5 ms·

I haven't seen a good answer to the question, "Does Lockdown on iOS 16 prevent whatever this exploited?" In any case, there was a Chrome 0day recently patched

• antegamisou 4y ago
  > Qubes is looking less and less like "A good idea" and more and more like "The only way to safely use web browsers." That is until someone comes up with a debilitating Xen 0-day
  • Syonyk 4y ago
    > That is until someone comes up with a debilitating Xen 0-day But you're adding layers. A Xen 0day, alone, isn't useful. You have to be able to deliver it, which probably implies local root. To get something useful out of a user's home directory on a typical OS install, you pop the browser, do what you want. To get something useful out of a user in Qubes, assuming they're using an untrusted browsing VM, you have to pop the browser, then get local root, then deploy your Xen exploit... and then maybe do something useful. There's also the standard malware anti-RE-sandbox techniques used. Show up in a clean profile on a hypervisor? Maaaaaybe not a good idea to be evil. Lots of stuff will refuse to actuate in something that looks like a malware RE sandbox, and a disposable Qubes VM certainly would look like that. I won't claim it's impossible, but I will claim that doing a cross-Qube hop through Xen is a lot harder than just one exploit and get the goodies.
    • GauntletWizard 4y ago
      You have to pop the browser, then export their password keychain, because who's going to do run a bazillion copies of Chrome to separate them by site
    • Qualadore 4y ago
      > then get local root With Qubes you already by default have local root [0], because LPE is usually almost a forgone conclusion if the attacker has a sandbox escape. > A Xen 0day, alone, isn't useful. I don't think there any attackers with the interest and capability to acquire a Xen sandbox escape that wouldn't readily have access to browser 0-days, unless the target is using something like Tor Browser Bundle with JS, SVG, and PDF.js disabled. [0] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/vm-sudo/ https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/vm-sudo/
• darkteflon 4y ago
  I know you’re referring to Qubes, but is there any value in using disposable VMs for browsing on MacOS?
  • sneak 4y ago
    Generally speaking, yes, though if you are that concerned about browser exploitation then a more practical mitigation is to browse untrusted sites with JavaScript disabled. This is what I do.
  • trailbits 4y ago
    I would think yes, if you can accept the performance hit. Always have to be careful of what files you share between guest and host. Even browsing as another MacOS user would offer much isolation from your main account if you make your main files unreadable by the rest of the system.
• MarkSweep 4y ago
  One unique feature of Edge is the ability to run some tabs inside of a VM: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/deployedge/microsoft-edge-security-windows-defender-application-guard https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/deployedge/microsoft-edge-s... It looks like it is an enterprise feature; I’m sure f it’s possible to turn on without Group Policy.
  • redacted 4y ago
    It's available in Windows 10 (Pro or Enterprise) and all Windows 11 versions, you can activate it using 'Turn Windows features on or off': https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-application-guard/install-md-app-guard https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-pro... You do need hardware that can support Hyper-V