6 ms·
Remember that phone numbers are only 10 digits long, so brute forcing all phone numbers is totally doable. Considering that, if you implement any flow that inv
by londons_explore 4y ago
Remember that phone numbers are only 10 digits long, so brute forcing all phone numbers is totally doable.
Considering that, if you implement any flow that involves checking if a phone number is already in use, then you are effectively leaking to an attacker a list of every phone number that uses your product.
- WaitWaitWha 4y agoIn the USA. They range from 4 (St. Helena) to 13 (Austria), I believe.
- RL_Quine 4y agoIt's typically smaller though, not every phone number is allocated and many are in sequential groups. Some are special cased, you don't need to search any number matching `****555***` in north america for example, which cuts down on the search space quite a bit.
- mrb 4y ago"Quite a bit"? Filtering out ***555**** removes only 0.1% of phone numbers ;)
- RL_Quine 4y agoThat's one example of an invalid range, not all of them. Lots of the area codes in north america just haven't been used for one reason or another.
- tomjakubowski 4y agoI didn't do the math here but: Filtering out 5*... would remove 10% of the search space. (dots mean "followed by more stars") Filtering out *5*... would remove 1%. So wouldn't ***555**** remove closer to 0.01%, not 0.1%?
- 8organicbits 4y agoTry the math, this is a good problem to work through. The position of the 5 doesn't impact the search space like that. 10% of the 10 digit numbers start with a 5. 10% of the 10 digit numbers end with a 5. 5... in your example shouldn't be 1%.
- coder543 4y agoSt Helena changed to 5 digits nearly 7 years ago.
- InfoSecErik 4y agohttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_mobile_telephone_prefixes_by_country https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_mobile_telephone_prefi...
- hunter2_ 4y agoRate limiting should be used to mitigate this, although I suppose a botnet could overcome that to some extent proportional to the size of the botnet. And for anyone who didn't read TFA, this incident goes well beyond leaking what phone numbers use the product, it leaked the usernames associated with each as well.
- RL_Quine 4y agoRate limiting is not useful meaningfully. For a service we ran we regularly had botnets with 100k+ IP addresses making one request an hour to endpoints, which absolutely decimated the backend but hit no limits at all that a real user wouldn't also trigger. Even with a couple of requests an hour you could enumerate the entire phone number space in a very short period with that botnet.
- hunter2_ 4y agoI guess I was thinking more like "limiting the number of attempts" than "limiting the number of attempts over time" -- take time out of the equation (but then NAT causes trouble). But even so, you're right: as the threat landscape approaches the size of the result set, it breaks down no matter what.
- RL_Quine 4y agoThat has some problems. If you limit the total number of attempts globally then the feature is effectively disabled, every botnet and script will blow through the attempt budget and real users can't use it. Global limits and IP address limits are not useful, and because we're assuming the user is unauthenticated (using the password reset), we have no other way of distinguishing good traffic.
- hunter2_ 4y agoCaptcha comes to mind, but that's a cat-and-mouse game in the age of machine learning (not to mention actual humans working for a bad actor). Cloudflare seems to be on the cutting edge with their newest challenge mechanism, but good vs bad is somewhat distinct from human vs script.
- sbf501 4y agoCPU throughput =/= endpoint throughput
- drusepth 4y agoIt's interesting to wonder why only 5M accounts were affected by this exploit, especially if it's brute forceable. IIRC this vulnerability was widely known about for at least months before it was fixed, so I can't imagine nobody in the know had access to the resources/botnets necessary to enumerate through every account. Have only 5M accounts linked their phone numbers on Twitter? That's less than 2% of their total accounts (~290M). I don't know what the industry average is for linking phone numbers, but this seems like an exceptionally low ratio.
- junon 4y agoPhone numbers in the US. In other parts of the world, they're longer.
- newsclues 4y agoUs and Canada, remember we (Canada)helped invent the phone systems
- junon 4y agoSo?
- knolan 4y agoAnd all US numbers begin with 555, or so I’m lead to believe.
- midoridensha 4y agoIt's absolutely true. All US numbers are 555-xxxx. You can see this in any US movie or TV show, which we know to be very accurate. Similarly, any time an American car has a fender-bender, or at least one of its wheels leaves the ground, it explodes in a massive fireball.
- martin_a 4y agoThat's what's really holding me back from getting an American car. Just fearing that somebody might hit my car and then it's over.
- quickthrower2 4y agoMaybe they should store salted hashes of phone numbers. The purposes of phone numbers: 1. Verify you are a not a bot: no need to store anything except TRUE once verified. 2. 2FA - well use something better than SMS, but if you must, store the hash, and make me enter my number for the 2FA each time. Compare with hash and then send SMS.
- quickthrower2 4y agoDownvote explainer?
- modernerd 4y agoDidn’t downvote and think your idea is reasonable, but worth noting that twitter currently needs unhashed phone numbers for: - Account search during password recovery (lets users search for their account by phone number): https://twitter.com/account/begin_password_reset https://twitter.com/account/begin_password_reset - User discoverability and account recommendations (users who upload their address books can find others by phone number, users who share their number can be found by others): https://help.twitter.com/en/using-twitter/account-suggestions https://help.twitter.com/en/using-twitter/account-suggestion... Hashing numbers has other implications, like support impact (some folks don’t know their own phone number), preventing the ability to offer SMS updates in countries that need it (or to reactivate that feature in national emergencies for countries that SMS support was pulled from), as well as making potential marketing, data mining, satisfying legal requests, and future feature development harder. So your suggestion is a good one for a privacy-conscious service that doesn’t already depend on (or that is unwilling to relinquish) unhashed numbers, but it probably isn’t in the nature of twitter to seek to protect user data at the expense of existing or future features, even after leaks like this.
- account42 4y agoNot to mention that only having salted hashes will make it harder for them to link your advertising profile with other data brokers.
- cudder 4y ago
- unethical_ban 4y agoIt's a solved problems that you never confirm or deny the registration of an identity (like email or phone) for your service. Bad login? "Not a valid user/pass combo" Password recovery? No matter what email or phone provided, simply say "If the email matches our records, we will send a recovery link".
- brabel 4y agoUntil the UX team comes in and demands "better error messages".
- unethical_ban 4y agoPossibly, but a good org will empower security teams to make that call and collaborate with UX on a safe compromise.
- DharmaPolice 4y agoWhat about new user sign up? Most systems will tell you if an email address has already been registered (and it seems hard to get round that).
- vinay_ys 4y agoYou can always show that message after email is verified. Don't reveal information without verifying the ownership of email or phone number.
- dncornholio 4y agoalready doable with e-mail addresses. doing this with just a phone number is not really a problem. It is a problem when you can link the phone and email. But discovering a phonenumber in itself is nothing more then pressing random numbers and see who answers?