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>It's interesting that this commit was made ~9 hours ago and the exploit happened a few hours after that. Where do you find employees, even $500K/year ones, yo
by rasz 5y ago
>It's interesting that this commit was made ~9 hours ago and the exploit happened a few hours after that.
Where do you find employees, even $500K/year ones, you would trust not to pick up $300m just sitting there in the open for the taking?
Hey team we need to patch this bug allowing anyone to drain all the funds of our company, get right on it while I browse Taycan options to match my wristwatch color.
- boringg 5y agoI think the other part of the equation, that is far uglier, is when you have that excess amount of returns why would you not expect criminal organizations to apply leverage on staff. I'm not saying that this happens but it is certainly a considerable security flaw - manageable but risky.
- astoor 5y agoDo you even have any incentive to find employees that won't steal, if you've already made off with millions in pre-mine or up-front no-commitment investment? Cryptocurrency and DeFi is one giant moral hazard.
- yrro 5y agoI guess you don't want the employees to steal from _you_?
- gitfan86 5y agoBut even in a world where everyone is a good actor, bugs and accidents will still exist. Then what happens when someone accidently sends money to a wallet where the owner is dead or unreachable? Why would anyone want to put their life savings into that situation?
- picsao 5y ago
- whywhywhywhy 5y agoBecause (they believe) the alternative is just as bad if not worse.
- Tenoke 5y agoNeither of those seem to apply to wormhole..
- capableweb 5y ago> Where do you find employees, even $500K/year ones, you would trust not to pick up $300m just sitting there in the open for the taking? As with any crime, you rely on the risk (and potential punishment) being higher than the reward. In this case, because it's based on blockchains that are public, immutable and very easy to trace, it'll be hard to impossible for the one doing the drain to actually get away with it. They can try to go to a exchange to get actual money out of it, but the exchange will most likely have blacklisted the addresses involved. They can try to tumble it, but the exchanges will mostly likely blacklist your account if they see any tumbling involved as they can't fulfill the KYC/AML laws then. They can try to sit on it for the future, but eventually they are gonna want to cash out somehow, and then the two previous issues get in the way again.
- gzer0 5y agoHow are "Coinjoined" transactions [1] able to be definitively traced to any one individual? Every coin-mixing event can be interpreted 1,496 different ways. With each cycle increasing interpretations exponentially. "Every Whirlpool is structurally sound with 100% maximum entropy; Never cycling with yourself; Never cycling previously seen coins together; Never any deterministic links between inputs and outputs; And never any address reuse." The authors of this coinjoin protocol use Boltzmann analysis to determine 1,496 possible linkages. [1] https://kycp.org/#/323df21f0b0756f98336437aa3d2fb87e02b59f1946b714a7b09df04d429dec2/in https://kycp.org/#/323df21f0b0756f98336437aa3d2fb87e02b59f19... [2] https://samouraiwallet.com/whirlpool https://samouraiwallet.com/whirlpool If everyone starts doing this, will all coins eventually become tainted? I don't see a way out of this problem.
- capableweb 5y ago> If everyone starts doing this, will all coins eventually become tainted? I don't see a way out of this problem. Indeed, if everyone started doing this (or everyone started using Zcash with z-addrs), then you might be able to get away with it. But that's not where we're at today. Try signing up to Coinbase and funnel $320M worth of ETH via that account. They will 100% lock your account and ask for proof of where it comes from. If it comes from after doing a bunch of tumbling, they will go harder against you to prove where it comes from. Any big exchange will do the same diligence as otherwise they themselves will get into trouble with the law.
- Taek 5y agoI think you'd be surprised. People take a lot of pride in their work and in their professionalism. Crypto has many examples of people leaving $100m+ on the table so they can properly fix a vulnerability.
- throwhauser 5y ago> Crypto has many examples of people leaving $100m+ on the table so they can properly fix a vulnerability. It all comes back to trust.
- fallat 5y agoThere are things more valuable than money. Not only are there a lot of legal problems with stealing that money, there are a lot of social problems too. This is where philosophy comes in and helps the situation. You find the employees who wouldn't steal because they believe that money isn't everything.
- oblio 5y agoGood luck with that! Plenty of honest people would blink when hearing about that kind of money, let alone all the dishonest ones that would try to persuade you that they're honest. It's life-changing money.
- deleted 5y ago[deleted]
- fallat 5y agoNo need for luck. There are already a surplus of examples of this. Look at the massive amount of extremely high impact open source projects that don't have malware embedded in them. Yeah it's life-changing if money is your reason for living. I recommend you read a bit from Seneca the Young to understand where I'm coming from.
- enkid 5y agoThe problem the above posters are referring is not that they feel life is about money or even that most people feel life is about money. The problem is reliably telling the difference between people that feel that way from those that don't. There's no recruitment process that can possibly determine whether someone, when faced with the prospect of walking away with $300M or not would make the right choice. It's just too extreme to be able to simulate. And you have to get it right 100% of the time. If you have 100 employees and get it wrong 1% of the time, you still have a problem.
- fddhjjj 5y agoDoes the current evidence noted by fallat — the massive amount of extremely high impact open source projects that don't have malware embedded in them — suggest the error rate is much much lower that 1%?
- Yanu-3452 5y agoIf I had to guess between "Inside job" and "Their CI system was owned", it may be neither, of course, but of the two I'd bet on the latter.
- danielvf 5y agoIn this case they had publicly posted the bug fix on GitHub hours before the attack.
- dcolkitt 5y ago9 hours ago? The original pull request identifying the problem with the Solana syscall was made back in October: https://github.com/solana-labs/solana/pull/20790 https://github.com/solana-labs/solana/pull/20790
- raziel2p 5y agoBad actors probably don't have the capacity to check every pull request. Yikes, though. Wonder what the outcome would've been if this was exploited before a patch was available in trunk and ready to be rolled out.