4 ms·

I disagree that it's useless. In fact I wouldn't be surprised if it's already been effective despite not being implemented yet. The announcement of an impending

joe_the_user 5y ago
I disagree that it's useless. In fact I wouldn't be surprised if it's already been effective despite not being implemented yet. The announcement of an impending threat of scanning probably managed to get most CSAM afficinados to swear off iCloud already. So the idea is that mass surveillance is great even if it's effect is scaring criminals while it actually only catches people at random? We've arrived at the opposite of the common reprise of law. No longer "It is Better that Ten Guilty Persons Go Free Than that One Innocent Person be Convicted" but "It is better that Ten Innocent Persons Be Dragooned Than that One Guilty Person Go Free"
- simondotau 5y ago
  All I'm saying is that I understand why Apple doesn't want CSAM on their servers, while also reserving the ability to implement end to end encryption on photo galleries in future. It's a tough line for them to walk. Personally I don't see any substantial moral difference to what Apple was planning versus what Google and Facebook already do, aside for the somewhat icky aspect that some initial CPU cycles are occurring on hardware I own. I'm equally concerned that a purported need to scan for CSAM could be used by legislators as a way to convince the population that the Government needs more encryption backdoors. Personally I'd rather have my photos inconsequentially hashed than have encryption legislatively broken.
  - joe_the_user 5y ago
    All I'm saying is... Actually, you've made quite a few claims, including some that even ineffective surveillance is good 'cause it makes criminals worried. But anyway... that I understand why Apple doesn't want CSAM on their servers, while also reserving the ability to implement end to end encryption on photo galleries in future. Given you've admitted Apple's filtering is ineffective, you have admitted that criminals could put CSAM on Apple servers. But weird thing is "end-to-end encryption" is entirely useless if everyone is being surveilled before the start and after the end. Sure, Apple wants to be buzzword compliant with privacy and entirely surveil it's users in reality. I suppose I too can see how that would be appealing.
    - simondotau 5y ago
      > Actually, you've made quite a few claims, The phrase "all I'm saying is" is an idiom, not a literal assertion. > Given you've admitted Apple's filtering is ineffective, you have admitted that criminals could put CSAM on Apple servers. Yes, I did. And I responded to that already. I'm not interested in engaging with "if it's not perfect then it's useless" type of arguments.
cortesoft 5y ago
But is getting them off iCloud the goal? As a society, are we better off?
- simondotau 5y ago
  Potentially yes. Having illegal activity on a major cloud service makes it harder for those services to offer robust encryption without law enforcement pressuring legislators to mandate backdoors.
  - nullc 5y ago
    This system is a backdoor. We should not be surprised if adding a backdoor reduces pressure to add a backdoor. :) But in the US it isn't just a backdoor, it's an indirect violation of the user's 4th amendment rights. If the government ordered apple to perform this scanning, the scanning would be unlawful and the result would be inadmissible in court. It is only lawful because Apple performs it voluntarily (or at least that is the pretext maintained in court-- repeatedly Apple staff have maintained to me that the government is requiring them to do this). The government should not get the ability to execute unlawful searches simply because it's able to use soft power to coerce user trusted third parties to perform the searching on their behalf.

joe_the_user 5y ago

I disagree that it's useless. In fact I wouldn't be surprised if it's already been effective despite not being implemented yet. The announcement of an impending threat of scanning probably managed to get most CSAM afficinados to swear off iCloud already. So the idea is that mass surveillance is great even if it's effect is scaring criminals while it actually only catches people at random? We've arrived at the opposite of the common reprise of law. No longer "It is Better that Ten Guilty Persons Go Free Than that One Innocent Person be Convicted" but "It is better that Ten Innocent Persons Be Dragooned Than that One Guilty Person Go Free"

simondotau 5y ago
All I'm saying is that I understand why Apple doesn't want CSAM on their servers, while also reserving the ability to implement end to end encryption on photo galleries in future. It's a tough line for them to walk. Personally I don't see any substantial moral difference to what Apple was planning versus what Google and Facebook already do, aside for the somewhat icky aspect that some initial CPU cycles are occurring on hardware I own. I'm equally concerned that a purported need to scan for CSAM could be used by legislators as a way to convince the population that the Government needs more encryption backdoors. Personally I'd rather have my photos inconsequentially hashed than have encryption legislatively broken.
- joe_the_user 5y ago
  All I'm saying is... Actually, you've made quite a few claims, including some that even ineffective surveillance is good 'cause it makes criminals worried. But anyway... that I understand why Apple doesn't want CSAM on their servers, while also reserving the ability to implement end to end encryption on photo galleries in future. Given you've admitted Apple's filtering is ineffective, you have admitted that criminals could put CSAM on Apple servers. But weird thing is "end-to-end encryption" is entirely useless if everyone is being surveilled before the start and after the end. Sure, Apple wants to be buzzword compliant with privacy and entirely surveil it's users in reality. I suppose I too can see how that would be appealing.
  - simondotau 5y ago
    > Actually, you've made quite a few claims, The phrase "all I'm saying is" is an idiom, not a literal assertion. > Given you've admitted Apple's filtering is ineffective, you have admitted that criminals could put CSAM on Apple servers. Yes, I did. And I responded to that already. I'm not interested in engaging with "if it's not perfect then it's useless" type of arguments.

cortesoft 5y ago

But is getting them off iCloud the goal? As a society, are we better off?

simondotau 5y ago
Potentially yes. Having illegal activity on a major cloud service makes it harder for those services to offer robust encryption without law enforcement pressuring legislators to mandate backdoors.
- nullc 5y ago
  This system is a backdoor. We should not be surprised if adding a backdoor reduces pressure to add a backdoor. :) But in the US it isn't just a backdoor, it's an indirect violation of the user's 4th amendment rights. If the government ordered apple to perform this scanning, the scanning would be unlawful and the result would be inadmissible in court. It is only lawful because Apple performs it voluntarily (or at least that is the pretext maintained in court-- repeatedly Apple staff have maintained to me that the government is requiring them to do this). The government should not get the ability to execute unlawful searches simply because it's able to use soft power to coerce user trusted third parties to perform the searching on their behalf.