4 ms·

All mobile networks should be assumed hacked, the data is too valuable to not be a target of highly sophisticated hackers, especially nation states. Infrastruct

All mobile networks should be assumed hacked, the data is too valuable to not be a target of highly sophisticated hackers, especially nation states. Infrastructure layer can’t be trusted and everything should be encrypted on top of it.

colechristensen 4y ago
The metadata of who and where I am can't be encrypted away, unfortunately, it's available on the physical layer and obviously unavoidably a target of hacks.
- ng55QPSK 4y ago
  Both informations are abstract identifiers and are decoded in a database to 'real' values only, PHY doesn't care about your decrypted ID. If the operator keeps that database closed, a reasonable privacy of who and where can be done.
  - harry8 4y ago
    > If the operator keeps that database closed Serious question, how much would you stake on that happening?
    - ng55QPSK 4y ago
      Serious answer: I have seen operators taking this serious. It's also a european trend not to blindly accept law enforcement requests to open data anymore. For US companies: read something on the recent twitter example.
      - harry8 4y ago
        No, you have not understood. I'm not asking your opinion about seriousness. I'm asking how much. So far you've shown a willingness to stake absolutely nothing, which is fair. Is that your response? If not, how much?
        ng55QPSK 4y ago
        i still don't understand. Should i put a bet (like €50), i can find an operator that closes such databases, or that you find an operator that doesn't? I'm part of the mobile communication industry (while being in research) and part of my job is interacting with operators.
        harry8 4y ago
        It's one thing to say "Oh yes, it's taken very seriously" when you have nothing riding on it. It's another to pledge you will donate $100,000 to the FSF or whatever if data gets out in the next 5 years. The first is worth nothing. The second claim is possible to have some weight. The stuff gonna get hacked and we both know it. Why pretend otherwise?
  - octoberfranklin 4y ago
    Yeah, so I can blend into that huge crowd of people who both (a) sleep in the same bedroom as me and (b) work at the same office as me. Great anonymity set you've got there.
    - ng55QPSK 4y ago
      So you have ID41323 and ID53242 over night (or at daytime) in the same location, how do you map this back to names? It's not impossible, but you need data that exists (like house-to-name mapping) from databases outside of the reach of the operators. And the location information in the network is only as precise as needed. Most of the time this is a cell area, so 100s of m2.
- im3w1l 4y ago
  Your assumption is that a phone must present a permanent identifier to the network on the physical layer but I don't think that is true. You could have temporary identifiers instead. If you have multiple concurrent ones and stagger their renewals, and proxy all traffic over tor then it seems like goal would be accomplished.
  - ng55QPSK 4y ago
    You just explained the TMSI - something that was used since GSM networks in the early 90s
    - im3w1l 4y ago
      Good guess, but tmsi is to protect you from eavesdroppers, not from the mobile tower.
      - ng55QPSK 4y ago
        Well, you're invited to join research on network ... because it's impossible to hide your ID from your access network. Tor and similar can hide your ID in transport, but that's no option in RAN.
  - PeterisP 4y ago
    Well, the operator has to be able to link that temporary physical layer ID to some permanent billing ID, otherwise they will refuse your connection to their network.
    - im3w1l 4y ago
      I can see two ways around it. If you have a free data/calls/texts, you could use a zero knowledge proof of having a free-data secret. If you have pay-as-you-go you could spend tokens each of which are unique and anonymous. Edit: I think the first approach may not work, as the secret could be duplicated..
      - 4y ago
ng55QPSK 4y ago
Actually in 5G network there is almost nothing that isn't encrypted. What Karsten decribes is that cloud installations very often trust the infrastructure, but that's no special 5G problem.
- jerf 4y ago
  If you're not doing the encryption, it isn't being done to solve your problems, it's being done to solve someone else's. That's not a bad thing and it may still help you on the net, but if you want to protect your own interests fully you need to be doing the encryption yourself. "Doing the encryption yourself" doesn't mean you have to write the code personally... HTTPS in the browser (assuming correct implementation) counts as "doing it yourself" for this purpose. You just can't count on the infrastructure alone to do it for you.
smeagull 4y ago
I agree. I've experience with CDR data, and I've never worked for a telco

colechristensen 4y ago

The metadata of who and where I am can't be encrypted away, unfortunately, it's available on the physical layer and obviously unavoidably a target of hacks.

