4 ms·

Identity Crisis: No, Mind-Uploading Is Not a Path to Immortality

11 points by bonkerbits 4y ago

Jack000 4y ago
There is a great short story by Greg Egan that deals with this issue called "Learning to be me". There's actually another short story that takes place in the same universe which kind of refutes this article imo.
- cwillu 4y ago
  Indeed. This is not an unexplored part of the futurist mythos.
- HyperSane 4y ago
  Permutation City and Diaspora also deal with it.
cwillu 4y ago
https://youtu.be/KUXKUcsvhQc https://youtu.be/KUXKUcsvhQc
deanmoriarty 4y ago
But what if the digital cloning process happened while you are under anesthesia/asleep, and then you’d be euthanized while unconscious? Could that situation be interpreted not as a “fork”, but as a simple continuation of the stream of consciousness, more or less similar to waking up the next morning, except this time in a different “body”?
e2le 4y ago
I wouldn't mind having a digital clone, if only as a backup.
HyperSane 4y ago
https://existentialcomics.com/comic/1 https://existentialcomics.com/comic/1
nicklo 4y ago
This is a classic ship of Theseus problem and TFA has a really hostile tone that to me indicates either a lack of exposure to the topic or an intentionally obtuse take as a form of clickbait. TFA argues that digitizing one self inevitably leads to two copies, and the digital one is not real. Let’s take a step back and start by replacing/simulating one neuron digitally. Is this a new you? I doubt TFA would argue so. Now replace 3,000 neurons every second over the course of a year and now your entire brain has been digitized. At which point did you stop being you? The options are, 1) every second you are a new you, with or without digital replacement, 2) every second you are the same you with or without digital replacement 3) every second you are a new you with digital replacement but the same you if you don’t digitally replace. 4) some arbitrary % that feels right like 50%. Option 3 hinges on a special differentiation between digital and chemical computation, which is at odds with fundamental properties of Turing Machines. Option 4 is as hand-wavey as it gets. Options 1+2 while they seem very different, ultimately can be treated as functional equivalents with slight philosophical differences. There are real debates to be had over the morality of mind uploading and the very real risks of doing so, and many great sci-fi short stories covering this topic. Unfortunately, this article is too caught up on its hot take to make room for a proper consideration beyond its knee-jerk reaction.
- leereeves 4y ago
  That's assuming it was possible to connect the digital brain, neuron by neuron, to the organic brain and exactly replicate the chemistry at the interface. Far beyond present technology. But supposing that's solved, consider building the same digital system without destroying any part of the human brain. Whether you digitize the whole brain in an instant or 3000 neurons/second, the digital copy is obviously a copy if the original still exists. So how does destroying the original turn a copy into not a copy?
- raffraffraff 4y ago
  > Now replace 3,000 neurons every second over the course of a year and now your entire brain has been digitized. At which point did you stop being you? Slowly, over the year, I would have died. You are describing a brain wasting disease. I'd ask it another way: if somebody could replicate your brain's neurons outside your skull, let's say inside a super-strong nuclear-powered titanium robot with x-ray vision, at which point are you happy to shoot yourself in the head and let your superbot digital counterpart continue to "live your life"? Or is this digital counterpart not supposed to take up your mantle until after you die naturally? If you try to prevent your digital clone from acting independently, can it sue you for it's freedom? Can it accuse you of false imprisonment or coercive control, and seek help? (There are plenty more Blake Lemoines out there who would take up it's cause against you) If "digital you" hasn't yet won its freedom to act as an independent person, and it then commits a crime (eg wire fraud or conspiracy to commit murder via bitcoin hitman) does "real you" go to court or to prison? If "digital you" doesn't win it's personhood and "real you" gets killed in a freak accident before signing a will that gives yor digital clone the right to inherit your personhood, do they have to become someone else?
the_omegist 4y ago
Stopped reading halfway through... It's repetitive and with poor/no philosophical/metaphysical idea(s). The article keeps the dichotomy you/your digital copy while, by definition, if you upload your mind your physical body will be either gone or "hibernating". No one expects to be interacting with his digital copy like in a mirror and even less make it some slave/assistant...

