4 ms·
Indeed the conflict (in favor of continuing the war after the nukes) within Japan's government was so widespread that literally right up to the arrival of MacAr
by adventured 5y ago
Indeed the conflict (in favor of continuing the war after the nukes) within Japan's government was so widespread that literally right up to the arrival of MacArthur there was an intense effort internally by Japan to put down a constant bubbling of coup efforts from the military, which wanted to keep fighting to the last man (Hirohito in his famous broadcast to the people of Japan recognized those emotions and asked the people to suppress them). The Japanese people often also had no idea just how poorly their military was faring toward the end, they didn't know they were clearly doomed to lose (which only added to the cultural resistance to capitulation). And it's important to note that their military was by far the most powerful faction of the government, as such it held enormous sway as to whether the war continued or not.
People that pretend Japan was going to surrender without the nukes (they barely surrendered with the nukes), are either liar apologists (America bad) or extraordinarily ignorant of what actually happened (they should read a book rather than regurgitating Reddit propaganda).
- everybodyknows 5y agoA plausible argument -- but how should we account for the sharply contrary opinions of Eisenhower and Leahy, as quoted above?
- AbrahamParangi 5y agoI mean they lost that argument. Even without assembling quotes we can conclude that their opinion was not convincing and did not carry the day.
- vanusa 5y agoI mean they lost that argument. They were outvoted or simply not listened to, you mean. Otherwise, the argument becomes circular: "Clearly there was no significant possibility that the Japanese Cabinet would have agreed to surrender had not the first two bombs been dropped. As evidenced by the fact that the bombs were dropped, and they did, after all, surrender."
- throw0101a 5y agoIt's more like "As evidenced by the fact that even after the first was dropped they were not willing to surrender, and after the second was dropped the Supreme War Direction Council or Inner Cabinet was still deadlocked on what to do." Two atomic bombs being dropped on them was not decisive in getting the Cabinet to decide to surrender. It took the Emperor's involvement to break the deadlock and even then there was a coup attempt to stop the surrender: * https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kyūjō_incident https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kyūjō_incident What action(s) with less weight/influence than two atomic bombs and the Emperor could have swayed the Japanese Cabinet? And even those things were only barely over the line: > When word of the emperor’s decision reached General Toroshiro Kawabe, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Imperial Army, he noted in his diary that he concurred with another senior general in doubting that the overseas commanders would comply with the emperor’s order. That these officers correctly doubted even an order from the emperor would secure compliance with key parts of the armed forces, was swiftly confirmed by messages from the commanders in China and the Southern Area, declaring they would not comply with the surrender. Their commands mustered between a quarter and a third of all Japanese servicemen. It took Hirohito’s personal emissaries to persuade these commands to surrender. * https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/japans-surrender-military-coup-1945 https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/japans-surren...
- throw0101a 5y ago> […] but how should we account for the sharply contrary opinions of Eisenhower and Leahy, as quoted above? Their opinions / conclusion of the situation was wrong. Just because they executed well in one area, does not mean they assessment in another area was as good. No one's perfect.
- everybodyknows 5y agoThat's not an accounting. It is merely a dismissal.
- deleted 5y ago[deleted]
- throw0101a 5y agoThey were wrong, so the accounting value of their assessment / opinion is zero. If something has no value, why shouldn't it be dismissed / disposed of?
- idontwantthis 5y ago> People that pretend Japan was going to surrender without the nukes (they barely surrendered with the nukes), are either liar apologists (America bad) or extraordinarily ignorant of what actually happened (they should read a book rather than regurgitating Reddit propaganda). Comment above quotes Eisenhower giving that opinion. I don’t think he was either of those things.
- ThrowawayR2 5y agoEisenhower was neither a Japanese cabinet official, whose accounts directly show that Eisenhower's opinion wasn't justified, nor did he have any significant involvement in the Pacific theater to give credibility to his opinion. Bringing up Eisenhower's hot take as a counterargument is really a stretch.
- vanusa 5y agoNor did he have any significant involvement in the Pacific theater to give credibility to his opinion. An odd thing to say, given that he was assigned to the General Staff to assist in long-range planning for both theaters immediately after Pearl Harbor. And it wasn't like being a Supreme Allied Commander kept him in an information bubble in regard to matters outside of Europe. Eisenhower was neither a Japanese cabinet official, Did we hear you correctly? Is that even an argument?