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> I'm a substance dualist so I'm admittedly a bit biased Thanks, I appreciate you pointing this out. Given that's the case, it might not actually be possible t

> I'm a substance dualist so I'm admittedly a bit biased Thanks, I appreciate you pointing this out. Given that's the case, it might not actually be possible to reconcile our two views and we can just agree to disagree. (I was a physicist for ten years, so it's challenging for me to inhabit a position that contends that thought and matter are non-overlapping magisteria.) I guess one question I might ask you is: how do you think substance dualism will affect your expectations about AI going forward? For example, is there any specific, measurable thing that you expect a future AI system absolutely will not be able to do? Or do any such "forbidden" things have to fall into categories like "thought", "feeling", etc. — i.e., the magisterium of the "mental", as opposed to the "physical" — under substance dualism?

dvt 4y ago
> we can just agree to disagree For what it's worth, Searle is a naturalist (so he thinks brains are "just" meaty machines) and he would also disagree with you. > For example, is there any specific, measurable thing that you expect a future AI system absolutely will not be able to do? Not sure how you'd measure this, but I think sentience is most likely unachievable by AIs (at least how we're building them now). This is not without controversy, as while Roger Penrose would agree with me, David Chalmers would not. I'm not actually sure when Chalmers pivoted on his stance (haven't read him much since undergrad) because he was a bit more hardline in the early 2000s[1]. [1] https://wanderingstan.com/files/chalmers_on_ai.pdf https://wanderingstan.com/files/chalmers_on_ai.pdf
- edouard-harris 4y ago
  > For what it's worth, Searle is a naturalist (so he thinks brains are "just" meaty machines) and he would also disagree with you. I definitely disagree that Searle's conclusion in the Chinese room experiment applies to the kinds of AI systems we're building today. I agree that nobody to my knowledge has figured out how to measure sentience, so I don't think that fits under the "measurable" heading. And this does suggest to me — because this was your hand-picked example — that your position as a substance dualist doesn't affect your concrete expectations about what AI systems will actually be able to do in the future. Is that right?
  - dvt 4y ago
    > I definitely disagree that Searle's conclusion in the Chinese room experiment applies to the kinds of AI systems we're building today. Unless you're trying to say that today's AI systems do anything but manipulate symbols (which is imo patently obvious), I'm not sure how you can make that argument.

dvt 4y ago

> we can just agree to disagree For what it's worth, Searle is a naturalist (so he thinks brains are "just" meaty machines) and he would also disagree with you. > For example, is there any specific, measurable thing that you expect a future AI system absolutely will not be able to do? Not sure how you'd measure this, but I think sentience is most likely unachievable by AIs (at least how we're building them now). This is not without controversy, as while Roger Penrose would agree with me, David Chalmers would not. I'm not actually sure when Chalmers pivoted on his stance (haven't read him much since undergrad) because he was a bit more hardline in the early 2000s[1]. [1] https://wanderingstan.com/files/chalmers_on_ai.pdf https://wanderingstan.com/files/chalmers_on_ai.pdf

edouard-harris 4y ago
> For what it's worth, Searle is a naturalist (so he thinks brains are "just" meaty machines) and he would also disagree with you. I definitely disagree that Searle's conclusion in the Chinese room experiment applies to the kinds of AI systems we're building today. I agree that nobody to my knowledge has figured out how to measure sentience, so I don't think that fits under the "measurable" heading. And this does suggest to me — because this was your hand-picked example — that your position as a substance dualist doesn't affect your concrete expectations about what AI systems will actually be able to do in the future. Is that right?
- dvt 4y ago
  > I definitely disagree that Searle's conclusion in the Chinese room experiment applies to the kinds of AI systems we're building today. Unless you're trying to say that today's AI systems do anything but manipulate symbols (which is imo patently obvious), I'm not sure how you can make that argument.