4 ms·
The solution you propose sounds vastly overengineered. Why would we need remote attestation, tampering resistance and enclaves when this is simply a problem of
by feanaro 4y ago
The solution you propose sounds vastly overengineered. Why would we need remote attestation, tampering resistance and enclaves when this is simply a problem of your peers being unauthenticated?
If you care about the identity of who you are speaking to remotely, the only solution is to cryptographically verify the other end, which just requires plain old key distribution and verification. It's just not widespread enough today for videocalls because up to now, there wasn't much need for this.
- judge2020 4y agoHow do you verify they are who they say they are, though? And verifying their picture matches their name?
- feanaro 4y agoWhat are the practical scenarios where you need this that would require the introduction of overengineered, Orwellian, crippled computers described above, while at the same time not being solvable by other more realistic means?
- chii 4y agoyou don't. You assume that the key distribution mechanism is secure, so that whoever has the key _is_ who they say they are. This doesn't prevent adversarial impersonation (where you cannot trust the party that want themselves impersonated). E.g., if you are an employer, and interviewing via video, you cannot tell that the person authenticated and performing on video is indeed the person you're hiring. I dont think this is a problem that _should_ be solved tbh.
- mike_hearn 4y agoThat just moves the problem around, it doesn't solve it. It's also incompatible with anti-money laundering laws that don't make it easy/safe to outsource ID verification.
- feanaro 4y agoAnti-money laundering laws aren't really viable in the end game, as will eventually be proven.