5 ms·
I think everyone should pump the brakes on being upset until the details actually come out. Presumably this chip is the same that they use on their "cloud" ser
by tw04 5y ago
I think everyone should pump the brakes on being upset until the details actually come out. Presumably this chip is the same that they use on their "cloud" servers, including the stuff that runs bare metal linux so there should be drivers for Linux.
That's a ton of assumptions, all probably wrong, but do we always have to immediately jump to the negative assumptions? Especially when it's meant to interface with the cerberus OCP project.
- xdennis 5y agoGiven Microsoft's history I think it's safe to assume the worse until proven otherwise.
- dannyw 5y agoI think it's quite obvious what "chip-to-cloud security" [1, official MS Blog] and "remote attestation" [2, Azure blog] is. To quote Microsoft: > However, AS3 must also authenticate the device itself. It does that via a protocol called remote attestation: > [...] 2. The device signs these values with Pluton’s private ECC attestation key and sends them back to AS3. > 3. AS3 already has the device’s public ECC attestation key and can therefore determine whether the device is authentic, was booted with genuine software, and if the genuine software is trusted. [...] It is OBVIOUS exactly what this is. This is technology that will progress as follows: 1. Your streaming platform will only work if you are using a Microsoft Pluton hardware-backdoor agent. The blog post literally talks about verifying "genuine" and "trusted" software. That's as close as you can say 'DRM' without explicitly saying 'DRM'. 2. Your banking apps, and eventually websites, will not work unless your device features a Microsoft Pluton hardware-backdoor agent; just like Google's "SafetyNet". 3. Your government is going to introduce QR code check-ins (like those here in Sydney, Australia; which technically carry a prison sentence if you don't comply), and the government QR scanner app will only work on devices with SafetyNet, Microsoft Pluton, etc. 4. Eventually, it will technically be impossible to connect to the internet, or your ISP, unless you are running ring -1 backdoored hardware. Your ISP will 'remotely attest' that your hardware and software is 'trusted'. 5. Think Apple's client-side CSAM scanning is bad? Just wait for governments to require all OS vendors scan local content (photos, soon text) are scanned against a government-controlled secret database of 'illegal' material. To protect the kids, and stop terrorism, or course. 6. Much like DMCA's anti-circumvention clause, attempting to disable Microsoft Pluton, or comparable agents, will become a felony, because you are circumventing a 'control measure'. [1]: https://blogs.windows.com/windowsexperience/2022/01/04/ces-2022-chip-to-cloud-security-pluton-powered-windows-11-pcs-are-coming/ https://blogs.windows.com/windowsexperience/2022/01/04/ces-2... [2] : https://azure.microsoft.com/en-au/blog/anatomy-of-a-secured-mcu/ https://azure.microsoft.com/en-au/blog/anatomy-of-a-secured-... P.S: 'The Pluton security processor’s firmware will be updateable through Windows Update along with standard industry control'.
- cromwellian 5y agoI read this as: Step 1: Microsoft Pluton Step 2: ... Step 3: Eating Babies You've taken a perfectly legitimate requirement in modern computing environments: The need to secure against attacks end to end, from the software you're running, through the entire ecosystem, even to the supply chain, and extending it to something nefarious. Sure, it could be used to create a world where no one can run unapproved code. Or it could be used to create a world where you can OPT IN to running approved or unapproved code. e.g. iOS vs Android side-loading. Consumers will likely retain the choice, on Windows, to override the system and run unsafe code. However enterprise / managed computer systems likely will prevent it. I mean what security team or sysadmin wants office workers to be able to install and run arbitrary code on corporate machines or networks? Let's try to avoid catastrophizing everything.
- xdennis 5y ago> You've taken a perfectly legitimate requirement in modern computing environments: The need to secure against attacks end to end, from the software you're running, through the entire ecosystem, even to the supply chain, and extending it to something nefarious. If the way to achieve end to end security is by giving full control to someone else then I don't think that's worth it. It is a catastrophe if people end up losing control of their systems like they have with phones and consoles.
- bitwize 5y agoA system that you have total control over is a system that you are totally responsible for administrating. Most people don't want that. Most people don't have time for that. For them, an Xbox that can browse web , run Office, and play streamers, remotely administered by a company with name recognition and trust like Microsoft, is enough. And that even goes for many Hackernews; if I had a nickel for everytime I've heard something like "Oh, desktop Linux? No thank you, that's for college students with plenty of time on their hands. I'm a professional dev, but I have kids and a mortgage so I need something that Just Works." I could buy a fancy meal for me and my girlfriend with the proceeds. A big part of Just Works in today's pervasively interconnected world involves delegating the security of your device to a third party, either your company's IT or Apple, Microsoft, or Google for personal devices.
- blihp 5y agoI suspect most Linux users aren't looking for drivers but rather a way to disable the functionality entirely. The issue with these types of features is that they tend to have unexpected surprises (i.e. back doors, bugs) while not providing enough documentation or access to said functionality to assess them. So it comes down to 'trust us' and it's functionality specified by Microsoft, so... no.
- no_time 5y agoYou don't have to assume anything. Take a look at SafetyNet on android and apply the exact same thing to PCs.