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(Author here.) This is a false dichotomy. Saying that consciousness is not fundamentally a computational process does not mean that it then has to be magic.

(Author here.) This is a false dichotomy. Saying that consciousness is not fundamentally a computational process does not mean that it then has to be magic. We could say the same thing about life. Life is not a computational phenomenon. But it is also not magic. It is, fundamentally, a particular kind of chemical process. Perhaps the same is true of consciousness, or maybe it is some other kind of physical process. I don't believe that saying that it is not computation means that we need to throw up our hands and resort to magic, though.

epgui 4y ago
I would absolutely argue that life is a particular category of computation as well, and that is actually closer to my area of expertise (biochemistry) than consciousness / neuro. For clarity: when I say "computation", I refer to any physical process ("physics") which involves information.
- lowwave 4y ago
  I think the parent author may be talking about life in a phenomenological model as in how we experience something vs knowing about it epistemologically. Often that gets mixed up. Knowing doesn't equal experiencing. This is something often the technocrats misses.
- antognini 4y ago
  I suspect we agree more than we disagree. But I think that your definition of a "computational process" is too broad. A bacterium does things that we can say are "performing a computation." But that is different from saying that life is, at root, a computational phenomenon. For instance, sorting a list is a computational process. It doesn't matter what kind of computer I run a sorting algorithm on, if I follow the algorithm, I end up with a sorted list. If I use quicksort, it takes me on average O(n log n) steps. It doesn't matter if I'm doing this on a Lego computer or if I'm simulating a Lego computer on a virtual computer. I always end up with a sorted list in an average of O(n log n) steps. By contrast, if I construct a collection of chemicals that matches the positions of those of a real bacterium, I have created a new bacterium. However, if I simulate the activity of those chemicals on a computer, I have not created a bacterium. I have just created a simulation of a bacterium. I haven't created a living thing. My argument is that the same is true of consciousness. If you create a perfect simulation of a brain in a computer, you have not created a new consciousness. You just have a simulation of a brain. None of this to say that a computational paradigm cannot sometimes be useful in understanding what is going on in life or consciousness. Just that it is not fundamentally a computational process, it's a physical process.
  - epgui 4y ago
    > I suspect we agree more than we disagree. I suspect the same, but I think there is tremendous value in taking a cosmic step back and seeing everything through the lens of information. It's the most reductionist neutral approach to the universe I can conceive us at this point in my life. > By contrast, if I construct a collection of chemicals that matches the positions of those of a real bacterium, I have created a new bacterium. However, if I simulate the activity of those chemicals on a computer, I have not created a bacterium. I have just created a simulation of a bacterium. I haven't created a living thing. I agree, but I think the context matters: you may not have created a bacteria, but that's because you've emulated a bacteria in a totally different environment. The bacteria makes no sense as a computational engine if you separate it from its environment, which is chemical in nature: this chemical environment must also be emulated inside the computer. So if we're going to take the idea of life as a computation seriously and to the extreme, we need to conceive of it as it exists within its environment and in the context within which it evolved. Otherwise what you've created, grossly speaking, is a function that is never called, which of course is much less interesting. Similarly for the brain, it must also be embodied, and you must also simulate its afferent inputs, and you must also give it an environment with which to interact and within which to exhibit features of agency. If you emulate the embodied brain with its environment, I contend that it doesn't matter what the substrate is: the brain you will have created will "feel" just as real to itself. It will perceive itself as being "conscious" just as well as you and I. Note that for this to make any sense in a relatable way to a human, it's not enough to just throw large numbers of neurons together, as I understand is common practice in AI work even today: a long-learned lesson in both neuro and biochem is that function follows structure, so you must emulate the gross organizational structure of the human brain in order to observe the same sorts of features that make up human-flavoured consciousness. If you compute consciousness, there will be zero distinction between how the computation feels real to itself, and how you and I feel to ourselves. That "magic" feeling we get where we have the impression that we're "someone", with a personal identity, that we're real, that we're alive, that we're aware, that we can make our own decisions... All of that stuff, your emulated consciousness will also experience. It won't be just bits turning on and off from its point of view: it will feel alive.
    - 4y ago
IshKebab 4y ago
Biological life is not a computational phenomenon. There's no reason very advanced computers couldn't make simulated life. OpenWorm is an example. By the way I find it hilarious how confident you (and other philosophers) are about your conclusions despite them basically being thought experiments with zero evidence. Imagine if scientists did that! Actually I guess string theory is an example of that.
- epgui 4y ago
  I would argue (and this is really just a semantic point) that it's more productive or instructive to think of biology as being literally a computational phenomenon. The substrate is different, the instruction sets are different, the rules are different... But ultimately it's just computing and iterating on a mind-bogglingly massive amount of information, on a time scale that is difficult for us to wrap our heads around.
  - IshKebab 4y ago
    Yeah I agree. That comes into play in Permutation City which someone mentioned elsewhere in this thread. Anyway OP is pretty clearly wrong, or at best proposing something very wild with no evidence.
simonh 4y ago
I would say that life is an emergent phenomenon, as is consciousness. I suspect that whether conscious systems can be computational is related to the question of weak versus strong emergence. If weak emergence pertains in physical systems then, just as physical systems are therefore entirely tractable to computation, then so is consciousness. If strong emergence pertains, then computational consciousness may not be possible. I subscribe to weak emergence. BTW thanks for the article, it's a very clear and well reasoned explanation of your position, even though I happen to disagree.

