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The argument you're making is just eliding the "hard problem". We can trivially imagine an electronic circuit that registers different current levels when expo
by PaulDavisThe1st 4y ago
The argument you're making is just eliding the "hard problem".
We can trivially imagine an electronic circuit that registers different current levels when exposed to red or blue light. Nobody (that I'm aware of) suggests that there is an experience within the electronic circuit, despite the fact that it "senses" different frequencies in the electromagnetic spectrum. The circuit is qualia-free.
You, on the other hand, are qualia-full. Whether the experience you have when a red object is in front of you derives purely from your optical sensory apparatus, or if it derives from a self-reflective awareness that your brain is dealing with "red" really makes no difference to the central point: you have an experience.
We have no explanation for how there can be experiences/qualia, and possibly, because they are either extremely or completely subjective, we may never any means of studying their existence.
- zasdffaa 4y agoWe don't know what qualia are so it's an acceptable possibility to me (unprovable, mind) that such a circuit may 'experience' something. It would be unutterably basic if it happened, nonetheless I'm ok with that. There's also a view that consciousness is intrinsic to everything (ah, here you go https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/does-consciousness-pervade-the-universe/ https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/does-consciousnes...) which is a cheap, cheesy and IMO totally unacceptable way to 'explain' consciousness and I reject that as an explanation, but it doesn't make it actually wrong. Edit: missed your last line "We have explanation for how there can be experiences/qualia" - I'm surprised, you can explain it, got any links?
- PaulDavisThe1st 4y agoSure, pan-qualism/pan-psychism may well turn out to be a respectable postion. [ fixed the missing "no" in the GP ]
- namero999 4y agoPanpsychism is untenable because it trades the hard problem of consciousness for the composition problem. The only consistent and coherent game in town is analytical idealism.
- zasdffaa 4y agoIt might be a piss-poor explanation, because it doesn't explain anything, it presumes its conclusion, but that doesn't make it wrong. And if you throw in phrases like "composition problem" and "analytical idealism" the fer fuck's sake provide some simple explanation or something.
- namero999 4y agoSomething that assumes its conclusion and doesn't explain anything is not even wrong... At any rate, given the context of the thread I didn't feel the need to clarify what the composition problem nor idealism are. But since you ask: The composition (aka combination) problem refers to the need to explain how multiple bits of consciousness combine together to form a united and cohesive experience such as yours or mine. The hard problem focuses instead on how quantities (matter) give rise to qualities (experience). Analytic Idealism is the view that experience is the ontological primitive. Both problems sublimate away. Yes, you can derive physics from it. In fact you don't even bother physics in any way: all we know about it remains valid under analytic idealism. If anything, many counterintuitive findings of QM fall into place under AI. If this pique your interest, here's a good intro https://www.essentiafoundation.org/analytic-idealism-course/ https://www.essentiafoundation.org/analytic-idealism-course/.
- zasdffaa 4y ago> Something that assumes its conclusion and doesn't explain anything is not even wrong... No. It can be entirely right. It just isn't useful in any way. From your link "Analytic Idealism is a theory of the nature of reality that maintains that the universe is experiential in essence" Maintain all you like. It might even - per my prior statement on pan-psychism - be true. I want quantifiable evidence before we accept it as true. Cough up. Anyway, thanks for the descriptions of the tech terms.
- postultimate 4y ago> We don't know what qualia are Actually, no. This is the one part of the problem we are clear on. Since this is an adequate excuse to give a lecture, here we go: Suppose I say "I am fat", and suppose you say of me "he is fat". In both of these sentences, the same thing is meant - an observation of the physical world was made, and excess lipids were detected. However, if I say "I am looking at a laptop", and you say "he is looking at a laptop", we don't mean the same thing. You mean that a particular physical state has been observed, with my eyeballs and brain directed laptopwards. Whereas what I mean... ...well, what I certainly don't mean is that I see any eyeballs, or brain. I don't observe any process of looking at all. I just look. What I mean by "I am looking" is completely different to what you mean by "he is looking" even though the two statements are formally similar. In other words, there are two wildly different, incommensurable uses of the word "am". One of them has a corresponding "is", one of them does not. So, getting back to qualia, there simply are no qualia. There are qualia that am, but as noted above, that doesn't imply that there are qualia that are.
