3 ms·
Maybe physical reality isn't the base layer. Maybe it's consciousness. I'm not sure I would go that far, but there are a number of phenomenon that are difficult
by bko 4y ago
Maybe physical reality isn't the base layer. Maybe it's consciousness. I'm not sure I would go that far, but there are a number of phenomenon that are difficult to explain through materialism (physical reality is all there is). I was particularly moved by Bernardo Kastrup. Here he is on simulation:
> This, however, is premised on the notion that a simulation of a mental phenomenon is equivalent, in essence, to the phenomenon itself. There are many compelling arguments against this notion in philosophy of mind, the most well known of which is perhaps John Searle’s (2004). To gain some intuition about what these arguments generally entail, consider this: Do we have any reason to believe that, by performing a perfectly accurate simulation of kidney function in a computer, the computer will begin urinating on its desk? Clearly not. There is an essential difference between a computer simulation and the phenomenon it simulates; they are not the same thing, no matter how accurate the simulation. Yet, those hoping to “upload consciousness” under the physicalist narrative seem to become so engrossed in abstraction that they lose touch with basic intuitions of plausibility. Their neurosis is, in this sense, comparable with religious dogmatism.
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2158244016674515 https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/21582440166745...
- kghe3X 4y agoA few things wrong with this in my opinion. 1. If simulation of a mental phenomenon is not equivalent, in essence, to the phenomenon itself, then what's a meaningful difference between the two? What is this elusive essence of the phenomenon and why is it a requirement in any meaningful definition of intelligence, consciousness, sentience, etc? If we build a silicon brain some day that passes as human, does it matter that its essence is different from a carbon-based brain? 2. Searle's Chinese Room neglects to acknowledge that the room itself is what would be exhibiting intelligence, not the homonculus within. His argument fails by presuming without evidence that consciousness is not an emergent phenomenon. 3. Of course we don't expect the computer to urinate on the desk, just as we don't expect a silicon mind to produce serotonin. That's irrelevant to the question of whether or not it exhibits the qualities or behaviors that we associate with consciousness. I guess I just don't understand why there needs to be this added, untestable, metaphysical requirement attached to all of these words. And my question to those who suggest this is, what would it convince you otherwise?
- spupe 4y agoCould you elaborate on what phenomena are difficult to explain through materialism?
- bko 4y agoThis is the big one https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hard_problem_of_consciousness https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hard_problem_of_consciousness
- spupe 4y agoWell, as the article itself describes, there are many decent materialistic explanations for this problem - I personally am fond of Daniel Dennett's interpretation of it.