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The argument seems to be that beyond a certain level of complexity you'll somehow automatically get consciousness. Clearly it's unlikely this is a hard cut off

The argument seems to be that beyond a certain level of complexity you'll somehow automatically get consciousness. Clearly it's unlikely this is a hard cut off. Adding one more byte of RAM, expanding the CPU from 64 to 128-bit words, or adding another dimension to a neural network isn't going to do it. But if consciousness emergent, how do you measure the amount of consciousness? Because the experience is subjective, you can't just assume that behaviours that appear conscious are proof that consciousness exists. You could - presumably - build a Turing bot, but it would still be an automaton. So you're left with people making very definitive statements about something which everyone experiences, but no one can measure or even define.

simonh 4y ago
>beyond a certain level of complexity you'll somehow automatically get consciousness Right, that's the argument, but I don't believe this at all. Consciousness is a computation therefore all computations are conscious. That doesn't follow. In any other philosophical or scientific discourse that sort of naive conceptual inversion would be laughed out of the room. Horses are animals therefore animals are all horses. It's absurd. Personally I think consciousness arises out of reflection on an internal model of one's own thought processes and behaviour. See Douglas Hofstadter's "I am a strange loop". I see no reason why a system like that wouldn't be tractable to computation.
- aneil 4y ago
  You could execute a loop that reflects on an internal model using pen and paper. Is that system conscious? Imagine only one computational step of that loop happening everyday. Does qualia arise from that? What is detecting that that one step is part of a larger series of steps that can be considered a computation? What provides the continuity? This is why the strange loop idea implemented using traditional computation doesn't make sense to me.
  - simonh 4y ago
    That's just a restating of the Chinese room argument. Like Searle you're bamboozling yourself with scale. If I was put in a magnetic field of some kind that slowed down my physical and neurological processes by 1000x would I be any less conscious? Would I be any less a human being? It would seem so to people observing me for sure, but would it change my essential nature?
    - tarsinge 4y ago
      And as Searle responded to that argument you are bamboozling yourself with speed. There is nothing that prove that accelerating the computation to a given speed that will make the consciousness emerge.
      - simonh 4y ago
        Of course not, that seems equally absurd, I don't understand why you are ascribing that position to me.
jonathanstrange 4y ago
> The argument seems to be that beyond a certain level of complexity you'll somehow automatically get consciousness. I agree with much of what you say but not with this statement. That would be a silly argument since it's very easy to imagine algorithms of arbitrary complexity that are trivially not conscious. A better argument for computationalism states that (1) consciousness could be an emergent property of certain algorithms when they are running on a computational device, and (2) among all known explanations of consciousness, a computational theory seems to be the overall best theory, especially if compatibility with contemporary physics is a goal. The article lays out one incorrect standard argument against (1) that basically just says that it's hard to imagine (1) and therefore (1) is not possible. The Chinese room and the Chinese brain arguments do the same, and they are equally flawed. Just because something is hard to imagine or comprehend doesn't imply that it isn't the case. In fact, if consciousness is an emergent property of certain algorithms when they run, then it is clear that their workings are hard to understand. That's reasonably clear because otherwise we would already have found them. Regarding your worry that we might not be able to detect consciousness: I agree with that but there is, interestingly, a loophole. At least in theory it could be possible that if computationalism is true, then we can determine that an algorithm produces consciousness by mere analytic insight. Again, this is hard to imagine, but it is not impossible. It seems more likely that (2) is the only route to go, that for some reason we lack the capacity to determine consciousness reliably by mere analysis, but we don't know. (2) is the most controversial in the philosophy of mind. On the one hand, it is clearly inference to the best explanation, and there are various methodological concerns with such arguments. One might claim that they have no justificatory value on their own. On the other hand, the alternatives to computationalism really are way more mystical. The brain could be a hypercomputer. But hypercomputers can also compute, so it's just an extension of computationalism and it is not even fully clear yet whether and which types of hypercomputers are physically possible. Then there is Penrose's theory of quantum consciousness, which basically just attempts to explain one mysterious phenomenon by another mysterious phenomenon. At least it was designed as a falsifiable theory and therefore is scientific. Finally, we have all kinds of non-computationalism that are mystical, explain nothing, and lead to strange homunculus problems. The worst offender is classical dualism. Dualists reject physicalism and often incorrectly assume that computationalism presumes physicalism. Ironically, however, computationalism would also be the best theory of how the mind works if dualism was true. The dualist just adds to this various stipulations that are incompatible with contemporary physics. > Because the experience is subjective, you can't just assume that behaviours that appear conscious are proof that consciousness exists. That's only true from a very narrow scientific perspective. Psychology allows the use of introspective data, so from that perspective subjective reports about consciousness (or related feelings and states of mind) can be valid data. Using a reasonable definition based on introspection we can even determine different degrees of consciousness and study what's going on in the brain while they appear to be active. Typical examples: falling asleep, dreaming, sleep paralysis, research on anaesthetics and mind-altering drugs, various forms of physical brain defects, the study of coma patients, etc. In a nutshell, I don't really buy the "consciousness cannot be measured" argument. What is correct is that we cannot show conclusively that another person or machine is conscious, just like we cannot disprove solipsism. But this is best treated as an overly skeptic philosophical argument, and at best this would support the theory that consciousness is an illusion and we are nothing but unconscious robots. That theory is not very plausible either, so we should be ready to grant consciousness to others based on introspective data.
denton-scratch 4y ago
> how do you measure the amount of consciousness? You seem to have assumed that consciousness is a measurable "stuff". My way of seeing it is that consciousness is either present or absent. Thoughts, beliefs and concepts are like ripples on the surface of consciousness, but are not themselves consciousness. So you can have consciousness without thoughts.
- olaulaja 4y ago
  If consciousness is binary like you state, we can hypothetically remove parts of it until we reach some arbitrarily small part after the removal of which the remainder is no longer conscious. This seems like a very weak argument to me, implying the opposite conclusion that consciousness must be on a sliding scale. (measuring the level of consciousness is left as an exercise to the reader)
  - slowmovintarget 4y ago
    We do know how to shut consciousness off or suppress it. That's what anesthesia drugs do. Autonomic functions are not affected. Self-awareness and motivated action shut down.
    - denton-scratch 4y ago
      Anaesthesia is fantastic nowadays. But it remains the fact that even very good anaesthetists don't really know how it works. "Motivated action" shuts down because they paralyse you, using curare (or something more modern, I guess). They don't want you twitching around while they're wielding the scalpel. Whether Self-awareness shuts down is very hard to say, without being that self. And it does seem clear that people can't lay down memories when they're anaesthetised. So I don't have any way of knowing whether I was awake when they operated on me.
  - denton-scratch 4y ago
    Hmmm. You seem to be talking about progressive removal of parts of the brain, until consciousness is no longer manifested. But that experiment is founded on the assumption that the root of consciousness is the brain; and that consequently, consciousness can be subdivided, like the brain, until there's very little left. But I contend that that begs the question: it assumes that the root of consciousness is material, and it assumes that consciousness is divisible. So you have made assumptions that are incompatible with consciousness being fundamental and indivisible. That is: it's not surprising that you disagree with me, because you've assumed that I'm wrong.

