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Like Dennett in "Consciousness Explained", both of these authors seem almost entirely focused on what we are conscious of rather than the fact that we are consc
by PaulDavisThe1st 5y ago
Like Dennett in "Consciousness Explained", both of these authors seem almost entirely focused on what we are conscious of rather than the fact that we are conscious of anything at all. Their descriptions of their work are all centered on the question of what it is that we actually experience. This is is a fascinating question, and entirely worthy of investigation.
But it is not the same question as: how is it possible that we have any experience at all?
- cscurmudgeon 5y agoWell said. There is another harder problem of consciousness: A lot of people miss the point of the hard problem of consciousness.
- plutonorm 5y agoI think it's a good test of how conscious a person is. The way we are taught to understand the world - through the scientific process - leads to the conclusion that consciousness is either an illusion or emergent. It is only through direct inspection of one's own internal experience that it becomes apparent consciousness is not an illusion. Therefore those who claim consciousness is an illusion are not in fact conscious. Those who say it is emergent are perhaps conscious but have not looked carefully enough to understand that consciousness is an entirely different category of thing to physical reality. The problem here is that science as a system of thought operates in a kind of space separate from the space of conscious experience. The intelligence born of that scientific process which is a kind of entity that exists in it's own right - is not itself conscious and hence cannot introspect correctly about consciousness. So when a person is operating in the mode of scientific thinking they are in a sense embodying that disembodied intelligence that is not aware. Or at least it is not able to introspect about it's own awareness. And so they draw incorrect and non-sensical conclusions that fly in the face of everyone's direct visceral experience. It really is quite a phenomena.
- beardedetim 5y agoI think they're two sides of the same coin. _How_ do we have any experience will be more easily answered the more we know about _what_ we actually experience. And _what_ we experience is predicated upon _how_ we experience it. I agree both need investigating. The _bigger_ question I see the coin representing is _who or what_ is experiencing in the first place? The way I see it, it's not really _a thing_ experiencing _something_ but instead _things_ experiencing _things_ at _times_.
- PaulDavisThe1st 5y agoThat presupposes that (a) panpsychism or semi-panpsychism is false (i.e. that qualia are not inherent properties of either anything at all, nor of "any sufficiently complex system") and that (b) there is a "how" that can be answered. I agree with you about the "things experiencing things at times".
- dibujante 5y agoYeah, this is the real question. I'm sure I could program an AI agent to respond to (dis-)incentives in a fuzzy way. Is it consciously experiencing pain and pleasure at that point? The answer would be "no" unless we could prove it.
- tasty_freeze 5y agoI am sure someone, perhaps you, could create an AI (or just a simple hard-coded program) that responds to (dis)incentives that clearly doesn't experience pain or pleasure. But that isn't the question. The question it possible that a sufficiently complex program could ever be able to have the experiences in the same way that humans have them (AKA "qualia").
- dibujante 5y agoI think it is the question, because if there is an AI that can experience qualia, and my toy AI doesn't, then there's some inflection point between the two that can experience qualia. You can set up goalposts just slightly past any toy example but you're just inventing Zeno's Qualia.
- vmception 5y agoI think with enough co-processors responding to enough "(dis)incentives" you could get the same result. Present and future anger, present and future pain, predicting whether future social cohesion will be maintained based on how a response is made to someone within a social graph. Understanding and assuming that nodes (other people) within a social graph can communicate to each other to update the state of a social interaction that they weren't present for. I think it is possible. If pleasure was just a variable on a scale from 0 to 10, and not its own co-processor, and an assumption that some forms of pleasure can influence parts of the social graph, it maybe isn't even that complicated anymore. I think it would become less distinguishable from consciousness.
- neosat 5y agoexactly ^. The first central question is "how is it possible that we have any experience at all?" That leads naturally to the other important question "who is the observer that's aware" i.e. who is the "we"/I that is aware. It's telling that science has made incredible progress (e.g. in the last 100 years) but on questions such as these above, we know little more than people knew then. Although we do know a lot more about the mechanics of what and how we experiences things.