- zozbot234 4y agoThe thing about experiences/qualia is that they aren't just subjective, but momentary. Any sense of permanence, continuing identity or indeed of experiences being "about" something in particular is ultimately linked to our memory, which is not part of the "hard problem" itself; it fits solidly within the structure of causal relations we usually call "reality", or just "the physical universe". So the hard problem is hard, but it's also very tightly constrained; it "only" has to explain tiny fragments of subjective experience that float in and out of existence.
- namero999 4y agoRecalling a memory or thinking about the future or whatever, are still and always experiences in the now. You are not getting out of it.
- zasdffaa 4y agoWe had a heatwave this summer in the UK, weeks of it. I loved every moment. Thus I refute your 'momentary'. I've also had decades of pain and while it might sink lower in your perceptions, it's always there while you're awake.
- layer8 4y agoThe circuit you’re describing registers the external light impulses, but it doesn’t experience its own registering of those impulses. What I’m imagining is that the registering mechanism would itself have sensors placed on its wires that measure the currency levels on those wires, and have the measurements of those sensors as additional inputs into the cognition automaton. And then have sensors on the gates and wires of that automaton, which again feed as additional inputs into that same automaton. Add memory and timing delays. And then multiply all that some million times to get to the level of complexity of our inner mind, of our sensory and movement apparatus, and of our mental models. When introspecting myself, I don’t see or feel or think anything that couldn’t be explained by such a setup. The different textures (qualia, if you will) of what I perceive in my mind have a certain complexity, but that is merely quantitative and structural, not qualitative. I therefore simply do not agree that there is a hard problem of consciousness to begin with, in the usually given sense. I don’t agree that there is a qualitative difference between the perception of “qualia” and other perceptions. “Qualia” are just a perception of representations and processes happening in my brain. I see no puzzling mystery that would require solving.
- PaulDavisThe1st 4y agoNo, this totally missing the point again. It is not a question of what the sensor detects. It is a question of how it is possible for there to be an experience when sensing occurs. Your introspection is simply pointing out the likely nature of what you experience, and I actually agree (tentatively) with the idea that most of our conscious experience is rooted in a self-reflecting system. But none of that has any bearing on how there can be ay experience at all.
- layer8 4y agoWhat you call “experience” for me is just sensing of internal information processing, of internal representations. This may need some dedicated introspection to fully realize. You’re making a distinction which I believe is a mirage. It’s just a special attributation we make in our minds to those inner perceptions. If you look closely, it vanishes. Think about it: How do you know that you have what you call an “experience”? It’s because you perceive the having of the experience. So, at some point, the perception of having an “experience” is something that enters as an input into your cognitive process, and you match it to some mental models you have about such inputs. I adjusted my mental model to think of those “qualia” perceptions as being the sensing of parts of the internal workings of my brain. It’s a side-effect of all the processing that is going on, if you will, and of the likely fact that the sensing of some subset of the processing steps is being feed back as inputs into the cognitive processing.
- goodthenandnow 4y ago> Nobody (that I'm aware of) suggests that there is an experience within the electronic circuit There is a theory, Integrated Information Theory (IIT) [0], which argues exactly that [1]. [0]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Integrated_information_theory https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Integrated_information_theory [1]: https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.2307/25470707#_i2 https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.2307/25470707#_i2
- PaulDavisThe1st 4y agoI'm familiar with IIT. I don't believe it suggests that a photosensor has qualia.
- lordnacho 4y agoIsn't the parent and related answers pointing towards the idea that there's a level of complexity above which you need to be to see those qualia? A single little circuit might not be the one that is conscious, but a bunch of them connected together might exhibit patterns that we could call experience? Maybe the analogy is that a single DNA molecule is not a living thing but that molecule along with a bunch of others is? Seems like the problem arises in pinning down what level of complexity is required.
