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The mental gymnastics involved in having a high security clearance.
- mmaunder 15y agoI wonder if any game theorists have thought about whether a country with no secrets could be militarily stronger. It's similar to the Linux vs Windows debate: at first glance it seems ludicrous that an open source OS could be more secure than a closed source OS. But with enough eyes and enthusiasts, all problems are quickly fixed. A small inner-circle who have access to the inner workings may find it hard to compete when their competitor has the whole world helping debug and fix the system, including the goodwill associated with that.
- kijin 15y agoI'm not sure if that analogy works. Wouldn't a country with no secrets like an organization whose source code is open AND all of whose encryption keys are public?
- alf 15y agoReally interesting question. I wonder if there are any small countries willing to give it a try. I bet there are more countries without a military than ones without military secrets.
- wisty 15y agoSure they have. IANA game theorist, but I think the conclusion is that some secrets are good, but the paramaters should generally be communicated. You didn't want to let the USSR know how many nukes you had (or they could come up with a stronger first strike plan). But you wanted them to know roughly how many, so they knew not to overreact (and build a massive deterrent to an overstated threat), or under-react (and get too cocky). There's also value in giving biased paramaters - the President is mad, and you have more nukes than they think (which will make them scared, and more likely to back down, because they think they are dealing with an irrational actor), but you don't want to sail too close too the wind here. The thing is, game theorists don't deal well with stuff that's not part of game theory. Game theory tends to assume that actors are all very smart, and aren't hamstrung by some of their best advisors being out of the loop.
- itmag 15y agoIsn't there some kind of game theory which takes irrational/drunken actors into account?
- secthrowaway 15y agoYes. And they also know that too many secrets makes a country militarily weaker. An example scenario, a intelligence professional comes across information that pertains to a plot to kill his co-worker that was collected in a way that is highly classified that he can't warn his colleague (with a lower clearance) about it.
- abecedarius 15y agoArthur Kantrowitz was not a game theorist, but he was a scientist involved in Cold War programs, IIRC. His "The Weapon of Openness": http://www.foresight.org/Updates/Background4.html http://www.foresight.org/Updates/Background4.html
- rmc 15y agoThe "military secrets" to "source code" isn't an apt analogy. Lots of Linux OSs have secrets, such as SSL private keys, ssh private keys, passwords that sort of thing. Those are like military/government secrets. A (windows or linux) server that told everyone what the ssl private key and root passwords were, would, obviously, not be secure/
- bediger 15y agoWell, this sure puts a different spin on the arrogance of the US Government. The new Aristocracy, those with "clearances", receive and can act on information that the rest of us can't be allowed to have. The Fed's "We just know better than you" attitude probably derives directly from this secret pool of knowledge. But why would you divide up information into 15 or 20 categories? I bet that even at "Top Secret" levels, the narrowness of view is stultifying.
- pork 15y agoI'm sorry, I've read your comment twice, and I have no idea what you're talking about. Perhaps you could write out your conspiracy theory in more easily digestible points?
- Dylan16807 15y agoYou're having a hard time finding the conspiracy theory because there isn't one. bediger simply called the government arrogant, along with worries that people are making decisions without enough info.
- bane 15y agoYou forgot the part where he felt the need to try to cast 'cleared' and 'uncleared' people into classes, insinuating a seething, out of site class warfare was part of the equation.
- sounds 15y agoI agree that the attitude is off-putting and the narrow view afforded to individuals is counterproductive. There are, however, members of the intelligence community who have the breadth of view to make good judgment calls. Just not enough of them, and no accountability.
- bediger 15y agoBut isn't that what the Kissinger story was about? Getting the breadth of view, the knowledge, leads almost inevitably to (arguably) terrible arrogance about what you (the cleared) know vs what everyone else knows, and what you (the cleared) get to do about it.
