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> every employee at the company is issued a FIDO2-compliant security key from a vendor like YubiKey. Since the hard keys are tied to users and implement origin
by josephcsible 4y ago
> every employee at the company is issued a FIDO2-compliant security key from a vendor like YubiKey. Since the hard keys are tied to users and implement origin binding, even a sophisticated, real-time phishing operation like this cannot gather the information necessary to log in to any of our systems.
This is why WebAuthn needs to become way more popular.
- EGreg 4y agoAnd yet. I am shocked to see that all the "two-factor authentication" approaches don't bother to mention the action that is being authenticated. People often are conditioned to simply enter their passwords and their two-factor authentication into a window just because they think they are dealing with an official representative. If you think you're immune, think of how many times you've entered your information into Plaid, which was displayed as a mere iframe on a website! How did you know it was Plaid? Because you trusted the enclosing website? And for that matter, why do you trust Plaid? People get phished all the time by having a "bank rep" call them on their phone and have them read back these numbers, claiming that a different action is about to take place than the one being confirmed. All that could be EASILY stopped by the banks if they just added the action that's about to be confirmed. But somehow this hasn't happened in any of the incarnations. PS: I think some places in Europe do mandate it but not USA at all!
- mirashii 4y agoWebauthn does cover the scenario described by associating the credentials in the hardware token with the domain name, so that you're not entering credentials into a random site or iframe; the browser and token are verifying that the URL requesting a challenge is the same as the one that generated the credentials in the first place. Showing the action as part of the dialog doesn't really solve the threat posed here, because if you're not validating where you're answering a challenge from, then you also don't really have a way to know they're not lying about the action presented.
- tialaramex 4y agoAll that the second factor mode of WebAuthn does is "This still me". Who? Me. That's all. The token intentionally has no idea who "me" is, nothing is preserved from one such interaction to another - it only knows that it's still the same token as it was before. This makes the technology privacy preserving yet is ideal for the specific scenario we care about - proving I'm still me. I just typed my username or email or whatever into a web site, so the web site already knows who I claim to be on that web site, they're just checking that in fact "this is still me" whoever that is. You can leverage this technology to do more, including your "action that is being authenticated" stuff, but this adds complexity we mostly don't need. It turns out we can get a really long way with just absolute certainty that "This is still me".
- kadoban 4y agoTo really do this right, the yubikeys would need to have some kind of display to see what action you're confirming. Slightly better than nothing, the OS/browser UI could show it. Something like Plaid is unfixable though, that's just a garbage heap of insecure patterns. I refuse to use it.
- g_p 4y agoSomething I was disappointed (but not surprised) to never see take off outside a few niche areas and closed systems like payment card terminals was personal smartcard readers. Even reasonably affordable ones commonly have a 16x2 or 16x4 LCD screen. While today's protocols and drivers don't inherently tie together the data being signed with a string shown on the screen, appropriate design of protocols could enable this - then you'd have a hardware reader with PIN pad, where your PIN isn't seen by the computer, and with a screen showing you exactly what domain you are logging into, or which action you're approving. You can implement webauthn on a smartcard just fine as well (there are open source applets for it I believe) - just a shame that hardware readers with trusted displays never really took off on desktop PC! Then again for "just login" like in webauthn, really the domain is the only thing seen. A rogue local browser app can prompt you to authenticate for an arbitrary domain, but it's challenge/response based so the attack needs to happen in real-time.
- kurupt213 4y agothis wouldn't have been caught by the authenticator app either, would it?
- Spivak 4y agoWhich is why it's so unbelievably stupid that the power to make unphishable systems is being arbitrarily tied to hardware keys and secure enclaves when it could just be an app on your system, deployed for free instantly across a whole fleet of machines that manages keys behind the password protected full disk encrypted systems they already have. "Oh but then someone who compromises the user loc... sssh the phishing protection alone is worth it." I know I'm talking about software authenticators, but the whole "movement" if you wanna call it that seems to be openly hostile to them to the point of implementing DRM via attestation because there's money to be made in selling new disposable plastic thing.
- psanford 4y ago> the power to make unphishable systems is being arbitrarily tied to hardware keys and secure enclaves Its not though. First of all, windows, android, macos and ios all support being used as platform authenticators. No need to use an external hardware key to get the benefit. This is what most people should use (really most people should use passkeys tied to your phone once those become widely available). I don't really understand your complaint that those implementations are tied to secure enclaves and TPMs. Every laptop issued by your company already has one of these in them. Why not use them? I get that there's a fear that TPMs somehow enable DRM. Given that TPMs have been around for 20 years and haven't been used for DRM applications I think thats a bit overblown. But even if you do believe that, I don't see how you can conclude that using webauthn with a key protected by your TPM somehow enables DRM. If you are really morally opposed to using a FIDO device that stores keys in protected hardware, go ahead and run a soft FIDO token! I wrote a software authenticator for linux that uses the TPM[1], but it also has a mode where it just uses keys stored in memory. There are other good software FIDO implementations[2]. These authenticators work on basically* every site that supports webauthn. Use them, they are still going to be much better than using SMS or TOTP factors. *It used to not work on vanguard.com but that changed when they upgraded from the old u2f APIs to the webauthn API. It also doesn't work for one enterprise site I use for my job, which checks attestation certs to ensure the key is one that was issued by the company and is FIPS compliant. [1]: https://github.com/psanford/tpm-fido https://github.com/psanford/tpm-fido [2]: https://github.com/danstiner/rust-u2f https://github.com/danstiner/rust-u2f