ng55QPSK 4y ago
Both informations are abstract identifiers and are decoded in a database to 'real' values only, PHY doesn't care about your decrypted ID. If the operator keeps that database closed, a reasonable privacy of who and where can be done.
- harry8 4y ago
  > If the operator keeps that database closed Serious question, how much would you stake on that happening?
  - ng55QPSK 4y ago
    Serious answer: I have seen operators taking this serious. It's also a european trend not to blindly accept law enforcement requests to open data anymore. For US companies: read something on the recent twitter example.
    - harry8 4y ago
      No, you have not understood. I'm not asking your opinion about seriousness. I'm asking how much. So far you've shown a willingness to stake absolutely nothing, which is fair. Is that your response? If not, how much?
      - ng55QPSK 4y ago
        i still don't understand. Should i put a bet (like €50), i can find an operator that closes such databases, or that you find an operator that doesn't? I'm part of the mobile communication industry (while being in research) and part of my job is interacting with operators.
        harry8 4y ago
        It's one thing to say "Oh yes, it's taken very seriously" when you have nothing riding on it. It's another to pledge you will donate $100,000 to the FSF or whatever if data gets out in the next 5 years. The first is worth nothing. The second claim is possible to have some weight. The stuff gonna get hacked and we both know it. Why pretend otherwise?
- octoberfranklin 4y ago
  Yeah, so I can blend into that huge crowd of people who both (a) sleep in the same bedroom as me and (b) work at the same office as me. Great anonymity set you've got there.
  - ng55QPSK 4y ago
    So you have ID41323 and ID53242 over night (or at daytime) in the same location, how do you map this back to names? It's not impossible, but you need data that exists (like house-to-name mapping) from databases outside of the reach of the operators. And the location information in the network is only as precise as needed. Most of the time this is a cell area, so 100s of m2.
im3w1l 4y ago
Your assumption is that a phone must present a permanent identifier to the network on the physical layer but I don't think that is true. You could have temporary identifiers instead. If you have multiple concurrent ones and stagger their renewals, and proxy all traffic over tor then it seems like goal would be accomplished.
- ng55QPSK 4y ago
  You just explained the TMSI - something that was used since GSM networks in the early 90s
  - im3w1l 4y ago
    Good guess, but tmsi is to protect you from eavesdroppers, not from the mobile tower.
    - ng55QPSK 4y ago
      Well, you're invited to join research on network ... because it's impossible to hide your ID from your access network. Tor and similar can hide your ID in transport, but that's no option in RAN.
- PeterisP 4y ago
  Well, the operator has to be able to link that temporary physical layer ID to some permanent billing ID, otherwise they will refuse your connection to their network.
  - im3w1l 4y ago
    I can see two ways around it. If you have a free data/calls/texts, you could use a zero knowledge proof of having a free-data secret. If you have pay-as-you-go you could spend tokens each of which are unique and anonymous. Edit: I think the first approach may not work, as the secret could be duplicated..
    - 4y ago

ng55QPSK 4y ago

Actually in 5G network there is almost nothing that isn't encrypted. What Karsten decribes is that cloud installations very often trust the infrastructure, but that's no special 5G problem.

jerf 4y ago
If you're not doing the encryption, it isn't being done to solve your problems, it's being done to solve someone else's. That's not a bad thing and it may still help you on the net, but if you want to protect your own interests fully you need to be doing the encryption yourself. "Doing the encryption yourself" doesn't mean you have to write the code personally... HTTPS in the browser (assuming correct implementation) counts as "doing it yourself" for this purpose. You just can't count on the infrastructure alone to do it for you.

smeagull 4y ago

I agree. I've experience with CDR data, and I've never worked for a telco