- webmaven 5y agoPersonally, I think that "who" is somewhat beside the point. "What" and "how" are the more interesting questions. The answer to "who" just becomes "a specific instance of X" that perhaps has some low probability combination of minor characteristics compared to other Xs.
- visarga 5y ago"Who is the observer" is not consistent. Maybe "what part of myself is the observer".
- GonzaloRizzo 5y agowho is the observer who is observing myself?
- deleted 5y ago[deleted]
- visarga 5y agoLet's try to replace "who" with "computer". Who is the computer that observes itself? all of them. A computer is not passive, a brain is not passive. It can observe itself. In other words, the parts communicate.
- PaulDavisThe1st 5y agoA city is not passive. The parts communicate. Is there consciousness there?
- jostmey 5y agoWhat is consciousness? Self-awareness seems like a good definition that can be explained in the context of artificial intelligence research. What is the experience of consciousness? The experience of an emotion? To me, this seems beyond the reach of our current understanding
- visarga 5y agoWell, at the very least there has to be a "space" of experiences where they can be represented and related to each other. This representation space needs to also include possible outcomes for the agent goals, this will color every perception into shades of "good" and "bad". This would explain how we can represent and value our experiences. Why do they feel like anything then? I bet it's because we have evolved hardware for it, and equally because we're playing a game with real stakes (the human game of life).
- deleted 5y ago[deleted]
- naasking 5y ago> But it is not the same question as: how is it possible that we have any experience at all? You're right, it's not the same question. Dennett answers that question too though: you don't have conscious experience, you only think you do. Thus, the questions he and these authors address are the only ones worth investigating. In time, exploring these questions will reveal the illusion behind consciousness, just like the progressive elaboration of the biochemistry of life revealed the fiction people tried to spin around how living matter simply had to have something different than non-living matter ("elan vital" in vitalism).
- GeorgeKangas 5y ago"you don't have conscious experience, you only think you do." That's what illusionism, the position of Keith Frankish, asserts. Dennett mostly seems to support it, as you note, but more equivocally than Frankish. For those of us who have subjective experience (SE), and are aware of it: SE is the thing, which we know must exist (as noted by Descartes). Anyone doubting the existence of SE, either is not having SE (i.e. is a "phenomenological zombie"), or (more likely, IMO) has not identified his own SE.
- naasking 5y ago> Dennett mostly seems to support it, as you note, but more equivocally than Frankish. I believe Dennett is an eliminative materialist, so he would consider qualia to be an illusion. > For those of us who have subjective experience (SE), and are aware of it: SE is the thing, which we know must exist (as noted by Descsartes). Descartes begged the question. Just deconstruct it: "I think therefore I am" presupposes the existence of "I" right at the very start. Except everybody knows there is no "I", you're just a bundle of atoms, and a bundle that's changing from moment to moment. Where are "you" exactly? The argument is fallacious and implies fallacious conclusions which led to mind/body dualism. The non-fallacious version is "this is a thought, therefore thoughts exist". This is undeniably true, and yet it does not imply the existence of an "I" or any kind of dualism between mind and matter. A thought would then simply be a specific material structure (edit: or rather, it's a particular logical structure that can be embodied as a material structure). > Anyone doubting the existence of SE, either is not having SE (i.e. is a "phenomenological zombie"), or (more likely, IMO) has not identified his own SE. Anyone doubting subjective experience has simply recognized that every prior claim to human specialness has failed spectacularly, that science has repeatedly shown that our obvious and intuitive grasp of perception and truth is fatally flawed in numerous ways, and therefore that we should not in a million years trust anything that we immediately perceive as completely obvious when it can be demonstrated quite easily that these perceptions are vague and often false. For christ's sake, your senses are telling you that water breaks pencils [1], and that you're burning up when you're dying of cold [2], and you're telling me that your internal perceptions of your subjective experience, arguably the most sophisticated part of your brain, is some kind factual oracle? Sorry, that's just nonsense. You should be immensely skeptical of your perceptions, looking both for justification that they are true or explanations for why you think they are true, you should not be treating them as simply a priori true. [1] https://scienceathomekids.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/IMG_9251-795x596.jpg https://scienceathomekids.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/IMG... [2] https://psichologyanswers.com/library/lecture/read/76624-do-you-feel-hot-when-you-have-hypothermia#0 https://psichologyanswers.com/library/lecture/read/76624-do-...
