There's some game theoryish ideas such as the Peter Principle which might explain why meritocratic promotion may not work out in the long run for organizations.

There's some game theoryish ideas such as the Peter Principle which might explain why meritocratic promotion may not work out in the long run for organizations. See: https://arxiv.org/abs/0907.0455 https://arxiv.org/abs/0907.0455 which won the parody Ig Nobel prize, but I don't really understand why, as I thought it was at least as interesting as Robert Axelrod's simulation of successful strategies in the iterated prisoner's dilemma. In fact, I think it would be even warranted to do an extension of this model, considering possible assumptions such as Dilbert principle, negative selection, and alignment of agents with different goals and basic strategies. I am not understanding why such a model would be considered silly instead of insightful.