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> And some believe even that wouldn't have been necessary: Those people would be wrong as the historical record shows: > The Japanese Army and Navy had their

> And some believe even that wouldn't have been necessary: Those people would be wrong as the historical record shows: > The Japanese Army and Navy had their own independent atomic-bomb programs and therefore the Japanese understood enough to know how very difficult building it would be. Therefore, many Japanese and in particular the military members of the government refused to believe the United States had built an atomic bomb, and the Japanese military ordered their own independent tests to determine the cause of Hiroshima's destruction.[84] Admiral Soemu Toyoda, the Chief of the Naval General Staff, argued that even if the United States had made one, they could not have many more.[85] American strategists, having anticipated a reaction like Toyoda's, planned to drop a second bomb shortly after the first, to convince the Japanese that the U.S. had a large supply.[61][86] * https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surrender_of_Japan#Hiroshima,_Manchuria,_and_Nagasaki https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surrender_of_Japan#Hiroshima,_... Even after the second bomb there was still some disagreement: > In the middle of the meeting, shortly after 11:00, news arrived that Nagasaki, on the west coast of Kyūshū, had been hit by a second atomic bomb (called "Fat Man" by the United States). By the time the meeting ended, the Big Six had split 3–3. Suzuki, Tōgō, and Admiral Yonai favored Tōgō's one additional condition to Potsdam, while General Anami, General Umezu, and Admiral Toyoda insisted on three further terms that modified Potsdam: that Japan handle their own disarmament, that Japan deal with any Japanese war criminals, and that there be no occupation of Japan.[96] * Ibid The Japanese government were still split on how to proceed after two atomic bombs were dropped. They were willing to stop fighting but only under their terms. If Germany was willing to stop fighting, but only if Hitler and the Nazis were allowed to stay in power (and keep a bunch of territory, etc), would that have been acceptable? Because that's basically what the Japanese were asking for.

