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They have long understood that security is always an argument to throw into the pot to justify their changes. Boot malware isn't really a widely spread problem

They have long understood that security is always an argument to throw into the pot to justify their changes. Boot malware isn't really a widely spread problem in 22 and MS still pushes TPM 2.0. It is probably less about user security than control about users and machines.

scarface74 5y ago
This is what can happen when you turn off SIP on the Mac. You can’t trust developers to not be careless and/or malignant. https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2019/09/no-it-wasnt-a-virus-it-was-chrome-that-stopped-macs-from-booting/ https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2019/09/no-it...
- digisign 5y ago
  Poor security design. App installers should definitely be sandboxed, "sip" or not. Preventing the local admin from making any changes due to lack of that, is fixing the wrong problem. Or perhaps not in a granular enough way.
  - scarface74 5y ago
    So it’s “poor security design” when a user with root access specifically disables the security and bad things happen?
    - digisign 5y ago
      Yes, useful and destructive/fatal configuration should be separated. If you have to remove a load-bearing pillar to install a light-switch, the design is poor, to say the least.
      - scarface74 5y ago
        There are two separate levels - root access - doesn’t disable SIP - Disabling SIP requires you to go through many contortions. People didn’t need to disable SIP to install Chrome. They were doing it for other reasons.
        digisign 5y ago
        Yes, and those reasons are why I mentioned poor design. This morning I was reminded, my work Mac has a dozen daemons trying to contact things I don't want, such as icloud, itunes, google, etc. A fraction of these are ostensibly useful, but I had to resort to Little Snitch to block them because the OS is read-only, i.e. insanity. Even the user-hostile mess of Windows allows me to turn off the worse services... although even that is dwindling.
        scarface74 5y ago
        The OS is not “read only” if you go through contortions. But if you can write anything to the OS, so can anything you run

scarface74 5y ago

This is what can happen when you turn off SIP on the Mac. You can’t trust developers to not be careless and/or malignant. https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2019/09/no-it-wasnt-a-virus-it-was-chrome-that-stopped-macs-from-booting/ https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2019/09/no-it...

digisign 5y ago
Poor security design. App installers should definitely be sandboxed, "sip" or not. Preventing the local admin from making any changes due to lack of that, is fixing the wrong problem. Or perhaps not in a granular enough way.
- scarface74 5y ago
  So it’s “poor security design” when a user with root access specifically disables the security and bad things happen?
  - digisign 5y ago
    Yes, useful and destructive/fatal configuration should be separated. If you have to remove a load-bearing pillar to install a light-switch, the design is poor, to say the least.
    - scarface74 5y ago
      There are two separate levels - root access - doesn’t disable SIP - Disabling SIP requires you to go through many contortions. People didn’t need to disable SIP to install Chrome. They were doing it for other reasons.
      - digisign 5y ago
        Yes, and those reasons are why I mentioned poor design. This morning I was reminded, my work Mac has a dozen daemons trying to contact things I don't want, such as icloud, itunes, google, etc. A fraction of these are ostensibly useful, but I had to resort to Little Snitch to block them because the OS is read-only, i.e. insanity. Even the user-hostile mess of Windows allows me to turn off the worse services... although even that is dwindling.
        scarface74 5y ago
        The OS is not “read only” if you go through contortions. But if you can write anything to the OS, so can anything you run