simonh 4y ago

>beyond a certain level of complexity you'll somehow automatically get consciousness Right, that's the argument, but I don't believe this at all. Consciousness is a computation therefore all computations are conscious. That doesn't follow. In any other philosophical or scientific discourse that sort of naive conceptual inversion would be laughed out of the room. Horses are animals therefore animals are all horses. It's absurd. Personally I think consciousness arises out of reflection on an internal model of one's own thought processes and behaviour. See Douglas Hofstadter's "I am a strange loop". I see no reason why a system like that wouldn't be tractable to computation.

aneil 4y ago
You could execute a loop that reflects on an internal model using pen and paper. Is that system conscious? Imagine only one computational step of that loop happening everyday. Does qualia arise from that? What is detecting that that one step is part of a larger series of steps that can be considered a computation? What provides the continuity? This is why the strange loop idea implemented using traditional computation doesn't make sense to me.
- simonh 4y ago
  That's just a restating of the Chinese room argument. Like Searle you're bamboozling yourself with scale. If I was put in a magnetic field of some kind that slowed down my physical and neurological processes by 1000x would I be any less conscious? Would I be any less a human being? It would seem so to people observing me for sure, but would it change my essential nature?
  - tarsinge 4y ago
    And as Searle responded to that argument you are bamboozling yourself with speed. There is nothing that prove that accelerating the computation to a given speed that will make the consciousness emerge.
    - simonh 4y ago
      Of course not, that seems equally absurd, I don't understand why you are ascribing that position to me.