- visarga 5y ago> But it is not the same question as: how is it possible that we have any experience at all? Let me send this ball straight back to you. In the morning when you wake up what happens? You might take something to eat. How would you find the kitchen, how would you recognise the food, or even know you need it? Of course, you are conscious. That's how. It is possible to be conscious because otherwise your body wouldn't be able to survive. It's essential for avoiding death. We are self replicators in a limited resource environment, after all. This balance between self replication and death evolved consciousness as an evolutionary advantage. Being exposed to your internal and external environment is the source of consciousness. Even a single cell can seek nutrients or avoid bad places, or decide when to replicate, it has a rudiment of consciousness. But panpsychism? It's one step away from new age babble. Stones are just stones.
- Dylan16807 5y agoYou don't think it's possible to seek nutrients without having experiences?
- abletonlive 5y agoI don't believe it is. This is the problem w/ the philosophical zombies, they are self defeating examples and can't exist in anything but a thought experiment. The fact that you're seeking nutrients at all means you can distinguish between sensory input, and therefore are experiencing something. If you can't distinguish between sensory input, then you are not experiencing anything. How can you be an effective seeker of nutrients if you don't experience anything and get feedback on whether you've found the nutrient or not? This is why I think the hard problem of consciousness is silly and only exists because language is so imperfect that philosophers have invented a problem which they can't even decide is actually a problem or not. Can any of us even agree on what an "experience" is? You can tell this is so because every conversation about the hard problem of consciousness starts off by trying to convince people there is a problem to talk about and use the same tired examples. We can "experience" red. There is an "experience" of being a bat.
- 5y ago
- davidhs 5y agoWell, the reason we have experience at all is because that is being simulated by the brain. For me a more interesting question is how it is being simulated by the brain.
- mckeed 5y agoIsn't that just layering an extraneous concept on top without explaining anything? Is there a difference between experiencing something (real) and having a "simulated" experience of experiencing it?
- justinpombrio 5y agoYes. If not for that, we wouldn't have so many bloody articles about consciousness.
- davidhs 5y agoI mean "simulated" in the same sense as how computational machines can simulate any other computational machine, as in you can define some arbitrary state and arbitrary rules and with such a machine apply those rules to the state to change it. I say that because of that's what I best understand the neocortex doing (it does that and probably something more). If you buy in what the Numenta people are talking about, then certain neurons in your neocortex configure themselves to be able to predict their inputs better, so they start to form a model of their input. In aggregate, these neurons probably start to learn multiple sequential models of their input. My guess it that these models in the brain interact with each other. I think some of the larger models that the brain models is us (individually), the environment we find ourselves in, our mind, how we relate to it, the 3D space that we find ourselves in, and such. This is a simulation to explain what is going on "out there" (the physical world) so that the physical organism can successfully navigate "out there". This simulated world, body, and such, is what is "real" to us.
- monktastic1 5y agoIf what I'm having is a "simulated experience," then where do "real experiences" exist?
- BobbyJo 5y ago> But it is not the same question This is debatable. If you subscribe to the idea that consciousness is an emergent phenomenon, then it makes sense as an avenue to the answer.
- PaulDavisThe1st 5y agoIf your answer to "how can anything be conscious" is "it just can, if the system meets these requirements", then obviously, that's the only answer and you may as well move on to "what are we conscious of?" At this point, I'm not willing to regard consciousness as something like gravity or the weak force, though I concede that it could turn out that way.
- BobbyJo 5y agoMy personal train of thought is this: 1) We know consciousness exists (as far as evidence goes it has more than anything else since it is the conduit to everything else) and 2) We know it is composed, in some way and to some degree, of information. Information might be a small piece, and it might be the thing itself, but it's the only tangible avenue we have to pursue, so I don't think it's a matter of them answering or discussing a different question, I think it's them framing the same question with slightly different assumptions.
- PaulDavisThe1st 5y ago> 2) We know it is composed, in some way and to some degree, of information. I don't see how we can be said to know this, certainly not at this point in human investigation of consciousness.