4 ms·
I feel your pain at a deep and spiritual level. I have been in charge of at least half a dozen endpoint protection products over the years (deployment, configur
by TecoAndJix 4y ago
I feel your pain at a deep and spiritual level. I have been in charge of at least half a dozen endpoint protection products over the years (deployment, configuration, management, etc.). Once a user experiences what you just described they are (rightfully) suspicious and sour towards endpoint protection.
Questions i would ask in your example:
1) Was the core business tool excluded from the more intrusive protection modules or does the tool have a significant risk surface?
2) What was the threshold set for quarantining? Does it make sense in this case?
3) Is/should your device be part of a "Developer" policy that is more permissive? Are all users of the tool impacted?
4) Does this happen frequently? If so, should definitions be manually pushed in batches so everyone is not nerfed at once.
5) What is the process for the developer to report/fix the false positive? Is the response time sufficient?
I'm probably forgetting a few. The point is, shit happens (especially with technology). You respond, fix, and hopefully learn. If shit happens a lot, its either because the tool owner doesn't give a shit or the product is shit itself. The delicate balance of security and business operations/innovation is all about weighing and evaluating risk/benefit.
- semi-extrinsic 4y agoCan I ask, since you're as a person who has administered endpoint protection products: how much legitimate stuff do they actually catch?
- zdragnar 4y agoNot OP, but I've worked for an endpoint protection product company. Part of the onboarding was them loading up a virtual machine with the endpoint installed, then demonstrating several attacks (installing malicious software, running scripts off the internet, etc) and showing the logs of what the endpoint detected, and at what point it shut down the malicious behavior. The examples shown were behavior based, not hash based. It didn't look up a file in a dictionary, it detected priviledge elevations and such. No product is perfect, but if you have a need to be protected (especially if you are at risk from adversaries such as in banking, health care, government work, or against corporate espionage) I'm quite confident in saying that you're much better off with it than without. The same company would also, at random times, attempt to phish us or send us fake emails to get us to click on links, to help educate us on the kinds of threats our customers faced I consider myself fairly savvy, and even I fell for one of them. I ended up leaving for a variety of reasons, but "losing faith in the product" was not one of them.
- nikanj 4y agoYou should’ve also demonstrated attacks like ”open the line-of-business app we’ve used daily for years”. My problem is not the hit rate on actual attacks, it’s the hit rate on collateral damage
- syntheticcorp 4y agoI work in offense and they can be a huge impediment. Significant work goes into bypassing or staying undetected from these products. While not all the detection occurs at runtime, they report a lot of data back from the endpoint so historical detection can happen. However what I see is essentially their true positive and false negative rate, I would be interested to know what the false positive rate is.
- semi-extrinsic 4y agoYeah, I guess this all boils down to your threat model in the end. As your post seems to indicate, if a dedicated attacker targets you, they're probably going to be able to work around the endpoint protection anyways. I'm more curious about the case if your org is a few thousand people and you receive random low-effort attacks distributed across those people, will endpoint protection be a panacea?
- Melatonic 4y agoI'm not the guy above but the better ones can be very useful. And if they are behaving that badly and impeding your work THAT much then it is most likely that the person in your org configuring it just sucks as their job.