5 ms·
I think the author forgets that while you may (potentially) be able to generate quintillions of UUID’s per second, there is no way you’ll be able to validate th
by Aeolun 4y ago
I think the author forgets that while you may (potentially) be able to generate quintillions of UUID’s per second, there is no way you’ll be able to validate that they’re correct at the same speed.
At least, I don’t feel bad saying my server would melt if it had to serve that many requests.
- jongjong 4y agoYeah, since they're trying to guess a random UUID from all issued UUIDs, they would have to make a request for each generated UUID. Even if you assume that ISPs would allow that kind of bandwidth, the entire internet would grind to a half before the attack even began. Also, the 2 * 46 figure used to represent the number of UUIDs is way too large. With proper access control of resources, we only really need to worry about active session IDs and in a world with 8 billion people, there's no way that there would be 2 * 46 active session IDs. If you assume that every person on earth was hooked to your service 24/7 and ignore the significant bandwidth limitation, it would still take more than 6 months for the entire Bitcoin network to hijack 1 random user's session. But it doesn't make sense to ignore bandwidth limitation anyway since it's the bottleneck. The Bitcoin network computes all these hashes in parallel and there is no way that anything close to this degree of parallelization can be achieved at the network layer.
- SkyPuncher 4y agoWhile you're not wrong, this is the type of thinking that can introduce security vulnerabilities. Your current systems might not be able to validate quintillions of UUID's per second, but your future systems might be able to (or at least get a lot closer).
- tsimionescu 4y agoThis is also the kind of thinking that people use for public-key cryptography: it's perfectly possible to guess the private key of any TLS cert, for example, it just takes a very long time with today's computers. Future computers may well guess it very quickly, so should we stop using it? Cryptography is a moving a target. Any cryptographic method except an OTP used with perfect opsec is brute forceable, and will need to be changed when your threat model changes (for example, when computing speed advances significantly).
- SkyPuncher 4y agoYes, but the public-key crptography includes a massive buffer against the unknown.
- Matthias247 4y ago+1. Most server deployments will break at less less than 10k RPS. If we talk about the largest scale public cloud deployments, we might end up in the millions to billions of RPS due lots of lots of instances. But the number will be very far off from the 24293141000000000000 rps rate that the author used for estimating the impact. Plus any deployment that is so large that a user could actually generate a reasonable amount of traffic will likely also have some variant of a DDOS/fraud/rate-limiting protection or at least alarms and manual interventions that will kick in once such a traffic flood is observed.