- PaulDavisThe1st 4y agoI broadly agree with this, and it's been my feeling since reading Dennett & Hofstadter in my teens and twenties. However, if this does turn out to be true, I suspect that it will not constitute an "explanation" of experience, merely a description of its prerequisites.
- nicoburns 4y agoIt's worth pointing out that there's zero evidence that complexity is required for conscious. Our only evidence that beings other than ourselves are conscious is that we know ourselves to be conscious and they seem similar to us. IF inanimate objects were conscious, we wouldn't know because... well, none of us actually has direct evidence than anything other than ourselves is conscious.
- rogerclark 4y agoThis argument is not "eliding" the hard problem. This argument is saying that Chalmers' hard problem does not actually exist. We have many explanations for what people describe as "the hard problem". But nobody who believes in "the hard problem" accepts these explanations, which have been given for decades by philosophers like Dennett. There is no way to reconcile your view, that there IS a hard problem and that no progress has been made toward solving it, with our view, that there is no such problem, and that it does not need solving.
- brotchie 4y agoI’m convinced at this point having read almost every book on the topic, hundreds of threads across the web, and many an in-person debate, that individuals actually have wildly different experiences of consciousness. For me, the hard problem is such an obvious and almost intractable thing that any folks who dismiss it clearly don’t understand it (or live an inner experience that lets them understand it). And because I’ve never really seen anyone flip on their view of the hard problem, I’m 99% convinced it’s because they actually have a different lived conscious experience. Perhaps they process information different, or have more or less access to their internal state. It’s possible that folks who dismiss the hard problem actually have more conscious access to their internal state and hence don’t understand why it’s an issue. An analogy is aphantasia (folks who don’t have an internal visual experience). Somebody with an aphantasic brain simply doesn’t experience consciously like others. I feel that understanding that the hard problem exists is something rooted in a different internal experience.
- CloudRecondite 4y agoIt’s also extremely obvious to me we have a fundamental gap in our understanding of the universe and reality that needs to be filled to explain the hard problem. I suspect most people have fairly similar conscious experiences though, that seems like a reasonable assumption. Humans hate to not understand something, we’ve come up with crazy religions and who knows what else to explain the world around us. The reality is there’s just so much we don’t know, so much we can’t know. I think that makes most people uncomfortable.
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- djokkataja 4y ago> you have an experience. What are "you"? And what is an "experience"? You highlight this like it's a magical phrase that cannot be explained, and your arguments suggest that you take it as a foundational assumption. But if you assume a fundamentally inexplicable nature to both personhood and experience, then you cannot possibly recognize any explanation for these, because doing so would require giving up your assumption. I recently came across a paper arguing that consciousness as commonly referred to does not exist due to semantic issues around the term "consciousness," and your arguments reminded me of it. It's quite readable, if you're interested: "Consciousness Semanticism: A Precise Eliminativist Theory of Consciousness" by Jacy Reese Anthis. The abstract and main argument: > Abstract. Many philosophers and scientists claim that there is a ‘hard problem of consciousness’, that qualia, phenomenology, or subjective experience cannot be fully understood with reductive methods of neuroscience and psychology, and that there is a fact of the matter as to ‘what it is like’ to be conscious and which entities are conscious. Eliminativism and related views such as illusionism argue against this. They claim that consciousness does not exist in the ways implied by everyday or scholarly language. However, this debate has largely consisted of each side jousting analogies and intuitions against the other. Both sides remain unconvinced. To break through this impasse, I present consciousness semanticism, a novel eliminativist theory that sidesteps analogy and intuition. Instead, it is based on a direct, formal argument drawing from the tension between the vague semantics in definitions of consciousness such as ‘what it is like’ to be an entity and the precise meaning implied by questions such as, ‘Is this entity conscious?’ I argue that semanticism naturally extends to erode realist notions of other philosophical concepts, such as morality and free will. Formal argumentation from precise semantics exposes these as pseudo-problems and eliminates their apparent mysteriousness and intractability. > 3 The Semanticism Argument > Now that terminology is established, the semanticism argument is brief and straightforward. > 1. Consider the common definitions of the property of consciousness (e.g., ‘what it is like to be’ an entity) and the standard usage of the term (e.g., ‘Is this entity conscious?’). > 2. Notice, on one hand, each common definition of ‘consciousness’ is imprecise. > 3. Notice, on the other hand, standard usage of the term ‘consciousness’ implies precision. > 4. Therefore, definitions and standard usage of consciousness are inconsistent. > 5. Consider the definition of exist as proposed earlier: Existence of a property requires that, given all relevant knowledge and power, we could precisely categorize all entities in terms of whether and to what extent, if any, they possess that property. > 6. Therefore, consciousness does not exist. https://jacyanthis.com/Consciousness_Semanticism.pdf https://jacyanthis.com/Consciousness_Semanticism.pdf I recommend reading it before objecting, as the author addresses a number of possible objections in section 4.
