Relatedly, Russia is a top exporter of fertilizers: https://thehill.com/policy/3513855-why-the-fertilizer-market-could-be-russias-hidden-leverage https://thehil

Relatedly, Russia is a top exporter of fertilizers: https://thehill.com/policy/3513855-why-the-fertilizer-market-could-be-russias-hidden-leverage https://thehill.com/policy/3513855-why-the-fertilizer-market... Interestingly, while over the past 10-15 years the U.S. condemned Germany for importing natural gas from Russia, the U.S. was methodically displacing some of its domestic fertilizer production with imports, a substantial fraction coming from Russia and Belarus--in particular, 12% of U.S. potash consumption comes from Russia, and 93% imported overall. See https://farmdocdaily.illinois.edu/2022/03/war-in-ukraine-and-its-effect-on-fertilizer-exports-to-brazil-and-the-us.html https://farmdocdaily.illinois.edu/2022/03/war-in-ukraine-and.... It seems small but it turned out to be a significant direct short-term lever, and presumably a much bigger lever with many other countries; and that's not even considering indirect leverage from Russia's ability to manipulate global market prices and thus U.S. domestic prices. Perhaps the only thing that hits harder than an increase in energy prices is an increase in food prices. (OTOH, for all I know the USDA, etc, may have actually been diligently working to minimize foreign dependence without being too disruptive--politically or economically--and the current percentages and source country distributions were the best they could accomplish.)