 4y ago
  And furthermore no simulation can have a “what it’s like to be them”
freejazz 4y ago
No it's not, it's an assertion that there is an essential biological or chemical function that occurs in the brain that results in human mental phenomenon. It has nothing to do with a soul. That's ridiculous.
jchanimal 4y ago
Here's a more academic argument, although not quite mine: https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/opphil-2022-0225/html https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/opphil-2022-0...
- quotemstr 4y ago
  If consciousness is a computation (and I think it is), and if you fork() that computation (as the article imagines as its core thought experiment), you end up with two conscious entities. I don't see the philosophical difficulty.
  - jchanimal 4y ago
    If consciousness is substrate independent, it can never be embodied like we are. If evolution explores solution space regardless of what science understands, it's likely minds operate on laws of physics that aren't appreciated yet. It's possible that having experience requires being real. As in the computable numbers are a subset of the real numbers, and only real life real time implementations can experience, because the having of experience can't be simulated. Here's a relevant bit from the article: > More generally, we acknowledge that positions on ethics vary widely and our intention here is not to argue that computational theorists who accept these implications have an irreconcilable ethical dilemma; rather we suggest they have a philosophical duty to respond to it. They may do so in a range of ways, whether accepting the ethical implications directly or adopting/modifying ethical theories which do not give rise to the issue (e.g., by not relating ethics to the experiences of discrete conscious entities or by specifying unitary consciousness as necessary but not sufficient for moral value).