- robotresearcher 4y agoYou're demanding a the hard problem be addressed from a point of view that doesn't see the hard problem as a thing. You might as well demand the atheist explanation for how god created the world. The atheist must deny the premise of the question, they can't give an answer in the terms of the question. "We have no explanation for how there can be experiences/qualia" We do, but not in the terms you set out. The explanation is that that there is not a you that experiences qualia, two separate things. Rather the experiences ARE YOU. There's nothing they happen to. Their happening is you. You don't have to agree with it. But the hard question is not ducked. It is not a coherent question in this view.
- PaulDavisThe1st 4y agoNot unexpectedly, I do not agree with this characterization. Short of panpsychism (which could be a thing), I think we mostly all agree that there are almost certainly objects in the world in which there is no experience By contrast, I think we mostly all agree that we (each of us as individuals, and humans as a group) are things in which experience does occur. This naturally gives rise to the question: if some set of things have no experience, and another set of things have experience, how does experience arise in the the second set of things? There are subsidiary question, such as whether experiences may come in different "levels" thus creating a continuum between "none" and "definitely experiencing". But these are secondary, mostly, the question of how things in which experience occurs differ from the things where it does not.
- lioeters 4y agoDepending on the definition of "mind", panpsychism sounds rather reasonable: "the view that the mind or a mindlike aspect is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of reality". https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panpsychism https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panpsychism It could be that a rock, an ant, a computer, and a human being are all experiencing its existence at varying levels of awareness. And that this "experience" isn't necessarily exclusive to living things - though it may be impossible to prove or understand how a computer experiences itself, if at all. It's also amusing to entertain the opposite, the perspective of people who deny the existence of "experience and qualia" altogether, who argue there is no "hard problem of consciousness" in the first place. Maybe people experience consciousness so differently, for some it's "invisible", and for others it's undeniable and obvious that it exists. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hard_problem_of_consciousness https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hard_problem_of_consciousness https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia
- bnralt 4y ago> Nobody (that I'm aware of) suggests that there is an experience within the electronic circuit, despite the fact that it "senses" different frequencies in the electromagnetic spectrum. The circuit is qualia-free. Your thought experiment actually shows why a materialistic model makes much more sense than any model that takes "the hard problem" seriously. It's trivially easy to show that the human brown is much more complex than an electronic circuit that registers red or blue light, and that the human brain is doing much more. It's no surprise to anyone that a simple circuit like that lacks an abstraction of the world around it. But if you believe qualia is an actual thing, than how can you show that the circuit lacks it? No one seems to be able to come up with any way of measuring qualia, or even showing that it exists. There's no way to show that we have more of it than the circuit, and we're left relying on what "feels right." Before demanding that models solve "the hard problem," we should first ask ourselves if there's any evidence that "the hard problem" even exists. The only evidence I've seen anyone provide for qualia is that they feel they have it, or extremely contrived thought experiments where people feel like it makes the most sense. Counter to this is the entirety of science showing that the world we live in is one that is an emergent one of physical properties. Which, yes, leads to a good number of surprising things. Creationists thought that god had to have a role in creating life, because they couldn't conceive that something as complex as an eye could be an emergent feature of random physical properties. "Hard problem" folks think that there must be some sort of non-physical "qualia," because they can't comprehend that our experiences are simply an emergent feature of the extremely complex neurons in our brains. Yet scientists that actually study these things don't run into these problems, and keep using the physical model because it's the only one that has made any sense so far.