11 points by bonkerbits 4y ago

There is a great short story by Greg Egan that deals with this issue called "Learning to be me". There's actually another short story that takes place in the same universe which kind of refutes this article imo.

cwillu 4y ago
Indeed. This is not an unexplored part of the futurist mythos.
HyperSane 4y ago
Permutation City and Diaspora also deal with it.

cwillu 4y ago

https://youtu.be/KUXKUcsvhQc https://youtu.be/KUXKUcsvhQc

deanmoriarty 4y ago

But what if the digital cloning process happened while you are under anesthesia/asleep, and then you’d be euthanized while unconscious? Could that situation be interpreted not as a “fork”, but as a simple continuation of the stream of consciousness, more or less similar to waking up the next morning, except this time in a different “body”?

e2le 4y ago

I wouldn't mind having a digital clone, if only as a backup.

HyperSane 4y ago

https://existentialcomics.com/comic/1 https://existentialcomics.com/comic/1

nicklo 4y ago

This is a classic ship of Theseus problem and TFA has a really hostile tone that to me indicates either a lack of exposure to the topic or an intentionally obtuse take as a form of clickbait. TFA argues that digitizing one self inevitably leads to two copies, and the digital one is not real. Let’s take a step back and start by replacing/simulating one neuron digitally. Is this a new you? I doubt TFA would argue so. Now replace 3,000 neurons every second over the course of a year and now your entire brain has been digitized. At which point did you stop being you? The options are, 1) every second you are a new you, with or without digital replacement, 2) every second you are the same you with or without digital replacement 3) every second you are a new you with digital replacement but the same you if you don’t digitally replace. 4) some arbitrary % that feels right like 50%. Option 3 hinges on a special differentiation between digital and chemical computation, which is at odds with fundamental properties of Turing Machines. Option 4 is as hand-wavey as it gets. Options 1+2 while they seem very different, ultimately can be treated as functional equivalents with slight philosophical differences. There are real debates to be had over the morality of mind uploading and the very real risks of doing so, and many great sci-fi short stories covering this topic. Unfortunately, this article is too caught up on its hot take to make room for a proper consideration beyond its knee-jerk reaction.

leereeves 4y ago
That's assuming it was possible to connect the digital brain, neuron by neuron, to the organic brain and exactly replicate the chemistry at the interface. Far beyond present technology. But supposing that's solved, consider building the same digital system without destroying any part of the human brain. Whether you digitize the whole brain in an instant or 3000 neurons/second, the digital copy is obviously a copy if the original still exists. So how does destroying the original turn a copy into not a copy?
raffraffraff 4y ago
> Now replace 3,000 neurons every second over the course of a year and now your entire brain has been digitized. At which point did you stop being you? Slowly, over the year, I would have died. You are describing a brain wasting disease. I'd ask it another way: if somebody could replicate your brain's neurons outside your skull, let's say inside a super-strong nuclear-powered titanium robot with x-ray vision, at which point are you happy to shoot yourself in the head and let your superbot digital counterpart continue to "live your life"? Or is this digital counterpart not supposed to take up your mantle until after you die naturally? If you try to prevent your digital clone from acting independently, can it sue you for it's freedom? Can it accuse you of false imprisonment or coercive control, and seek help? (There are plenty more Blake Lemoines out there who would take up it's cause against you) If "digital you" hasn't yet won its freedom to act as an independent person, and it then commits a crime (eg wire fraud or conspiracy to commit murder via bitcoin hitman) does "real you" go to court or to prison? If "digital you" doesn't win it's personhood and "real you" gets killed in a freak accident before signing a will that gives yor digital clone the right to inherit your personhood, do they have to become someone else?

the_omegist 4y ago

Stopped reading halfway through... It's repetitive and with poor/no philosophical/metaphysical idea(s). The article keeps the dichotomy you/your digital copy while, by definition, if you upload your mind your physical body will be either gone or "hibernating". No one expects to be interacting with his digital copy like in a mirror and even less make it some slave/assistant...