5 ms·

It doesn't. It simply makes the argument that deep religious beliefs are not different from other deep beliefs. At it's face, this appears to be a pretty reason

• WithinReason 5y ago
  The OP used the expression "because I really really want it", which doesn't describe religious belief. You might do something that your religion tells you to do even if you don't want to do it.
  • NikolaNovak 5y ago
    >> "You might do something that your religion tells you to do even if you don't want to do it." That merely pushes recursion one quick and easy level further. As an individual with agency, you choose to adopt and obey a particular religion. You "want to". It should not excuse you from your actions or give extra special credence to your demands.
  • danbruc 5y ago
    I don't think this is a valid argument. If you have a conflict between what your religions says and what you conclude by other means and you decide - for whatever reasons - to follow the religion, then you still want this thing. It might not be a case of I really, really want this but it is still a case of I just want this.
    • WithinReason 5y ago
      Case in point: "Really really wanting" to make an animal suffer is only possible for people with a certain level of cruelty. Religious prescription makes it possible for otherwise not cruel people to make animals suffer. Blurring the distinction is not helpful or smart in any way.
      • danbruc 5y ago
        I do not think that there is necessarily a conflict - you could really, really want this animal killed in this specific way for religious reasons and still not want the animal to suffer. You might believe that animals can not suffer, you might believe that god makes the animal not suffer in this case, or whatever. So I think one should be careful to not mix up really, really wanting to kill an animal in a certain way and really, really wanting the animal to suffer. But I will happily accept that there are at least some people facing a conflict. With regard to your more general point that those desire are not exceptionally strong and involve conflicts - sure, notwithstanding me arguing against this in this specific case, I will grant you that, this is certainly possible. But I am not sure that you could make this point in the general case, I do not see why there could not be strong religiously motivated desires without conflicts. Finally and notwithstanding the points above, I still think we are focusing to much on the really, really aspect. I do not think that the focus of the original comment was on the strength of the desire but on the lack of rational justification.
      • NikolaNovak 5y ago
        I deny you the distinction. If There are people who demand certain level of cruelty upon living beings, whether animals or people, "I really want it" and "I choose a framework of ethics that demands / enables me to do it" and "voices told me to do it" and "I persuaded myself it's ok" and "I choose religion that tells me to do it" boil down to equivalent statements. You are making a statement that religion excuses people from cruel actions and I will fight you to end of the earth on that one.
        • WithinReason 5y ago
          > You are making a statement that religion excuses people from cruel actions Well then you completely misunderstood me
          • NikolaNovak 5y ago
            well then - help me out :) I've re-read your post several times. "Religious prescription makes it possible for otherwise not cruel people to make animals suffer. Blurring the distinction is not helpful or smart in any way." I think there exist valid distinctions; e.g. a vet who needs to make an animal suffer temporary pain while providing long term relief is an important distinction. However, what I've put forward is that currently, we are giving TOO much credit and distinction for people who desire cruelty upon animals (and many other things) due to religion alone; vs other arbitrary personal desires and preferences. I think we need to blur that distinction, or support it with something else than "because religion". In other words, to me: Group A: Inflicts temporary pain to animals for purpose of long term relief or some other quantifiable objective benefit to something or somebody somewhere Group B: Inflicts pain to animals for no good reason / for enjoyment of cruelty / for fun / for religion. I deny your claim that people who desire harm upon animals for religious reasons alone, are "otherwise not cruel people". I think "Cruel" is precisely what they are, and I deny them using religion as valid ethical excuse that means anything else than "because I wanted to", because religion is freely chosen and freely obeyed and we remain agents of free will. Or to put it another way - what about humans? If people want to harm other humans for only religious reasons, are we still treating them as "otherwise not cruel"? I'm willing to listen what your alternative hypothesis/point/statement is - why are people who desire cruelty upon animals for religious reasons alone "not otherwise cruel", or how DO you narrowly define cruelty then? (and again, it took me personally 30 years to stop giving religion a culturally-conditioned, social-norms free pass on these things; and I still have to fight this ingrained reflex to not instinctively believe that "because religion" is a superior reason to "because I want to". I don't expect anybody else to make that journey in 15 minutes debating internet strangers even if they want to). [Final note: IF your point is more along the lines of "we should understand the details of reasoning and motivations", absolutely; but I did not see that line of reasoning in your original post. My point is I see no moral distinction or superiority between "because religion" and "because I want to", and one should not be given more credence than the other -- which is not to deny that understanding the motivations in detail is a useful and positive effort]