5 ms·

I'm banking on the emergency access feature [1] of Bitwarden (available in self-hosted version too [2]). The "how it works" section has more information [3] bu

I'm banking on the emergency access feature [1] of Bitwarden (available in self-hosted version too [2]). The "how it works" section has more information [3] but it essentially boils down to trusted individuals requesting access - which can be manually approved by account holder or they are automatically granted access after a pre-defined wait time. Bitwarden (paid version) also claims this - "If your premium features are cancelled or lapses due to failed payment method, your trusted emergency contacts will still be able to request and obtain access to your Vault. You will, however, not be able to add new or edit existing trusted emergency contacts." [1] - https://bitwarden.com/help/emergency-access/ https://bitwarden.com/help/emergency-access/ [2] - https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/wiki/ https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/wiki/ [3] - https://bitwarden.com/help/emergency-access/#how-it-works https://bitwarden.com/help/emergency-access/#how-it-works

sneak 4y ago
This means that the time delay could be theoretically bypassed by someone other than you (as time delay access is not a cryptographic construction), which means that someone else has access today (likely Bitwarden the company), which means the end-to-end encryption has been circumvented to enable this feature, which means they could be issued a search warrant to yield all of your passwords to law enforcement immediately, prior to your being convicted of a crime. Self host with Vaultwarden and do not use this feature.
- DavideNL 4y ago
  How did you come to this conclusion? I would assume that only the "trusted individual(s)" - a spouse or whatever - has the "private key" of the vault, so only that person can access it (not Bitwarden, and nothing can be circumvented.)
  - ben-schaaf 4y ago
    That just circumvents the other part of the feature; the timeout. It also means you have to trust that individual's security.
    - Epa095 4y ago
      Can't it be handled e.g by the spouse having "half" the key, bitwarden the other "half", which they only gives out after the timeout. Ok, bitwarden and your "trusted one" can collude to open it before, but they must both be in on it.
      - smaudet 4y ago
        Better just not to encrypt anything like that. If you have a house, which has windows, your locks do not provide security against someone smashing open the window. Key cutting schemes are a bit like this - no key offers security, only one of several access routes. Having multiple access routes may be desirable and simultaneously a concern - a fireman smashing through your window to save your life is desirable, a burglar slitting your throat after smashing through your window is not. Encryption is more like a lockbox or a safe room - having a burglar compromise your safe room is undesirable, and going into one during a fire is also undesirable. But you do want to use one in the event of a burglary. A key cutting scheme may be useful in the case of mutli tenancy, but it is not a reasonable dead man switch - if your data needs to be re-encrypted either the keys themselves must be related (calling into question the security of the keys), or the encrypting party must multi encrypt the data, meaning whomever does the encrypting has full access to all the key data. If e.g. you are yourself encrypting the data, you must multi encrypt - it would be faster just to share the key yourself, as you already have all the keys. If the third party is encrypting, this means they have side channeled your data such that they can decrypt at any point. Again, even in the case there are e.g. two mathematically related keys, you cannot then enforce a timeout without first referencing and thus controlling the original key. You MUST distribute your keys yourself to your 3rd parties, or your data cannot be secure.
        danuker 4y ago
        > A key cutting scheme may be useful in the case of mutli tenancy No. Cutting a key in half doesn't halve its security, but it reduces it exponentially. 256 bits = 2^256 possibilities for bruteforcing 255 bits = 2^255 possibilities for bruteforcing, or half 128 bits = 2^128 possibilities, or 1/(2^128) the security
