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You're just re-stating (1). I understood (1) fine and addressed it directly. Observation isn't required for Turing machines to exist. A computer is still a com

You're just re-stating (1). I understood (1) fine and addressed it directly. Observation isn't required for Turing machines to exist. A computer is still a computer even if it has no user or doesn't compute anything deemed useful. i.e., Whether something is a computer or not doesn't depend on interpretation or observation. (Directly saying 1 is wrong)

denton-scratch 4y ago
Yes, I'm restating (1). That's why my remark was introduced with the phrase "The argument was [...]". In particular, I was trying to rationalise the dumb "iron bar" example as a justification for (1). I don't think you addressed anything; you just flatly denied (1), without offering any reasoning. In particular, you don't seem to have tried to understand the author's attempt to justify (1) using iron bars. For my part, I'm not sure about (1). As far as I can see, there's a steady flow of people discovering that some X is a Turing-complete language, when X wasn't actually even meant to be a language at all. So it seems that some configuration of stuff is a computer IFF (a) it is capable of doing computation, and (b) someone is willing to consider it as a computer. Four odd socks could be considered a computer, by someone who was using them as a 4-bit adder.
- 3g4o53g4o5 4y ago
- i_like_apis 4y ago
  No. Some things are Turing machines and some are not. Human interaction and interpretation are not involved. This applies to any model of computation. Cellular autonoma for instance. A mind is not required to interact with the system for computation to take place. Take a living cell. No mind is in the loop when the cell computes the manufacture of organelles from stored data. > Four odd socks could be considered a computer, by someone who was using them as a 4-bit adder. No. A group of 4 socks is not a computational system. That's just MEMORY. Same with iron bars. It doesn't compute on it's own because it's not a full computer. The fact that memory doesn't compute by itself isn't evidence that a mind needs to be involved for computation to take place. The argument is really stupid.
  - denton-scratch 4y ago
    > No. A group of 4 socks is not a computational system. That's just MEMORY. Same with iron bars. It doesn't compute on it's own because it's not a full computer. Agreed; that was a rather throwaway rhetorical remark. But if you concede that four socks can be a memory, then it's not a huge jump to see that a bunch of arbitrary objects can in principle compose a computer. My contention is that whether that arrangement of objects is in fact a computer is subjective; it depends on whether anyone conceives of it as a computer, or uses it to obtain computational results.
    - i_like_apis 4y ago
      Again, no, not anything can a computer. If you like Turing machines, there are specific requirements for what makes a Turing machine. None of these things are ingredients of a Turing machine: * Observation * Measurement * Interpretation * Intent * A mind > My contention is that whether that arrangement of objects is in fact a computer is subjective You are wrong. It is discretely defined. Read about the requirements for a Turing machine. * When the requirements are *not* met, subjectivity can not turn something into a computer. * When the requirements *are* met, subjectivity can not change the fact that it is computer. It's obvious that subjectivity has no effect -- either in the matter of classifying computers, or allowing computation to take place. > it depends on whether anyone conceives of it as a computer, or uses it to obtain computational results. Again, refuted, in so many different ways. Here's an obvious one which I will restate: * Cells inarguably perform computation. They pre-date minds by billions of years. Put a different way, if a Turing Machine computes in the woods and there's no one around to see it, computation will still have taken place. The burden of proof would be on you to say otherwise. I only see two very messy and wrong arguments: A) Iron bars don't compute by themselves --> A mind is needed to "map" iron bars to "states of an arbitrary Turing machine" It doesn't follow. Iron bars don't compute on their own because they are just the memory component. What is missing is MACHINERY WITH SPECIFIC PROPERTIES to complete a Turing machine. If the machinery is present, computation is possible. No mind necessary. B) Socks are a computer if I decide they are --> arbitrary objects can in principle compose a computer --> deciding is necessary to make computers. It doesn't follow. While computers could be made of just about anything, fully arbitrary objects cannot be computers. Only specific systems yield computation. Decision has nothing to do with it. Not even observation is required. > there's a steady flow of people discovering that some X is a Turing-complete language, when X wasn't actually even meant to be a language at all. You're arguing my point. "discovering" Turing machines ... meaning some things are already Turing machines before a mind became involved. > So it seems that some configuration of stuff is a computer IFF (a) it is capable of doing computation, and (b) someone is willing to consider it as a computer. You say "So it seems" and "IFF" but it does not follow at all. (b) is not supported. Computation can happen without "someone". At best, you're arguing that trees falling in the forrest make no sound. Anyway, why do I think I have time for this ...

