3 ms·
1) For ILOM and UPS, etc. Only allowed clients should be even allowed to reach the device, long before auth. 2) Hardware needs to have onboard safety interlock
by sitkack 5y ago
1) For ILOM and UPS, etc. Only allowed clients should be even allowed to reach the device, long before auth.
2) Hardware needs to have onboard safety interlock, meaning that there should be a separate hardware subsystem that enforces safety parameters. A user or programmer of the main system should not be allowed to put the system in an unsafe state. Software should not be the safety mechanism. A common way to harm devices is through rapid cycling. The subcomponent would implement rate control/hysteresis so that it could not be commanded in this way. Yes, the subcomponent has software on it, that isn't the point.
Flaws like these should have repercussions beyond market forces.
Someone should make a comment about how the C programmer was unskilled and that they should try harder to not make flaws.
- hulitu 5y agoHa ha. Safety in HW is expensive and nobody wants to pay for it.
- sitkack 5y agoI don't think it is. Each subsystem would have a small processor infront of it, that you communicate with over SPI, it would enforce the different safety parameters and do the local control. Things like setting PID values, monitoring and setting voltages, etc. It would ignore values that exceeded its predetermined operating envelope for the subsystem. It would have cost about an extra 1 or 2 dollars to implement this technique in the UPS.