5 ms·
OK, for starters, ECC has to become standard. Then the rate of ECC errors has to be monitored. If something is trying a rowhammer attack, it's going to cause u
by Animats 5y ago
OK, for starters, ECC has to become standard.
Then the rate of ECC errors has to be monitored. If something is trying a rowhammer attack, it's going to cause unwanted bit flips which the ECC will correct. Normally, the ECC error rate is very low. Under attack, it should go up. So an attack should be noticeable. You might get some false alarms, but that just means it's time to replace memory.
- arcticbull 5y agoLuckily all DDR5 DIMMs will have on-chip ECC. My understanding is it's not a complete mitigation but does make exploitation harder.
- snak 5y agoYes, the article mentions it: > What if I have ECC-capable DIMMs? > Previous work showed that due to the large number of bit flips in current DDR4 devices, ECC cannot provide complete protection against Rowhammer but makes exploitation harder.
- hinkley 5y agoIt sounds to me like ECC isn't being included in the DDR5 spec due to magnanimity so much as because it doesn't function without it. That ECC has become 'load-bearing'. Does that mean we need an extended ECC to deal with critical systems that require additional robustness?
- Legion 5y agoWho error checks the error checkers?
- RedShift1 5y agoIt's just a matter of time before someone finds a way to exploit the ECC part, calls it Hammerrow and brings us back to square one...
- aaaaaaaaaaab 5y agoRowhamming would be a better pun, as DDR5 uses a Hamming code for error correction.
- eqvinox 5y ago> My understanding is it's not a complete mitigation but does make exploitation harder. It won't. It's designed to counter silicon limitations to increased density, i.e. it's made to correct the errors that result from packing cells beyond the limit of error-free operation. The extra redundancy from on-chip ECC is intended to be "consumed" by the chip itself, and since this will allow optimizing chip manufacture to denser and cheaper, it's no question at all that it will get pushed to the very limit. There's still "classic" ECC for DDR5. 8 bits mapped to 9, terminated at the CPU which can look at things. That's what I want, need, and will buy. P.S.: Shame on Intel for still walling off desktop CPUs from ECC. https://ark.intel.com/content/www/us/en/ark/search/featurefilter.html?productType=873&0_StatusCodeText1=3,4&0_ECCMemory=True&2_MarketSegment=Desktop https://ark.intel.com/content/www/us/en/ark/search/featurefi...
- Dylan16807 5y ago> It won't. It's designed to counter silicon limitations to increased density, i.e. it's made to correct the errors that result from packing cells beyond the limit of error-free operation. I'd love to see actual parameters for the error correction codes, but DDR5 could pretty easily be a lot more robust than DDR4. When you have no error correction at all, you need ridiculously high reliability. Even if these new memory cells are have a much higher error rate, if they're designed to seamlessly handle a few bits in the same row flipping then the overall reliability could skyrocket. Edit: Oh, there's a paper from micron talking about DDR5 only having single bit correction internally. That's not as useful as it could be against attacks... > There's still "classic" ECC for DDR5. 8 bits mapped to 9 But Single Error Correction, Dual Error Detection is not enough to prevent attacks. Also because DDR5 uses a smaller width you actually need to map 8 bits to 10.
- eqvinox 5y ago> I'd love to see actual parameters for the error correction codes Well, the spec is $369, but a PDF with some early discussion (rev 0.1…) says: DDR5 devices will implement internal Single Error Correction (SEC) ECC to improve the data integrity within the DRAM. The DRAM will use 128 data bits to compute the ECC code of 8 ECC Check Bits. However, I have no idea whether this is what got specified in the end. 8 ECC bits on 128 data bits would be half the amount of added redundancy compared to "classical" ECC. Note also it's not SECDED, just SEC, confirming the Micron paper you mentioned. > But Single Error Correction, Dual Error Detection is not enough to prevent attacks. The OP suggested monitoring for a sudden increase in ECC events, which hopefully this would work for. It's not a perfect countermeasure, just a statistical one, but I'll take what I can get... > Also because DDR5 uses a smaller width you actually need to map 8 bits to 10. Now that kinda makes it better, doesn't it? :)
- kevin_thibedeau 5y ago> Luckily all DDR5 DIMMs will have on-chip ECC Until someone starts building chips with fake ECC to boost profit.