adventured 5y ago
Indeed the conflict (in favor of continuing the war after the nukes) within Japan's government was so widespread that literally right up to the arrival of MacArthur there was an intense effort internally by Japan to put down a constant bubbling of coup efforts from the military, which wanted to keep fighting to the last man (Hirohito in his famous broadcast to the people of Japan recognized those emotions and asked the people to suppress them). The Japanese people often also had no idea just how poorly their military was faring toward the end, they didn't know they were clearly doomed to lose (which only added to the cultural resistance to capitulation). And it's important to note that their military was by far the most powerful faction of the government, as such it held enormous sway as to whether the war continued or not. People that pretend Japan was going to surrender without the nukes (they barely surrendered with the nukes), are either liar apologists (America bad) or extraordinarily ignorant of what actually happened (they should read a book rather than regurgitating Reddit propaganda).
- everybodyknows 5y ago
  A plausible argument -- but how should we account for the sharply contrary opinions of Eisenhower and Leahy, as quoted above?
  - AbrahamParangi 5y ago
    I mean they lost that argument. Even without assembling quotes we can conclude that their opinion was not convincing and did not carry the day.
    - vanusa 5y ago
      I mean they lost that argument. They were outvoted or simply not listened to, you mean. Otherwise, the argument becomes circular: "Clearly there was no significant possibility that the Japanese Cabinet would have agreed to surrender had not the first two bombs been dropped. As evidenced by the fact that the bombs were dropped, and they did, after all, surrender."
      - throw0101a 5y ago
        It's more like "As evidenced by the fact that even after the first was dropped they were not willing to surrender, and after the second was dropped the Supreme War Direction Council or Inner Cabinet was still deadlocked on what to do." Two atomic bombs being dropped on them was not decisive in getting the Cabinet to decide to surrender. It took the Emperor's involvement to break the deadlock and even then there was a coup attempt to stop the surrender: * https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kyūjō_incident https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kyūjō_incident What action(s) with less weight/influence than two atomic bombs and the Emperor could have swayed the Japanese Cabinet? And even those things were only barely over the line: > When word of the emperor’s decision reached General Toroshiro Kawabe, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Imperial Army, he noted in his diary that he concurred with another senior general in doubting that the overseas commanders would comply with the emperor’s order. That these officers correctly doubted even an order from the emperor would secure compliance with key parts of the armed forces, was swiftly confirmed by messages from the commanders in China and the Southern Area, declaring they would not comply with the surrender. Their commands mustered between a quarter and a third of all Japanese servicemen. It took Hirohito’s personal emissaries to persuade these commands to surrender. * https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/japans-surrender-military-coup-1945 https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/japans-surren...
wbsss4412 5y ago
You write about conditional surrender as though it were completely without precedent.
- throw0101a 5y ago
  > You write about conditional surrender as though it were completely without precedent. I write about a conditional surrender as though it would not be accepted by the general public, especially in that time. Truman would have found his head at the top of a pike if he accepted such terms from any Axis power.
  - wbsss4412 5y ago
    “It would have been a politically unpopular move domestically” isn’t quite the same thing as “there was no alternative to end the war”.
    - zugi 5y ago
      In 1942 the leaders of the US, UK, France, and Russia had agreed that unconditional surrender was the only acceptable end to the war - for a variety of reasons including partly that no ally would negotiate surrender terms separately from the rest. The Allies held true to that for Germany and Italy. In Japan, even after two atomic bombings, Japan was still trying to negotiate terms. Ultimately we did break from that by agreeing informally (not in writing) to one of their terms - not to execute the emperor - and with that Japan finally agreed to surrender. Even so, a military group attempted a coup to stop the surrender the night before - after the emperor's surrender message had been recorded but before it was broadcast. After the invasion of Okinawa but before the atomic bombs, Japan was a country that was clearly militarily defeated, but not close to surrender.
      - throw0101a 5y ago
        > After the invasion of Okinawa but before the atomic bombs, Japan was a country that was clearly militarily defeated, but not close to surrender. The Japanese themselves knew that they could not win the war in 1944: > Rear Adm. Soichi Takagi, who was attached to the ministerial secretariat of the Naval General Staff, made a study between 20 September 1943 and February 1944, of the war's battle lesson up to that time. He conclude that Japan could not win and verbally presented his findings in March 1944 to Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai and Vice Adm. Seibi Inouye. Takagi's study, interestingly enough, was undertaken at the end of the second year of the war--the time beyond which, the Japanese Navy's top command had estimated before hostilities, Japan could not fight a successful war. Takagi's estimate was based on an analysis of fleet, air, and merchant ship losses suffered to date, the serious difficulties in acquiring essential imported materials, the internal confusion in Japan, and a growing feeling among the "intelligentsia" that Tojo should be let out. It seemed clear to Takagi that potential long-range air attacks on the home islands and Japan's inability to import essential materials for production had created a situation which dictated that Japan should seek a compromise peace. In Takagi's view Japan at this time should have envisaged withdrawing from China and giving up both Korea and Formosa as part of the peace terms. His study in any case documented the fears Yonai and others held before the war and lent support to the increasing but still carefully guarded concern of their fellow Jushin that all was not well with Tojo's prosecution of the war. * https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/j/japans-struggle-end-war-1946.html https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading... Yet they continued to fight in the hopes of grinding down the US' will to fight and get better terms.

adventured 5y ago

Indeed the conflict (in favor of continuing the war after the nukes) within Japan's government was so widespread that literally right up to the arrival of MacArthur there was an intense effort internally by Japan to put down a constant bubbling of coup efforts from the military, which wanted to keep fighting to the last man (Hirohito in his famous broadcast to the people of Japan recognized those emotions and asked the people to suppress them). The Japanese people often also had no idea just how poorly their military was faring toward the end, they didn't know they were clearly doomed to lose (which only added to the cultural resistance to capitulation). And it's important to note that their military was by far the most powerful faction of the government, as such it held enormous sway as to whether the war continued or not. People that pretend Japan was going to surrender without the nukes (they barely surrendered with the nukes), are either liar apologists (America bad) or extraordinarily ignorant of what actually happened (they should read a book rather than regurgitating Reddit propaganda).