denton-scratch 4y ago

Yes, I'm restating (1). That's why my remark was introduced with the phrase "The argument was [...]". In particular, I was trying to rationalise the dumb "iron bar" example as a justification for (1). I don't think you addressed anything; you just flatly denied (1), without offering any reasoning. In particular, you don't seem to have tried to understand the author's attempt to justify (1) using iron bars. For my part, I'm not sure about (1). As far as I can see, there's a steady flow of people discovering that some X is a Turing-complete language, when X wasn't actually even meant to be a language at all. So it seems that some configuration of stuff is a computer IFF (a) it is capable of doing computation, and (b) someone is willing to consider it as a computer. Four odd socks could be considered a computer, by someone who was using them as a 4-bit adder.

3g4o53g4o5 4y ago
i_like_apis 4y ago
No. Some things are Turing machines and some are not. Human interaction and interpretation are not involved. This applies to any model of computation. Cellular autonoma for instance. A mind is not required to interact with the system for computation to take place. Take a living cell. No mind is in the loop when the cell computes the manufacture of organelles from stored data. > Four odd socks could be considered a computer, by someone who was using them as a 4-bit adder. No. A group of 4 socks is not a computational system. That's just MEMORY. Same with iron bars. It doesn't compute on it's own because it's not a full computer. The fact that memory doesn't compute by itself isn't evidence that a mind needs to be involved for computation to take place. The argument is really stupid.
- denton-scratch 4y ago
  > No. A group of 4 socks is not a computational system. That's just MEMORY. Same with iron bars. It doesn't compute on it's own because it's not a full computer. Agreed; that was a rather throwaway rhetorical remark. But if you concede that four socks can be a memory, then it's not a huge jump to see that a bunch of arbitrary objects can in principle compose a computer. My contention is that whether that arrangement of objects is in fact a computer is subjective; it depends on whether anyone conceives of it as a computer, or uses it to obtain computational results.
  - i_like_apis 4y ago
    Again, no, not anything can a computer. If you like Turing machines, there are specific requirements for what makes a Turing machine. None of these things are ingredients of a Turing machine: * Observation * Measurement * Interpretation * Intent * A mind > My contention is that whether that arrangement of objects is in fact a computer is subjective You are wrong. It is discretely defined. Read about the requirements for a Turing machine. * When the requirements are *not* met, subjectivity can not turn something into a computer. * When the requirements *are* met, subjectivity can not change the fact that it is computer. It's obvious that subjectivity has no effect -- either in the matter of classifying computers, or allowing computation to take place. > it depends on whether anyone conceives of it as a computer, or uses it to obtain computational results. Again, refuted, in so many different ways. Here's an obvious one which I will restate: * Cells inarguably perform computation. They pre-date minds by billions of years. Put a different way, if a Turing Machine computes in the woods and there's no one around to see it, computation will still have taken place. The burden of proof would be on you to say otherwise. I only see two very messy and wrong arguments: A) Iron bars don't compute by themselves --> A mind is needed to "map" iron bars to "states of an arbitrary Turing machine" It doesn't follow. Iron bars don't compute on their own because they are just the memory component. What is missing is MACHINERY WITH SPECIFIC PROPERTIES to complete a Turing machine. If the machinery is present, computation is possible. No mind necessary. B) Socks are a computer if I decide they are --> arbitrary objects can in principle compose a computer --> deciding is necessary to make computers. It doesn't follow. While computers could be made of just about anything, fully arbitrary objects cannot be computers. Only specific systems yield computation. Decision has nothing to do with it. Not even observation is required. > there's a steady flow of people discovering that some X is a Turing-complete language, when X wasn't actually even meant to be a language at all. You're arguing my point. "discovering" Turing machines ... meaning some things are already Turing machines before a mind became involved. > So it seems that some configuration of stuff is a computer IFF (a) it is capable of doing computation, and (b) someone is willing to consider it as a computer. You say "So it seems" and "IFF" but it does not follow at all. (b) is not supported. Computation can happen without "someone". At best, you're arguing that trees falling in the forrest make no sound. Anyway, why do I think I have time for this ...