- XMPPwocky 5y agoWhile ECC memory is probably important and probably better than nothing, if there's one thing we've learned about Rowhammer it's that the obvious mitigations that "should" stop or detect it often fail to a clever attacker. Just the first thing that popped into my head, but: say you watch the ECC correctable error rate over time, and somehow (not so easy!) determine which process is causing those errors. You forcibly kill the process and log a message about it, and also terminate/notify processes potentially affected (say, send them a SIGBUS or something and unmap the pages containing the affected data). I, a "clever" attacker, use this to leak out your secrets- I do my hammering juuust right so that, if some secret bit is 0, your hammering flips ECC bits, while if it's 1 your hammering doesn't affect things. Lovely little side-channel. Universal memory encryption and authentication seems to be the only sure way out of the cycle of "attack, mitigation, attack the mitigation", and it's already starting to roll out.
- rajnathani 5y agoNoob question: With DDR5's option for in-chip ECC, if Animats' suggestion of monitoring ECC anomalies is implemented on a control unit on the DIMM module, then will that make the attack impossible?
- tentacleuno 5y ago> I, a "clever" attacker, use this to leak out your secrets- I do my hammering juuust right so that, if some secret bit is 0, your hammering flips ECC bits, while if it's 1 your hammering doesn't affect things. Lovely little side-channel. Would ASLR make this harder? I assume it would because it'd be a lot harder to get to the correct memory location (?).
- account42 5y agoASLR adds nothing to attacks that rely on the physical location of pages since those area already allocated independently of the virtual address space.
- guerrilla 5y agoFrom the article: > What if I have ECC-capable DIMMs? > Previous work[1] showed that due to the large number of bit flips in current DDR4 devices, ECC cannot provide complete protection against Rowhammer but makes exploitation harder. 1. https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=8835222 https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=8835222
- pjerem 5y agoWhen I was a CS student, a little more than a decade ago, we learnt what ECC was and how it worked. Interestingly, I remember that we were taught that ECC was and should be everywhere. From physical storage to data transfer protocols, we were said you really wouldn’t bypass ECC anywhere if you wanted things to work reliably against the hard physical world. It was like a basic CS rule. And still, there we are, still arguing that some reliability is needed into objects as critical as DRAM chips.
- iamthemalto 5y agoI'm a CS student as well, curious what course taught you about ECC? Would be interested in such a course as well, the only course I can imagine teaching this is an information theory course (which my university doesn't offer).
- patentatt 5y agoMaybe this is common knowledge, but can ECC be done in software? I don’t necessarily see why not, despite the common-sense wisdom that it has to be done in hardware. With dram so cheap these days, why not just go full RAID 1 (where ECC is analogous to a RAID-5 implementation), and store each critical-path memory byte twice to detect bit flips or three times to fix? Let’s see row hammer attacks flip the same bit in two or three places at the same time. Sure it would impact performance, but maybe for something like encryption or banking it’s an acceptable trade off.
- carlmr 5y agoIn some safety related contexts you do have bitflip protection on the software level. E.g. you write every variable together with it's complement, to see if a random bit flip occurred. It's quite a lot of work, but if you have a long running embedded system, or a lot of the same, e.g. in cars, the incidence of bit flips increases. This is it course additional to other protection mechanisms.
- datameta 5y agoIn enterprise server memory controller firmware we use soft and hard row repair algorithms.
- jl6 5y agoThis attack is great news for ECC. Now someone like Apple could launch a consumer product with “High Security Memory” and the rest of the industry can follow.
- butterknife 5y agoThey already tried with G5. May be they can try again?