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> Children can be protected without companies combing through personal data Darn right they can.

unsupp0rted 4y ago
- mikestew 4y ago
  - d0mine 4y ago
  - jacooper 4y ago
    Well that certainly worked for WhatsApp, when they delayed the new privacy policy, and then just rolled out when the media coverage died down.
jdlshore 4y ago
Okay, that's a nice soundbite. Now let's steelman it. I believe the following to be true: 1. Children are sexually abused. This abuse is far more widespread than we as a society want. 2. Images of this abuse is called CSAM (child sexual abuse material). CSAM is easily distributed over the Internet. 3. People who intentionally download CSAM are criminals who deserve to be punished. 4. Services that scan for CSAM (using hashes provided by the NCMEC, the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, and similar bodies) identify these criminals, who are in turn prosecuted by the police. In fact, hundreds of thousands of CSAM are reported by cloud services every year. This, along with the fear of being caught, reduces the demand for CSAM. 5. Some of those caught are found to be creating as well as consuming CSAM. Catching them reduces the creation of CSAM as well as the demand for it. 6. Reducing demand and creation of CSAM protects children. 7. Scanning files for CSAM catches criminals that would not otherwise be caught. Therefore, "combing through personal data" protects children that would not otherwise be protected. When you agreed with "children can be protected without companies combing through personal data," did you mean that my sequence of reasoning is wrong? If so, how? Or were you expressing a personal philosophy that's closer to "I think the benefits to privacy (from not scanning) are more important than the benefits to children (from scanning)?" If so, why do you believe it?
- lzaaz 4y ago
- lupire 4y ago
  #1 is 99% of the problem, and #2-#7 is 1%.
  - athrowaway12 4y ago
    I always thought starting with CSAM was just a convenient pretext for slowly introducing surveillance tech in the U.S. #1-#7 are all bad. I don't think saying "some aspects of [bad thing] aren't so bad" is an effective argument against surveillance tech. Better just to call bullshit on the surveillance tech itself.
- falcolas 4y ago
  > Reducing demand and creation of CSAM protects children. You're thinking of this as if CSAM production follows a rational supply/demand relationship (such as with food, or furniture). But is there really evidence to back up the idea that CSAM production follows the same rational relationship? Child abuse is not rational, and an abuser provides their own demand for the CSAM they create; a child will not be saved from abuse even if there's nobody for their abuser to share the photos with.
  - XorNot 4y ago
    The existence of international trading networks of CSAM material speaks otherwise to this, as well as the frequency with which participants in trading but not active producers are usually an ingress point into compromising them. Even if the currency is barter - i.e. "more unique content" - that means the incentive is for people operating unchecked to feed their thirst for it have a market for the creation of it. Temporarily cornering the market with new content no one's seen before means you can trade for huge amounts of other content successfully. After all, everyone involved is taking a huge risk by even being a participant.
- nonbirithm 4y ago

mikestew 4y ago
- d0mine 4y ago
- jacooper 4y ago
  Well that certainly worked for WhatsApp, when they delayed the new privacy policy, and then just rolled out when the media coverage died down.

Okay, that's a nice soundbite. Now let's steelman it. I believe the following to be true: 1. Children are sexually abused. This abuse is far more widespread than we as a society want. 2. Images of this abuse is called CSAM (child sexual abuse material). CSAM is easily distributed over the Internet. 3. People who intentionally download CSAM are criminals who deserve to be punished. 4. Services that scan for CSAM (using hashes provided by the NCMEC, the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, and similar bodies) identify these criminals, who are in turn prosecuted by the police. In fact, hundreds of thousands of CSAM are reported by cloud services every year. This, along with the fear of being caught, reduces the demand for CSAM. 5. Some of those caught are found to be creating as well as consuming CSAM. Catching them reduces the creation of CSAM as well as the demand for it. 6. Reducing demand and creation of CSAM protects children. 7. Scanning files for CSAM catches criminals that would not otherwise be caught. Therefore, "combing through personal data" protects children that would not otherwise be protected. When you agreed with "children can be protected without companies combing through personal data," did you mean that my sequence of reasoning is wrong? If so, how? Or were you expressing a personal philosophy that's closer to "I think the benefits to privacy (from not scanning) are more important than the benefits to children (from scanning)?" If so, why do you believe it?

lzaaz 4y ago
lupire 4y ago
#1 is 99% of the problem, and #2-#7 is 1%.
- athrowaway12 4y ago
  I always thought starting with CSAM was just a convenient pretext for slowly introducing surveillance tech in the U.S. #1-#7 are all bad. I don't think saying "some aspects of [bad thing] aren't so bad" is an effective argument against surveillance tech. Better just to call bullshit on the surveillance tech itself.
falcolas 4y ago
> Reducing demand and creation of CSAM protects children. You're thinking of this as if CSAM production follows a rational supply/demand relationship (such as with food, or furniture). But is there really evidence to back up the idea that CSAM production follows the same rational relationship? Child abuse is not rational, and an abuser provides their own demand for the CSAM they create; a child will not be saved from abuse even if there's nobody for their abuser to share the photos with.
- XorNot 4y ago
  The existence of international trading networks of CSAM material speaks otherwise to this, as well as the frequency with which participants in trading but not active producers are usually an ingress point into compromising them. Even if the currency is barter - i.e. "more unique content" - that means the incentive is for people operating unchecked to feed their thirst for it have a market for the creation of it. Temporarily cornering the market with new content no one's seen before means you can trade for huge amounts of other content successfully. After all, everyone involved is taking a huge risk by even being a participant.
nonbirithm 4y ago