- Palomides 15y agofor those interested in US governmental secrecy stuff, http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/ http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/ is a very interesting blog/newsletter
- littlebird 15y agoFor a more nuts and bolts view of security requirements and procedures, the NISPOM is publicly available http://www.dss.mil/isp/fac_clear/download_nispom.html http://www.dss.mil/isp/fac_clear/download_nispom.html
- teyc 15y agoIf anyone has seen the comedy series "Yes, Prime Minister", they'll often understand how a leader can be manipulated by his mandarins through selective disclosure of uncorroborated information, present consequences couched in politically unacceptable terms, force the hand by setting the agenda. This is especially true if dissenting opinion is filtered before it gets handed to the President etc. I apologize if the following sounds a little leftist. I only intend to make a point about how mistakes come to be made, and what governments may need to do to arrive at better decisions: Over in Australia, an ASIO analyst chose to resign rather than see Australia join the Iraq war on the basis of WMD pretexts. (Andrew Wilke is now a Member of Parliament). The trillion dollar mistake US made was due to influencers being able to feed super-classified information to the willingly gullible people. It is not easy for a President to call bullshit. I believe the reason is because there isn't sufficient accountability that is built into the system. In days past, members of the royalty are expected to fight in wars. Even during Roman days, only landowners could join the army. The appearance of the professional soldiers lowered the personal risk of the people in power who rush into war. The Chinese emperors surrounded themselves with eunuchs thinking that the absence of offspring give some assurance that these people will be less biased, but it didn't work out that well. Influence is still peddled, particularly because power itself is very addictive on its own. Some cultures resort to shamans to try to get an outcome that is independent of any one person's viewpoint. The most interesting one that I came across is the use of ibogaine, where people have a "spiritual" moment, where they see the big picture instead of worrying about themselves. For a complex society to survive and transcend humanity's limitations, we may need to create a supermind. Some elements of this already exist. One is the idea of "opensource intelligence" that can be used to corroborate otherwise secret accounts.
- deleted 15y ago[deleted]
- leot 15y agoIf a proposed war is genuinely necessary for national self-defense, then at a minimum it should be possible to convince the nation's wealthiest to pay for it. If they can't be so convinced, then the war is either unnecessary or the war's advocates are probably too incompetent to wage it effectively.
- throwaway31 15y agoI used to be in the intelligence field, and I held a top secret SCI clearance for about five years. What most people don't realize about classified information is that it's not the information itself that's so sensitive; it's the means via which such information is acquired that must be protected. If this were not so, targets could simply sidestep our intelligence collection vectors. I rarely dealt with any classified information that was interesting or surprising. It's mostly stuff you would expect. The technologies and methods used to acquire a piece of intelligence were always more interesting than the intelligence itself.
- libraryatnight 15y agoJust to play up the intrigue, perhaps you don't know of the information or clearances being mentioned. ;) "...a person who didn't previously know they even existed."
- fragsworth 15y agoThe article spoke distinctly of security clearances that you don't even know exist. You probably didn't have those.
- frisco 15y agoTop Secret SCI ("secret compartmentalized information") isn't one clearance: each SCI has a codeword, and you get cleared individually for each one. That's probably what Ellsberg means by about to receive "15 or 20 special clearances", and what throwaway is referring to. It's not uncommon for TS-cleared individuals to be additionally cleared on at least one TS-SCI thing. Obviously codeword-classified information can vary in interestingness.
- SoftwareMaven 15y agoIt doesn't even need to be top secret. There are "special access" projects at secret level as well.
- count 15y ago
- falcolas 15y agoA side note to the content of the article, which was interesting, but I couldn't zoom the text. I'm using Chrome, and when I zoomed in, the pictures, headers and footers all grew appropriately, however the text remained a constant size. I'm not sure how they managed that, but it makes for a terrible user experience when you want (or need) to increase the font size to make it more readable.
- ryoung 15y agoLooks like it's -webkit-text-size-adjust: none; that's inhibiting the zoom.
- joshuarrrr 15y agoIt's because it's their mobile website. The text on the normal version of the story seems to zoom fine: http://motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2010/02/daniel-ellsberg-limitations-knowledge http://motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2010/02/daniel-ellsberg-li...