- wodenokoto 4y ago
  This is the paradox. You want trusted parties to have access, only when you are unable to access it yourself, in cases such as your death, or Alzheimer. But you _don't_ want trusted parties to be able to access this in case you are incapable due to being arrested, or choosing to simply elope.
  - spurgu 4y ago
    Yup. If I were to use it I'd set it to something like 4 weeks, to be sure to cover most scenarios where I'm still alive.
- pprotas 4y ago
  But the wait time process only bypasses the manual approval step, not the private key step right? So you would still need a private key to initiate the time delay
Pilottwave 4y ago
FYI: Bitwarden premium costs 10$ a year!
- alostpuppy 4y ago
  Oh? Do we like it better than last pass?
  - lucaaa 4y ago
    Yes please
    - wallaBBB 4y ago
      yes x2
  - Pilottwave 4y ago
    I used KeePass with google drive sync before, so cant speak to LastPass. What got me interested is that Bitwarden is open-source and empowers you to self-host, which for me goes a long way for establishing trust. It has a modern interface through desktop, browser extensions and CLI. You can choose to cloud-host your vault on bitwarden servers, for convenience, with a very generous free tier. Which is what i've been doing for years now, no complaints really.
    - howlett 4y ago
      If you have been taking exports as backup, be aware that any attachments you have were not exported - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=31702594 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=31702594
  - deleted 4y ago
    [deleted]
  - 88840-8855 4y ago
    significantly better than lastpass. moved 3 years ago, got the 10 usd premium subscription just to support the project.
Aeolun 4y ago
That sounds like a lot of work when you can just write down your password somewhere safe?
- spurgu 4y ago
  Where? And how to stop your spouse from spying on you? I suppose notification of "Login from new device" would be a tell. But that would also be a shitty situation if you end up in a fight. The Bitwarden access request seems cool since it has a "quarantine period" where the owner gets notified of the access request and can deny it, if still alive (against a malicious spouse request). If you're sure you never face the "malicious spouse" scenario, then sure, but how many marriages end up in divorce again?
  - Aeolun 4y ago
    > And how to stop your spouse from spying on you? I dunno about you, but I kind of got married to them because I trust them.
    - spurgu 4y ago
      That's what everyone does. Did you read my last sentence?
      - lupire 4y ago
        Dicorcing a criminal CFAA violator may be to your advantage in the divorce.
        spurgu 4y ago
        Perhaps, but I still wouldn't want anyone prying into my private stuff (while I'm alive). Also, tracking back, what I'd need to store somewhere (hence I asked "Where?" originally) is: - password to password manager - password to encrypted laptop - password to email account (not stored in password manager) - frequently used PIN codes (mobile screen lock and various apps) I could store the PIN codes in the password manager to make things a bit easier, but I'd still be storing the two passwords somewhere that can unlock my online identity, plus the laptop password that unlocks some really private stuff. None of these would be acceptable to me to get into the hands of a nefarious spouse, whether or not I could sue for it later. As to "Where?"... an alternative to the Bitwarden feature could be to store these passwords using some sort of 3/5 multi-sig encryption with friends and family members where they'd have to collude in order to get a hold of my stuff. But I wouldn't want to give them access either, my spouse only. But then again, what if we both die in a plane crash? Perhaps there's no optimal solution. Maybe the good ol' lawyer would work. Give a lawyer the passwords, along with contacts to hand over the information in an order of precedence, like spouse->brother->mother->friend. If something happens, give first person alive in the list the information in X weeks.

