5 ms·
> in its current form, so-called perceptual hashing based client-side scanning (PH-CSS) algorithms will not be a ‘magic bullet’ for detecting illegal content li
by IshKebab 5y ago
> in its current form, so-called perceptual hashing based client-side scanning (PH-CSS) algorithms will not be a ‘magic bullet’ for detecting illegal content like CSAM on personal devices
Whoever said it would be a magic bullet?
> The researchers say this highlights just how easily people with illegal material could fool the surveillance.
Ha yes, all you need to do is go to a university computing department and ask them to research algorithms to fool the scanner, and then turn it into an easy-to-use app.
Then you chance it with some real CP images. It might work! Or not.
Interesting but I don't think anyone at Apple will be shocked by this.
- aidenn0 5y agoPlus, my opinion has been for some time that the point of Apple's image-scanning (for Apple) isn't to detect harmful material in iCloud, it's to project an image of not wanting the harmful material stored in iCloud. Apple has a vested interest in preventing iCloud from becoming "That image storage place for pedophiles." Also, I'm sure that the FBI is probably pretty okay with "we only catch the people who ever, in a single instance, forget to filter their images through this program that fools the filters" since that's probably like 99% of all people.
- Nasrudith 5y agoThat whole notion of "image storage for pedophiles" is deeply stupid and fundamentally illiterate. It is like calling a bank's safe deposit box used to store sealed envelopes "a child porn sanctuary". When dealing with demagogues it is time to go on the offense - there is a reason why McCarthy was damned by the line "Have you no decency?!"
- aidenn0 5y agoThe problem right now is that there really isn't a single demagogue to attack. Also, for the more cynical, here's a headline from 2016 Washington Post: “Joe McCarthy was brought down by attacks on his decency. Trump will lose the same way.”
- simondotau 5y agoThe irony is, Apple has probably achieved most their goal with the announcement, making the implementation largely redundant. It's worth stopping to consider that while Apple's plans were a hot topic for the the civil liberties crowd, that's probably piss in the wind compared to how hard the announcement landed among underground CSAM communities across the globe. I dare say that even the most technically inept CSAM aficionados will be acutely aware of this looming threat and will know to keep that shit far away from any of their Apple devices. (It would be especially ironic if there's now more awareness in those communities of Apple's semi-aborted CSAM scanning than of Google or Facebook's CSAM scanning, which has been operational for many years.)
- masswerk 5y agoWhile I agree that this is most probably a PR stunt, it's also an interesting conflict of interest: Apple has probably lost some trust in tech communities since, but might conversely build trust with law enforcement, legislators and the broader public so that they may continue without external intrusion.
- nullc 5y ago> I'm sure that the FBI is probably pretty okay with "we only catch the people who ever, in a single instance, forget to filter their images through this program that fools the filters" since that's probably like 99% of all people. Then why bother with the false-positive-risk inducing neuralhash to being with? Compute the sha256 sum of the decompressed image pixels and use that... at that point a false positive is a successful attack on sha256. The only downside is that trivial image modification will make the hash not match, but that's also true for the perceptual hashes... just with a slightly more complicated definition of trivial. It will be equally effective against the idiot-pervert -- arguably more effective because there would be a lot less reason for people oppose the deployment of such a scheme. Using a cryptographic hash would make the software vastly simpler, vastly faster, and effectively eliminate a whole host of privacy attacks. They could then go further and stop using the cryptographic obfuscation that protects apple against accountability for the content of the database-- just make the database the cleartext sha256 hashes. Doing this would substantially address a whole host of other privacy concerns and would make the system radically simpler and less cpu hungry. They can't do that with the neuralhash because of how trivial it is to modify images to match target hashes... but after switching to a cryptographic hash they certainly could. (Well, could except the database providers know their database contains a lot of lawful content and are extremely aggressive at preventing the lists of hashes from getting out).
- MauranKilom 5y ago> The only downside is that trivial image modification will make the hash not match, but that's also true for the perceptual hashes... just with a slightly more complicated definition of trivial Well, the difference between the two version of "trivial" is the difference between "incidental" and "purposefully". Re-compressing, resizing or cropping the image changes the SHA256, but (with high probability) not the NeuralHash. Those operations happen all the time in the normal course of image distribution. Unlike "running through a tool designed to alter the NeuralHash value". In other words, your suggestion trades false positive rate for false negative rate, under the argument that any nonzero false negative rate is effectively the same. This argument is not convincing, particularly when your suggestion would reduce the true positive rate from (a hypothetical) 99% to a much lower value.
- marcellus23 5y agoAnd then even if it does work and flags enough images to get over the threshold, a human will then review them and immediately notice they're not CP.
- na85 5y agoSeems like it would be pretty easy to ruin someone's life by texting them images of your cat, except they get flagged by this algorithm.
- marcellus23 5y agoNo, I think you don't know how the proposed CSAM scanning works: 1. It's only done on cloud photos. That person would have to manually save each photo to their photos library (with iCloud photos turned on) for the scanning to occur. 2. After reaching a threshold # of photos automatically flagged, a human reviewer has to confirm that the photos are illegal before any action is taken. So just texting someone even real CP won't do anything.
- na85 5y agoI was under the impression that iMessage does its own scanning as well. I could be wrong; I don't use an iphone.
- simondotau 5y agoThe proposal to perform scanning of photos in iMessage was an entirely different thing. It would look for photos that were likely to be sexually explicit and show a warning message prior to displaying them, but only where: 1. The account is for a child under the age of 13 2. The account was configured with family sharing 3. The feature was enabled by a parent Results of these scans would remain entirely local to the device and—with the consent of the child—also sent to the parent. But I think this last feature has been dropped.
- 5y ago