everybodyknows 5y ago
A plausible argument -- but how should we account for the sharply contrary opinions of Eisenhower and Leahy, as quoted above?
- AbrahamParangi 5y ago
  I mean they lost that argument. Even without assembling quotes we can conclude that their opinion was not convincing and did not carry the day.
  - vanusa 5y ago
    I mean they lost that argument. They were outvoted or simply not listened to, you mean. Otherwise, the argument becomes circular: "Clearly there was no significant possibility that the Japanese Cabinet would have agreed to surrender had not the first two bombs been dropped. As evidenced by the fact that the bombs were dropped, and they did, after all, surrender."
    - throw0101a 5y ago
      It's more like "As evidenced by the fact that even after the first was dropped they were not willing to surrender, and after the second was dropped the Supreme War Direction Council or Inner Cabinet was still deadlocked on what to do." Two atomic bombs being dropped on them was not decisive in getting the Cabinet to decide to surrender. It took the Emperor's involvement to break the deadlock and even then there was a coup attempt to stop the surrender: * https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kyūjō_incident https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kyūjō_incident What action(s) with less weight/influence than two atomic bombs and the Emperor could have swayed the Japanese Cabinet? And even those things were only barely over the line: > When word of the emperor’s decision reached General Toroshiro Kawabe, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Imperial Army, he noted in his diary that he concurred with another senior general in doubting that the overseas commanders would comply with the emperor’s order. That these officers correctly doubted even an order from the emperor would secure compliance with key parts of the armed forces, was swiftly confirmed by messages from the commanders in China and the Southern Area, declaring they would not comply with the surrender. Their commands mustered between a quarter and a third of all Japanese servicemen. It took Hirohito’s personal emissaries to persuade these commands to surrender. * https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/japans-surrender-military-coup-1945 https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/japans-surren...

wbsss4412 5y ago

You write about conditional surrender as though it were completely without precedent.

throw0101a 5y ago
> You write about conditional surrender as though it were completely without precedent. I write about a conditional surrender as though it would not be accepted by the general public, especially in that time. Truman would have found his head at the top of a pike if he accepted such terms from any Axis power.
- wbsss4412 5y ago
  “It would have been a politically unpopular move domestically” isn’t quite the same thing as “there was no alternative to end the war”.
  - zugi 5y ago
    In 1942 the leaders of the US, UK, France, and Russia had agreed that unconditional surrender was the only acceptable end to the war - for a variety of reasons including partly that no ally would negotiate surrender terms separately from the rest. The Allies held true to that for Germany and Italy. In Japan, even after two atomic bombings, Japan was still trying to negotiate terms. Ultimately we did break from that by agreeing informally (not in writing) to one of their terms - not to execute the emperor - and with that Japan finally agreed to surrender. Even so, a military group attempted a coup to stop the surrender the night before - after the emperor's surrender message had been recorded but before it was broadcast. After the invasion of Okinawa but before the atomic bombs, Japan was a country that was clearly militarily defeated, but not close to surrender.
    - throw0101a 5y ago
      > After the invasion of Okinawa but before the atomic bombs, Japan was a country that was clearly militarily defeated, but not close to surrender. The Japanese themselves knew that they could not win the war in 1944: > Rear Adm. Soichi Takagi, who was attached to the ministerial secretariat of the Naval General Staff, made a study between 20 September 1943 and February 1944, of the war's battle lesson up to that time. He conclude that Japan could not win and verbally presented his findings in March 1944 to Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai and Vice Adm. Seibi Inouye. Takagi's study, interestingly enough, was undertaken at the end of the second year of the war--the time beyond which, the Japanese Navy's top command had estimated before hostilities, Japan could not fight a successful war. Takagi's estimate was based on an analysis of fleet, air, and merchant ship losses suffered to date, the serious difficulties in acquiring essential imported materials, the internal confusion in Japan, and a growing feeling among the "intelligentsia" that Tojo should be let out. It seemed clear to Takagi that potential long-range air attacks on the home islands and Japan's inability to import essential materials for production had created a situation which dictated that Japan should seek a compromise peace. In Takagi's view Japan at this time should have envisaged withdrawing from China and giving up both Korea and Formosa as part of the peace terms. His study in any case documented the fears Yonai and others held before the war and lent support to the increasing but still carefully guarded concern of their fellow Jushin that all was not well with Tojo's prosecution of the war. * https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/j/japans-struggle-end-war-1946.html https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading... Yet they continued to fight in the hopes of grinding down the US' will to fight and get better terms.