sneak 4y ago

This means that the time delay could be theoretically bypassed by someone other than you (as time delay access is not a cryptographic construction), which means that someone else has access today (likely Bitwarden the company), which means the end-to-end encryption has been circumvented to enable this feature, which means they could be issued a search warrant to yield all of your passwords to law enforcement immediately, prior to your being convicted of a crime. Self host with Vaultwarden and do not use this feature.

DavideNL 4y ago
How did you come to this conclusion? I would assume that only the "trusted individual(s)" - a spouse or whatever - has the "private key" of the vault, so only that person can access it (not Bitwarden, and nothing can be circumvented.)
- ben-schaaf 4y ago
  That just circumvents the other part of the feature; the timeout. It also means you have to trust that individual's security.
  - Epa095 4y ago
    Can't it be handled e.g by the spouse having "half" the key, bitwarden the other "half", which they only gives out after the timeout. Ok, bitwarden and your "trusted one" can collude to open it before, but they must both be in on it.
    - smaudet 4y ago
      Better just not to encrypt anything like that. If you have a house, which has windows, your locks do not provide security against someone smashing open the window. Key cutting schemes are a bit like this - no key offers security, only one of several access routes. Having multiple access routes may be desirable and simultaneously a concern - a fireman smashing through your window to save your life is desirable, a burglar slitting your throat after smashing through your window is not. Encryption is more like a lockbox or a safe room - having a burglar compromise your safe room is undesirable, and going into one during a fire is also undesirable. But you do want to use one in the event of a burglary. A key cutting scheme may be useful in the case of mutli tenancy, but it is not a reasonable dead man switch - if your data needs to be re-encrypted either the keys themselves must be related (calling into question the security of the keys), or the encrypting party must multi encrypt the data, meaning whomever does the encrypting has full access to all the key data. If e.g. you are yourself encrypting the data, you must multi encrypt - it would be faster just to share the key yourself, as you already have all the keys. If the third party is encrypting, this means they have side channeled your data such that they can decrypt at any point. Again, even in the case there are e.g. two mathematically related keys, you cannot then enforce a timeout without first referencing and thus controlling the original key. You MUST distribute your keys yourself to your 3rd parties, or your data cannot be secure.
      - danuker 4y ago
        > A key cutting scheme may be useful in the case of mutli tenancy No. Cutting a key in half doesn't halve its security, but it reduces it exponentially. 256 bits = 2^256 possibilities for bruteforcing 255 bits = 2^255 possibilities for bruteforcing, or half 128 bits = 2^128 possibilities, or 1/(2^128) the security
wodenokoto 4y ago
This is the paradox. You want trusted parties to have access, only when you are unable to access it yourself, in cases such as your death, or Alzheimer. But you _don't_ want trusted parties to be able to access this in case you are incapable due to being arrested, or choosing to simply elope.
- spurgu 4y ago
  Yup. If I were to use it I'd set it to something like 4 weeks, to be sure to cover most scenarios where I'm still alive.
pprotas 4y ago
But the wait time process only bypasses the manual approval step, not the private key step right? So you would still need a private key to initiate the time delay

Pilottwave 4y ago

FYI: Bitwarden premium costs 10$ a year!

alostpuppy 4y ago
Oh? Do we like it better than last pass?
- lucaaa 4y ago
  Yes please
  - wallaBBB 4y ago
    yes x2
- Pilottwave 4y ago
  I used KeePass with google drive sync before, so cant speak to LastPass. What got me interested is that Bitwarden is open-source and empowers you to self-host, which for me goes a long way for establishing trust. It has a modern interface through desktop, browser extensions and CLI. You can choose to cloud-host your vault on bitwarden servers, for convenience, with a very generous free tier. Which is what i've been doing for years now, no complaints really.
  - howlett 4y ago
    If you have been taking exports as backup, be aware that any attachments you have were not exported - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=31702594 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=31702594
- deleted 4y ago
  [deleted]
- 88840-8855 4y ago
  significantly better than lastpass. moved 3 years ago, got the 10 usd premium subscription just to support the project.

Aeolun 4y ago

That sounds like a lot of work when you can just write down your password somewhere safe?

spurgu 4y ago
Where? And how to stop your spouse from spying on you? I suppose notification of "Login from new device" would be a tell. But that would also be a shitty situation if you end up in a fight. The Bitwarden access request seems cool since it has a "quarantine period" where the owner gets notified of the access request and can deny it, if still alive (against a malicious spouse request). If you're sure you never face the "malicious spouse" scenario, then sure, but how many marriages end up in divorce again?
- Aeolun 4y ago
  > And how to stop your spouse from spying on you? I dunno about you, but I kind of got married to them because I trust them.
  - spurgu 4y ago
    That's what everyone does. Did you read my last sentence?
    - lupire 4y ago
      Dicorcing a criminal CFAA violator may be to your advantage in the divorce.
      - spurgu 4y ago
        Perhaps, but I still wouldn't want anyone prying into my private stuff (while I'm alive). Also, tracking back, what I'd need to store somewhere (hence I asked "Where?" originally) is: - password to password manager - password to encrypted laptop - password to email account (not stored in password manager) - frequently used PIN codes (mobile screen lock and various apps) I could store the PIN codes in the password manager to make things a bit easier, but I'd still be storing the two passwords somewhere that can unlock my online identity, plus the laptop password that unlocks some really private stuff. None of these would be acceptable to me to get into the hands of a nefarious spouse, whether or not I could sue for it later. As to "Where?"... an alternative to the Bitwarden feature could be to store these passwords using some sort of 3/5 multi-sig encryption with friends and family members where they'd have to collude in order to get a hold of my stuff. But I wouldn't want to give them access either, my spouse only. But then again, what if we both die in a plane crash? Perhaps there's no optimal solution. Maybe the good ol' lawyer would work. Give a lawyer the passwords, along with contacts to hand over the information in an order of precedence, like spouse->brother->mother->friend. If something happens, give first person alive in the list the information in X weeks.