- nicoburns 4y ago> The only evidence I've seen anyone provide for qualia is that they feel they have it Is that not sufficient? It's Descartes' "I think therefore I am". Qualia are just experiences, so if you experience something then they exist. I don't think qualia need to be non-physical. The "hard problem" remains even if they are physical, because they don't exist within our current understanding of physics and thus still need to be explained. Actually, reading https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia/#Uses https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia/#Uses, it seems that your restricted definition of qualia "Qualia as intrinsic, nonphysical, ineffable properties" is one use of the term. But it also has a more general meaning: "Qualia as phenomenal character. Consider your visual experience as you stare at a bright turquoise color patch in a paint store. There is something it is like for you subjectively to undergo that experience. What it is like to undergo the experience is very different from what it is like for you to experience a dull brown color patch. This difference is a difference in what is often called ‘phenomenal character’."
- nicoburns 4y ago> Nobody (that I'm aware of) suggests that there is an experience within the electronic circuit, despite the fact that it "senses" different frequencies in the electromagnetic spectrum. The circuit is qualia-free. I personally feel like it's hard to justify being anything other than agnostic on this question (and indeed the question of whether inanimate objects like rocks have consciousness). Reason being essentially that we have so little understanding of consciousness that it seems hard to justify claiming any knowledge of it at all.
- mlsu 4y agoReally? + Human beings + Dogs + Bugs + Plants + Eukaryotes + Viruses + Proteins + Molecules + Atoms + Subatomic Particles + ??? + Pure Information, ones and zeros Here is a line (--------). Place it so that above it, things are conscious, and below it, things are not conscious. It seems very obvious to me that there is nothing special about human beings, (or dogs, or bugs, or plants, or wherever you draw the line), that makes them special and conscious. For example; if you assert that the line is at "Bugs" I could not possibly disprove or prove you right, although I would suspect that you might be a Bug. Likewise, I could assert that your circuit has qualia, and you could never prove or disprove me. Proving or disproving me is solving the hard problem. It's hard because it's meaningless, because consciousness is either shared by all things; or, shared by no things. Which is, imho, a distinction without a difference.
- mlsu 4y agoAs an aside, you can trivially place the line above humans: + ??? + The Galaxy + The entire Biosphere + Regions of Space + Corporations + Humans
- PaulDavisThe1st 4y ago> because consciousness is either shared by all things; or, shared by no things. Alternative: it is shared by 192 kinds of things, and nothing else. Why not?
- mlsu 4y agoIndeed, why not. I couldn't possibly prove you wrong or right. That's why the hard problem does not exist and there is no line.
- RHSman2 4y agoCheck out Peter Russell. The person closest to the mark for me. If you know of him the above is that but if not, he is amazing.
- namero999 4y ago
- JohnBooty 4y agoI'm a neophyte on the topic, at least as far as reading "serious" literature on it, but: We can trivially imagine an electronic circuit that registers different current levels when exposed to red or blue light. Nobody (that I'm aware of) suggests that there is an experience within the electronic circuit ...yeah, I'd like to here this addressed by those who claim consciousness is a non-hard problem. If we are to claim that consciousness is a series of inputs and outputs, then even a simple device like the one you described is "conscious." A moderately more complex device (say, a Roomba) might even be said to experience "qualia" because it clearly makes decisions and considers some things good and other things bad. And by this logic a blade of grass is almost certainly conscious. That's fine, I guess, but it feels awfully lazy. If we expand the definition of consciousness to include Roombas and blades of grass, that's cool, but we still have the challenging problem of defining what makes human consciousness different from grass consciousness. If we decide that the difference is purely quantitative, then we have some uncomfortable things to think about. If we value human life more than grass or Roombas, because we have "more" consciousness, then are some humans more valuable than others because they have more neurons, or perhaps simply more active neurons?
- RHSman2 4y agoThe hard problem is hard because most people don’t get why it is hard.