epgui 4y ago

I would absolutely argue that life is a particular category of computation as well, and that is actually closer to my area of expertise (biochemistry) than consciousness / neuro. For clarity: when I say "computation", I refer to any physical process ("physics") which involves information.

lowwave 4y ago
I think the parent author may be talking about life in a phenomenological model as in how we experience something vs knowing about it epistemologically. Often that gets mixed up. Knowing doesn't equal experiencing. This is something often the technocrats misses.
antognini 4y ago
I suspect we agree more than we disagree. But I think that your definition of a "computational process" is too broad. A bacterium does things that we can say are "performing a computation." But that is different from saying that life is, at root, a computational phenomenon. For instance, sorting a list is a computational process. It doesn't matter what kind of computer I run a sorting algorithm on, if I follow the algorithm, I end up with a sorted list. If I use quicksort, it takes me on average O(n log n) steps. It doesn't matter if I'm doing this on a Lego computer or if I'm simulating a Lego computer on a virtual computer. I always end up with a sorted list in an average of O(n log n) steps. By contrast, if I construct a collection of chemicals that matches the positions of those of a real bacterium, I have created a new bacterium. However, if I simulate the activity of those chemicals on a computer, I have not created a bacterium. I have just created a simulation of a bacterium. I haven't created a living thing. My argument is that the same is true of consciousness. If you create a perfect simulation of a brain in a computer, you have not created a new consciousness. You just have a simulation of a brain. None of this to say that a computational paradigm cannot sometimes be useful in understanding what is going on in life or consciousness. Just that it is not fundamentally a computational process, it's a physical process.
- epgui 4y ago
  > I suspect we agree more than we disagree. I suspect the same, but I think there is tremendous value in taking a cosmic step back and seeing everything through the lens of information. It's the most reductionist neutral approach to the universe I can conceive us at this point in my life. > By contrast, if I construct a collection of chemicals that matches the positions of those of a real bacterium, I have created a new bacterium. However, if I simulate the activity of those chemicals on a computer, I have not created a bacterium. I have just created a simulation of a bacterium. I haven't created a living thing. I agree, but I think the context matters: you may not have created a bacteria, but that's because you've emulated a bacteria in a totally different environment. The bacteria makes no sense as a computational engine if you separate it from its environment, which is chemical in nature: this chemical environment must also be emulated inside the computer. So if we're going to take the idea of life as a computation seriously and to the extreme, we need to conceive of it as it exists within its environment and in the context within which it evolved. Otherwise what you've created, grossly speaking, is a function that is never called, which of course is much less interesting. Similarly for the brain, it must also be embodied, and you must also simulate its afferent inputs, and you must also give it an environment with which to interact and within which to exhibit features of agency. If you emulate the embodied brain with its environment, I contend that it doesn't matter what the substrate is: the brain you will have created will "feel" just as real to itself. It will perceive itself as being "conscious" just as well as you and I. Note that for this to make any sense in a relatable way to a human, it's not enough to just throw large numbers of neurons together, as I understand is common practice in AI work even today: a long-learned lesson in both neuro and biochem is that function follows structure, so you must emulate the gross organizational structure of the human brain in order to observe the same sorts of features that make up human-flavoured consciousness. If you compute consciousness, there will be zero distinction between how the computation feels real to itself, and how you and I feel to ourselves. That "magic" feeling we get where we have the impression that we're "someone", with a personal identity, that we're real, that we're alive, that we're aware, that we can make our own decisions... All of that stuff, your emulated consciousness will also experience. It won't be just bits turning on and off from its point of view: it will feel alive.
  - 4y ago

IshKebab 4y ago

Biological life is not a computational phenomenon. There's no reason very advanced computers couldn't make simulated life. OpenWorm is an example. By the way I find it hilarious how confident you (and other philosophers) are about your conclusions despite them basically being thought experiments with zero evidence. Imagine if scientists did that! Actually I guess string theory is an example of that.

epgui 4y ago
I would argue (and this is really just a semantic point) that it's more productive or instructive to think of biology as being literally a computational phenomenon. The substrate is different, the instruction sets are different, the rules are different... But ultimately it's just computing and iterating on a mind-bogglingly massive amount of information, on a time scale that is difficult for us to wrap our heads around.
- IshKebab 4y ago
  Yeah I agree. That comes into play in Permutation City which someone mentioned elsewhere in this thread. Anyway OP is pretty clearly wrong, or at best proposing something very wild with no evidence.

simonh 4y ago

I would say that life is an emergent phenomenon, as is consciousness. I suspect that whether conscious systems can be computational is related to the question of weak versus strong emergence. If weak emergence pertains in physical systems then, just as physical systems are therefore entirely tractable to computation, then so is consciousness. If strong emergence pertains, then computational consciousness may not be possible. I subscribe to weak emergence. BTW thanks for the article, it's a very clear and well reasoned explanation of your position, even though I happen to disagree.