- DanielBMarkham 15y agoThere's a flip side to this as well: as a voter, I don't know what information my elected leaders have when making decisions. In theory, with a small amount of secrecy needed to make diplomacy and security function, this makes sense. The problem is that it's not actually working in practice. There are so many un-elected people who have jobs for life and also the ability to classify broad swaths of information that the incentives are all set to increasing amounts of classified data. There's no correction mechanism. In theory, you'd have Congressmen aggressively using their oversight powers to correct the system. In practice, elected officials are mostly in for life (or as long as they choose) and are easily manipulated by the system. In fact, they don't want anything to do with making tough decisions. The more things are secret, the less they have to worry with those nagging voters giving their opinions about things. I read about intelligence oversight committees being told they don't have clearance to see things and it just blows my mind: our entire system of using force rests on civilian oversight. Thousands have died because civilians have made mistakes with information they've be given -- and that's the way it is supposed to work. Somehow we've forgotten all about this critical principle. As an example, I'll pick a topic where you guys can all call me fuzzy-headed: UFOs. I pick this topic because of its ludicrous nature. Heaven help me if I were to pick something that was diplomatically sensitive and start hammering on it. I've been studying sightings and evidence as a hobby for many years, and based on credible eye-witness testimony I'm comfortably convinced that the United States government knows a lot more about intermittent atmospheric phenomenon than they are letting on. Why? I don't know. Why not a little more openness? I don't know. What part of this information is being used by my elected officials to make decisions? Again, I don't know. This leaves the door open for all kinds of crazy speculation. It's an insane way for a democracy to treat its citizens. Yet this is just par for the course. All I did was pick a way-out example. Laugh off my UFO example if you wish, but for every thing like that there is a thousand other things that drive public policy -- and you and I will never know about them. Taken to this level, it is a very unstable way to maintain consent of the governed. Not only does it make it impossible for an elected official to take advice, it makes it impossible for voters to make reasoned and educated judgments about the actions of officials. Secrecy corrupts everything it touches. That's why it must be aggressively minimized.
- anigbrowl 15y ago
- JosephHatfield 15y agoEven given the variations of security clearances in use, there is the requirement that classified information is always and only distributed on a "Need to Know" basis; two people with exactly the same level clearance may still have official secrets from each other.
- Tossrock 15y agoWhen I first heard about the Bell-LaPadula model ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bell%E2%80%93LaPadula_model http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bell%E2%80%93LaPadula_model ) in my security class, it was pretty eye opening, especially the notion that once you're given a certain level of access, you can no longer write at lower levels. I think it might explain in part the explosion in the amount of classified material generated each year.
- secthrowaway 15y agoYeah, that model is more or less what's in use. Except the real-world version is a bit more complicated and messier (and more confusing). But the principle is all the same. Read goes down, write goes up. You can move information down only if the information is at the level you are moving it to and it's been properly signed off. e.g. something that is marked Secret, but written to a Top Secret system, can be moved back down to the Secret system)
- ChuckMcM 15y agoDoes anyone know of any research into compartmentalized network protocols? Specifically I'm wondering about protocols where components co-operate to acheive some goal but don't know enough to compromise the entire network. I'm sure the botnet guys have done a lot of work on this but I'm wondering there are any good references in the open literature.
- littlebird 15y agoNot sure about network protocols, but, the systems research version of this is called multi-level secure systems. You might want to start looking there.