jonathanstrange 4y ago

> The argument seems to be that beyond a certain level of complexity you'll somehow automatically get consciousness. I agree with much of what you say but not with this statement. That would be a silly argument since it's very easy to imagine algorithms of arbitrary complexity that are trivially not conscious. A better argument for computationalism states that (1) consciousness could be an emergent property of certain algorithms when they are running on a computational device, and (2) among all known explanations of consciousness, a computational theory seems to be the overall best theory, especially if compatibility with contemporary physics is a goal. The article lays out one incorrect standard argument against (1) that basically just says that it's hard to imagine (1) and therefore (1) is not possible. The Chinese room and the Chinese brain arguments do the same, and they are equally flawed. Just because something is hard to imagine or comprehend doesn't imply that it isn't the case. In fact, if consciousness is an emergent property of certain algorithms when they run, then it is clear that their workings are hard to understand. That's reasonably clear because otherwise we would already have found them. Regarding your worry that we might not be able to detect consciousness: I agree with that but there is, interestingly, a loophole. At least in theory it could be possible that if computationalism is true, then we can determine that an algorithm produces consciousness by mere analytic insight. Again, this is hard to imagine, but it is not impossible. It seems more likely that (2) is the only route to go, that for some reason we lack the capacity to determine consciousness reliably by mere analysis, but we don't know. (2) is the most controversial in the philosophy of mind. On the one hand, it is clearly inference to the best explanation, and there are various methodological concerns with such arguments. One might claim that they have no justificatory value on their own. On the other hand, the alternatives to computationalism really are way more mystical. The brain could be a hypercomputer. But hypercomputers can also compute, so it's just an extension of computationalism and it is not even fully clear yet whether and which types of hypercomputers are physically possible. Then there is Penrose's theory of quantum consciousness, which basically just attempts to explain one mysterious phenomenon by another mysterious phenomenon. At least it was designed as a falsifiable theory and therefore is scientific. Finally, we have all kinds of non-computationalism that are mystical, explain nothing, and lead to strange homunculus problems. The worst offender is classical dualism. Dualists reject physicalism and often incorrectly assume that computationalism presumes physicalism. Ironically, however, computationalism would also be the best theory of how the mind works if dualism was true. The dualist just adds to this various stipulations that are incompatible with contemporary physics. > Because the experience is subjective, you can't just assume that behaviours that appear conscious are proof that consciousness exists. That's only true from a very narrow scientific perspective. Psychology allows the use of introspective data, so from that perspective subjective reports about consciousness (or related feelings and states of mind) can be valid data. Using a reasonable definition based on introspection we can even determine different degrees of consciousness and study what's going on in the brain while they appear to be active. Typical examples: falling asleep, dreaming, sleep paralysis, research on anaesthetics and mind-altering drugs, various forms of physical brain defects, the study of coma patients, etc. In a nutshell, I don't really buy the "consciousness cannot be measured" argument. What is correct is that we cannot show conclusively that another person or machine is conscious, just like we cannot disprove solipsism. But this is best treated as an overly skeptic philosophical argument, and at best this would support the theory that consciousness is an illusion and we are nothing but unconscious robots. That theory is not very plausible either, so we should be ready to grant consciousness to others based on introspective data.

denton-scratch 4y ago

> how do you measure the amount of consciousness? You seem to have assumed that consciousness is a measurable "stuff". My way of seeing it is that consciousness is either present or absent. Thoughts, beliefs and concepts are like ripples on the surface of consciousness, but are not themselves consciousness. So you can have consciousness without thoughts.

olaulaja 4y ago
If consciousness is binary like you state, we can hypothetically remove parts of it until we reach some arbitrarily small part after the removal of which the remainder is no longer conscious. This seems like a very weak argument to me, implying the opposite conclusion that consciousness must be on a sliding scale. (measuring the level of consciousness is left as an exercise to the reader)
- slowmovintarget 4y ago
  We do know how to shut consciousness off or suppress it. That's what anesthesia drugs do. Autonomic functions are not affected. Self-awareness and motivated action shut down.
  - denton-scratch 4y ago
    Anaesthesia is fantastic nowadays. But it remains the fact that even very good anaesthetists don't really know how it works. "Motivated action" shuts down because they paralyse you, using curare (or something more modern, I guess). They don't want you twitching around while they're wielding the scalpel. Whether Self-awareness shuts down is very hard to say, without being that self. And it does seem clear that people can't lay down memories when they're anaesthetised. So I don't have any way of knowing whether I was awake when they operated on me.
- denton-scratch 4y ago
  Hmmm. You seem to be talking about progressive removal of parts of the brain, until consciousness is no longer manifested. But that experiment is founded on the assumption that the root of consciousness is the brain; and that consequently, consciousness can be subdivided, like the brain, until there's very little left. But I contend that that begs the question: it assumes that the root of consciousness is material, and it assumes that consciousness is divisible. So you have made assumptions that are incompatible with consciousness being fundamental and indivisible. That is: it's not surprising that you disagree with me, because you've assumed that I'm wrong.