4 ms·
> Rather than try to pinpoint the exact level of dedication we’re trying to foil, from curious power user to nation state actor, let’s aim for something that’s
by Dylan16807 4y ago
> Rather than try to pinpoint the exact level of dedication we’re trying to foil, from curious power user to nation state actor, let’s aim for something that’s hopefully as hard to break as our transport (e.g., HTTPS). AES should be helpful.
AES is in that range for the short term. Not over months or years.
Anyone considering this should keep in mind youtube's mass privating of older unlisted videos, which was needed because they used to use an encrypted counter for video IDs. That key was in so many places, and it got out.
- feanaro 4y ago> AES is in that range for the short term. Not over months or years. Why do you say so?
- Dylan16807 4y agoOh, I guess my second paragraph is not a good enough explanation? The key leaked, which means anyone that has the key can generate all the IDs from videos uploaded before 2017. If your key ever gets out, you face the same problem. The secrecy of all existing IDs is gone. With HTTPS, you can rotate keys often, older connections would have to have been packet-captured to get decrypted, and newer connections mandate perfect forward secrecy.
- feanaro 4y agoOh, I somehow managed to understand those two paragraphs as two separate observations. Sorry. Yes, the key can leak and there's no forward secrecy in this scheme. That's a valid point.
- chrismorgan 4y agoHave you any source for that being the reason? https://support.google.com/youtube/thread/114633828/changes-to-unlisted-videos-uploaded-before-2017?hl=en https://support.google.com/youtube/thread/114633828/changes-... is all I find, and it says this: > In 2017, we rolled out a security update to the system that generates new Unlisted video links. This update included security enhancements that make the links for your Unlisted videos even harder for someone to discover if you haven’t shared the link with them. That doesn’t imply a leaked key to me (I’d consider that wording dishonest if it actually is describing a leaked key), but rather an increase in the sparsity of the ID space, presuming they were using encrypted sequential IDs.
- Dylan16807 4y ago> Have you any source for that being the reason? Not a particularly good one. > That doesn’t imply a leaked key to me (I’d consider that wording dishonest if it actually is describing a leaked key) I'm not sure exactly what you mean. Even if they did announce a leaked key, I don't think it would go in that paragraph anyway. So that paragraph wouldn't be dishonest no matter what. > but rather an increase in the sparsity of the ID space, presuming they were using encrypted sequential IDs. The reason you do that is because you're worried about key leaks, isn't it? I can't really think of another reason. And then they felt the need to pull the emergency lever and hide all videos on the old system.
- chrismorgan 4y agoDo you have any source? Is this something you heard, or an interpretation of your own? (I’m not being hostile, I’d just like to know.) For that matter, have you any definite knowledge that YouTube uses encrypted sequential identifiers for its URLs? Looking from the outside, there’s no visible difference between this approach and something based on randomness, save that something random is likely to be longer because that approach is normally paired with statistical collision avoidance rather than checked collision avoidance. The reason you increase the sparsity of an ID space is because you have discovered a weakness in the generation scheme (which allows faster guessing of valid IDs), faster testing has become possible than you planned for, or occupation has exceeded what you deem to be acceptable probabilities (which could be that occupation has been increasing, or that it was constant but you’ve changed your opinion on acceptable probabilities). If you’re worried about key leaks, merely changing keys gets you only a brief respite for an already-leaked key. In this instance, they gave one month’s notice of a change, and the underlying ID scheme change had clearly occurred about six months earlier. This suggests to me that they did not know of any immediate threat, but were being cautious in just the way they described, for the second or third reason. If they did know of a leaked key, I would expect them to state the consequences more forthrightly in the announcement, and have made the change rather more rapidly than they did.
- Dylan16807 4y ago