- secthrowaway 15y agoThought I'd make a throw away and tip in as there are lots of people here who've never had a clearance and don't really understand what it's all about (I've had one for more than a decade). I'll try and answer some questions in the threads as I can. In the U.S. here's how it works (I'm writing this from the perspective of a contractor): You are hired to work on a government contract, that contract requires you to work on xyz project that requires you to handle information classified at a certain level (or with certain caveats or handling requirements). You fill out a bunch of paperwork (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/E-qip http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/E-qip) and it's submitted to the government. The information you put down isn't really a whole lot more interesting than what you might put down on a home loan application, but you sign some consent forms that the investigator can do some credit checks, that sort of thing. You also put down some references they can contact. Depending on the level you are applying for, the investigation may take longer, particularly if they interview your references. The interview questions are usually simple things like, "did you work with so and so at such and such place?" "have you ever heard them talk about overthrowing the government?" that sort of thing. If you're a normal person, no serious prison record, drug addiction, serious mental health problem, or threatening political viewpoints (card carrying member of the nuke the US party) there's really not a lot that can prevent you from getting a clearance. Even prior drug use doesn't necessarily prevent you from getting one. A Secret clearance has a very low bar to entry. You can get one after application in perhaps 3-6 weeks. I can't even get a cable guy to come to my house in that length of time. A Top Secret clearance takes a bit longer, and is slightly more involved, but it's on the order of months to a year. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security_clearance http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security_clearance Most of the time people either get a Secret clearance of a Top Secret clearance -- there is no such thing as a "clearance" above Top Secret but people can often be confused by special accesses at those levels (explained below). Operating at the Secret level, you'll have access to most of the information that is classified at that level. If you've read any of the wikileaks State Department stuff or the Afghan and Iraq war diaries you've seen what kind of stuff it is. Most of the time it's just information that the government would rather not go public with, but isn't really all that interesting in nature. Records of events, meetings, general information reports, troop movements, that sort of thing. Probably 1 in 150 Americans has at least a Secret level clearance, and probably 1 in 50-70 have had one at one time (there are a lot of people that move through the military and/or for the military). The Military's information systems are generally geared around the Secret level of classification and done on an Internet-like network called SIPRNET, There's even a Wikipedia analog and a Google search on it. It's like using a slightly shoddy version of the Internet as it was 5-10 years ago. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SIPRNET http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SIPRNET http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intellipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intellipedia To be honest it's not really much more interesting than using your regular run-of-the-mill corporate firewalled intranet, except it's an unusually large organization. Not all Secret information can be shared with our allies. Why? Well, we may be fighting a war with say, New Zealand at our side, but also investigating a case of attempted bribery where NZ is trying to smuggle sheep into California or some such. We don't share the bribery investigation data for example. To deal with this we use what are called "handling caveats". Something shareable with say Canada and Great Britain might then be marked as SECRET//REL TO USA, GBR, CAN or similar. There are also group handling codes like NATO, ISAF etc. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Classified_information_in_the_United_States#Handling_caveats http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Classified_information_in_the_U... http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Security_Assistance_Force http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Security_Assistan... There are also other classification markings that are used as caveats. They look kinda the same and are called compartments. It's generally just more restrictions on who can see the information. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sensitive_Compartmented_Information http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sensitive_Compartmented_Informa... People use 'SCI' like it's the same as "SECRET" or a some super high level classification. But what it really means is that it is information gathered in some way that we would really really rather keep private and thus you need another level of need-to-know to get access to it. Typically it's this way because billions of dollars was spent getting that information gathering capability and replacing it would be billions more or revealing it could expose people to severe risk, harm or death.. SCI compartments exist at all levels of classification. Often knowing what the information is showing can directly inform somebody how it was gathered as well. So it's not just the means that's protected directly, but the data as well. To see this information, you need to be working on a program that requires you to work with information in that compartment (need-to-know). And you will be "indoctrinated" or "read on" into that compartment. Which usually involves filling out some more forms, submitting the application, and watching a boring video telling you what the compartment is all about. There are many compartments. Compartments can also have sub-compartments. However, in some cases, the information is so super sensitive (almost always meaning that people could be killed if it becomes known) that the government wants to make sure you can be trusted with it. So you might get polygraphed. Usually they just ask you things like "have you ever considered trying to overthrow the U.S. government" and other similar. You might also go through a slightly different polygraph with highly personal questions about your sex habits. Even more restricted are Special Access Programs (SAPs) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special_access_program http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special_access_program These are things like the Nuclear Codes. Even the names of the SAPs are super double probation classified. Often they are one super specific kind of information, and they are managed very closely by the agency that creates them. Very few people will be granted access to the SAP. All of this holds true for Top Secret clearances and information, except everything is just that much more carefully controlled. You have to have a reason for accessing it, most people don't, and you have to fill out lots of paperwork and have lots of background investigation stuff. You are encouraged frequently to try and accomplish as much as possible at the lowest classification possible. Mostly so we can share the information (all of which is declassified after 25 years max). But sometimes we just can't and things have to move up in classification. Everything has a legal hurdle. There's lots of lawyers and other bureaucrats involved in everything. You have to report where you are everyday or establish where you'll be if you'll be out of contact for any length of time or you lose your job. If you did something bad while missing, then you'll probably end up in Federal prison for a very long time. There's definitely too much stuff classified. What most people who don't know anything about the classified world complain about is this problem. It's actually reasonable to argue this. What they don't realize is it's a pain in the ass to keep stuff classified. What they also don't know is that everything declassifies after 25 years (or sooner) unless it's something super special sensitive (nuclear codes). This is a tremendous pain in the ass for the government to go through, but in the interest of stopping information that should be free from being locked away, it's done and most people I know in the field think this is great. Because keeping this stuff secret is a drag, you can't talk about most of what you do everyday at work with anybody outside of your work. You can't talk about it at home, even if your spouse is cleared. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executive_Order_12958 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executive_Order_12958 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executive_Order_13526 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executive_Order_13526 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Declassification http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Declassification To put this in perspective, we're almost halfway to the point where everything about the lead up to the mistake of the Iraq War will automatically become declassified and available via FOIA requests. All of this is done in special facilities called SCIFs http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sensitive_Compartmented_Information_Facility http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sensitive_Compartmented_Informa... (technically work that is not SCI protected doesn't occur in a SCIF, but that's what everybody calls them). They usually have all kinds of access controls, some have several layers. For example (a real one), you may have to pass through a gate with an armed guard, an armed guard at a desk who checks ID, a proximity badge and keypad turnstile, a locked door with badge and keypad, an elevator with badge and keypad, a finger print scanner badge keypad combo, and then a safe to get to your hard drive, which is then protected by an encryption key, the login user/pass for the system, then a user/pass encryption key for the database you are accessing and finally a special decryption password for the file you need to download and unarchive from the database. This doesn't even include all of the signin/out logs and other paperwork required to get through a day. Depending on your clearance, you may end up with several different computers at your desk at the same time, usually connected by a KVM of some sort. Something like this isn't all that unusual http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/6f/Intel_GreenDoor.jpg http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/6f/Intel_Gre...
- jhuckestein 15y agoInteresting. Perhaps the comment about not being able to learn from people who don't have these clearances also applies to highly knowledgeable individuals in any field that have trouble listening to people with less information or understanding of matters. Perhaps it even explains how years of "knowing more" can lead to resistance to change (the kind that I've found to be characteristic of bad professors or some people I used to work for) I think it's important to be aware of this. If I ever find myself not listening to someone because I think the person doesn't know all the facts, I hope that I'll become aware of it and try to zero in on what facts they are missing. Luckily I know very few secret things (I have even been known to intentionally make secret things un-secret) so I'd gladly share those facts and see for myself if it changes the other person's opinion.
- secthrowaway 15y agoAnd the corollary, just because people have access to sensitive information means they know all of the sensitive information. "Well I have a clearance and can tell you this is how it is" is probably the mark of somebody who just wants to win the debate but doesn't know squat.
- lwhi 15y agoI think there's a big danger here. Of course the idea of being initiated into a secret circle is extremely attractive. It appeals to our sense of ego, intrigue, romantic notions of the other. It's the stuff of novels and films .. it's the beginning of a great story. The personal advice given sounds good. But the dangerous part for me is the inference that we need to consider that those above us necessarily know best, and we should, by necessity, capitulate control. The fact that such layers of information, access to information, and access to power exist should not supplant the fact that this system embodies one single way the world can be ordered. What would happen if everyone had access to everything?